Professor Mark P Denbeaux is an American attorney, professor, and author. He holds the position of Law Professor at Seton Hall University School of Law in Newark, New Jersey, and serves as the Director of its Center for Policy and Research. Denbeaux is renowned for his extensive work on the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, producing influential reports and testifying before Congress on the subject. He, along with his son Joshua Denbeaux, served as legal representatives for two Tunisian detainees at Guantanamo. Additionally, Denbeaux is the lead Civilian Military Commission Counsel for two individuals who were subjected to torture by the CIA in black sites before their detainment.
CJLPA: Welcome, Professor Mark Denbeaux. Thank you very much for taking the time to come and interview with The Cambridge Journal of Law, Politics, and Art. Today, we would like to concentrate this interview on your research on Guantanamo Bay. Can you briefly tell us why you became involved in legal work around Guantanamo Bay?
Mark Denbeaux: I have always been a civil rights lawyer. It started in Selma, Alabama, in 1965 and kept going. I represented Black Panthers, handled sex discrimination cases, and various other issues, including criminal defence work.
My son came to me—he is also a lawyer. Josh said to me, ‘Dad, what do you think of Guantanamo?’. I said I had not thought much about it. This was right after the Supreme Court decision came down, giving the right to some kind of legal representation in Guantanamo. And he said, ‘Well, do you think they have the right guys there?’ I said, ‘I am sure they have some of the right guys, and I am sure they got some of the wrong guys. And it is the normal thing: they can’t tell’.
He said, ‘Do you think Grandpa would have believed that Patton’s Third Army could distinguish the good Germans from the bad Germans?’ I said, ‘Absolutely not. Dad would not have thought Patton had a clue who the good Germans were from the bad Germans’. Then I said, ‘But Josh, Dad would not have cared either. Because he did not believe there were any good Germans’. (They had liberated two camps.) So Josh said, ‘Well, is not that the point?’
I thought about it a little bit, and then he and I agreed that we ought to try to represent a couple of people down there just to see if we could do what we normally do as lawyers: figure out what the cases are, who should be released, and who should not.
Josh got me into it. We joined a group of people who were talking about how to do it—other lawyers, and we went together. At those meetings, they, among other things, referred the names of people who wanted lawyers. They gave Josh and me two, they were two Tunisians. This goes back 20 years.
We were given them because the belief was that they were a father and son. Therefore, they thought it would be nice for a father and son to represent a father and son. Well, they were not father and son. They did not know each other. It was a class difference. There was a big difference in many ways. But we represented them.
Over the course of years, we got one out to Slovakia. It was about 2009. His name is Rafiq Al Hami. We went to Slovakia to see him. He was quite grumpy. It turns out he had been released to Slovakia, but he had been held in Slovakia in what was a former Soviet prison, which had been renovated so that it was not as harsh. There were sort of groups of people living together. They had quite a bit of freedom.
We went to see him, and he said, ‘You know, I can’t leave here for two years. They are teaching me Slovakian’. I said, ‘Well, that’s good’. He said, ‘Can you think of a language that is less useful in the world today than somebody who knows how to speak Slovakian?’ All I could think of was to say, ‘Well, now it opens you up to the whole world of Slovakian literature’.
He was not very impressed with that. He was grumpy and unhappy.
The truth is we had both Tunisians released and life was not good for either of them when they got out. Rafiq’s brother lawyer in Tunisia. So was his sister. He came from a fairly substantial social class.
My other client—Lotfi Bin Ali—was also a Tunisian. He was not healthy. He had rheumatic fever as a child, and he had a rheumatic heart. He left Tunisia when he was 19 to go to Italy, where he was illegal. He was hiding, living on the streets, hand to mouth, and doing various criminal activities, some for which he was captured and prosecuted. But he had surgery on his heart there that helped him. He always wanted to return to Italy to be a chef.
Both of them were taken through the various routes. Both of them were tortured in Kabul in the ‘Prison of Darkness’, which is a gross story I can share if you want. They slowly got released: Rafiq to Slovakia and then Lotfi to Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan was not a good place for Lotfi as access to healthcare could have been better. They were very hostile. He was also six foot eight. I did not realise at the time that Kazakhstan is basically an ethnically Chinese country. He could not find any clothes that would fit him. In the wintertime, he could not get winter clothes. He had a tough time. After a lot of work, we had him move to Mauritania, which was at least a Muslim country. Kazakhstan was only nominally Muslim. Mauritania was much better. He had a community there. Sadly, two weeks before he was about to be returned to Tunisia, he dropped dead of a heart attack. He was a very witty, funny man. My wife enjoyed talking to him, and we could use WhatsApp. He was enjoyable in conversations.
CJLPA: It means a lot that you built a bond with your clients during your representation of them: you know their story, you were moving forward with them, checking what was happening after they were released. I would encourage you to tell that story about the ‘Prison of Darkness’.
MD: I did bond with them. Most of the Guantanamo lawyers, if they stayed any length of time, we all bonded. There was nothing you could really do for your clients except, to some extent, be a human being and have a relationship with them, because they had no other relationships. They were in real isolation except for guards who were hostile to them. As years went by, we got closer and closer.
At the beginning, they were not friendly. In the beginning, Rafiq asked what I could do. I said, ‘Well, I’m a lawyer, and the Supreme Court says I can do various things for you’. He said, ‘How big is the Supreme Court’s army?’ Of course, I had to say, well, they do not have an army. He was not impressed, therefore, with the Supreme Court.
Over a period of time, I helped him just by keeping human contact. We could send him books to read, do various things, and develop some rapport.
I got a phone call about the ‘Prison of Darkness’. One of them was Human Rights Watch, who called me up and said, ‘You know, your client Rafiq was in the Prison of Darkness’. I said, ‘What is the Prison of Darkness?’ He said, ‘Oh, it is in Kabul, et cetera’. He did not describe it to me then. I said ‘Why are you telling me this?’ He said, ‘Well, we are trying to find out all the people who were held in the Prison of Darkness. We know he was there. We would like to know when he was there to fill in the gaps’. I said, ‘Okay, but I do not believe he was because he has never told me this. I have represented him for almost five years’. He said, ‘Believe me, he was there’.
Josh and I went down to talk to him. It was a fairly complicated time. He could have been more talkative. Finally, he came into the room.
See, one of the things that detainees can do is say ‘no’ to lawyers. It is one of the few things they can say ‘no’ to. So they say ‘your lawyer has come here from New York City. They are here. They would like to see you’, and they can say, ‘No, I am not going to do it’. And that would happen. That was very difficult. You could go down there and maybe have no visits. It is a long trip.
During the second part of our visits, he showed up. I was in another meeting with my other client—Lotfi Bin Ali—I came in late, and I walked in. My son said, ‘Dad, do not say a word, sit down, sit there and shut up’. I felt like he must have enjoyed that! He was no longer 17, so there must be something going on. Rafiq had said, ‘I will tell you everything I know about the Prison of Darkness until you ask a single question. As soon as you ask a question, I will not tell you anymore. I had not heard that statement. That is why Josh did not want me to start asking my questions.
The story Rafiq told was quite elaborate. First of all, we said, ‘Rafiq, why did you not tell us about this?’ He said, ‘Well, you did not ask’. I said, ‘Rafiq, I would not know to ask about a “Prison of Darkness” in Kabul’.
So he did tell us. Here is the story he told us the first time, and Lotfi confirmed it, because they were more or less overlapping in their time there.
The Prison of Darkness was in Kabul near the airport, sometimes called the ‘salt pit’. NPR found the location and described it, and they have shown it on television, but they described it in a less vivid way because it was already gone when they got there.
First, for some context, Rafiq’s story. Rafiq was from Tunisia and had gone to Germany, where he had been selling drugs, making money, and getting into problems. He had stashed a lot of money away. Finally, a group of people came to him and said, ‘Look, you are being a bad Muslim’. They made arrangements to send him to Pakistan, where he went. While he was in Pakistan, the US started bombing Afghanistan after 9/11. The Pakistanis did not want the Arabs there. So, he was pushed into Afghanistan and ended up in Kabul. When the US started bombing it, he had enough money to hire a guide to guide him through the mountains into Iran. As he said, that was not a great choice for a destination. He paid a certain amount of money to be taken there, and then his guide sold him to the Iranians for even more money.
He was held in five different Iranian prisons. I asked him about Guantanamo. He said, ‘Oh, there are many worse prisons. I have been in five war prisons in Iran’. I said, ‘Well, how did you get to Kabul?’ He said, ‘Well, what happened was the US wanted all of us who were captured to be given to them’. So Iran gave them—those many people who ended up in Guantanamo—over to Afghanistan, who then handed over them to the US. Officially, Iran was sent not intervening, but they were flown to Afghanistan by Iran.
He was brought in and put in the ‘Prison of Darkness’. You go in a big building. There is loud noise, very few windows, people shouting, music. They move you into another room. They get all your clothes, everything off there. That room is really like a hallway, it has a door into the hallway that gives some light. When you close the door, there is no light in the hallway. The door was open when he went in. They took his clothes off, and he was naked. They then closed the door and then took him through another door into a smaller room. While they took him in there, there was a bar going across, four feet up from the floor, in a five-foot-tall room, so you could not stand.
Once in the room, they were made to stand up with one hand, the other hand, or both hands locked to a pole, for an unknown amount of time, because there were no clocks, lights, or calendars. They were naked. They were quite upset that there was no way for any sanitation facilities. They would have to soil themselves. They stopped eating. They went through a very difficult time. Occasionally, they would be put against a wall with one hand in a ring just above their heads. They could sit and lean against it. Sometimes, they rotated their hands. He was here for about six weeks. About once or twice a week, he would be taken out of the room naked.
Rafiq described how he was taken into a room to be interrogated by a woman interrogator speaking fluent English, an American woman who was dressed, and he was standing there naked. It was incredibly difficult for all of them to be naked, even moreso in front of women.
He was at some point released and sent to the Bagram International Airport Prison. He was there when one of the detainees was killed. There is a documentary about it called Taxi to the Dark Side. He was brought as a witness, but he did not know anything.
I learned similar things from Lotfi Ben Ali. But the picture is the same. It is dark, cold, naked, no food, no ability to sit or stand for an unknown length of time.
CJLPA: How would you interpret the impact of international human rights laws and conventions on the legal framework governing the detention of individuals in Guantanamo Bay?
MD: Well, I am a law professor, so I would like to think that somehow the law mattered here. But it is not easy to see where the law mattered in any of this. Torture is illegal, no matter what the Department of Justice says. And they tortured: I have represented four people, all of whom were tortured. Two were held as high-value detainees, and all that means is the CIA wanted permission to torture them, not because they were important. Both of the clients I am talking about now—my Tunisians—were released. In theory, they were supposed to be free to go.
One of the things that I have been interested in is how basically benign these individuals were. The truth is, they were a mixture of people, some lost souls looking for something to do, some swept up at the wrong time in the wrong way. The clients I had, the government admits, never committed any hostile acts against the US or its allies, but they were captured for a variety of reasons.
Now, the real problem was America panicked. We were hysterical. We did not know what to do, so you reach out and think you have to do something. They grabbed people but did not even know who they had caught. One of our reports concluded that only 4% of the people held in Guantanamo were held because the United States caught them. Warlords, tribal chieftains, and local police in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other places turned over 96%. The US never even knew the evidence against people because they were just being handed over.
When it comes to torture and interrogation, there are three models of torture involved. The simple one is the American, the Western world’s view of interrogation, which is that the US police and the FBI bring people in and almost always talk to them. This is what is called ‘relationship building’ by the FBI. They will come in at a certain date and bring people in to talk to them. Those people know what crime has been committed and where. They have reasons to want to ask the person questions, and they have a pretty good focus on what they are trying to find. They are pretty good at it. Much as I would not admit it in court, they do not do a whole lot of physical abuse.
Then you have military intelligence, which is really designed only to find out what is over the next hill. They want to have no ambushes, and so on. That works.
Then we invented something that said, let’s find out who are bad people who do not like the United States. That is all they were looking for because they did not know what else to look for. All of these people brought into Guantanamo were brought in by people who did not have any evidence because there was not any.
It is important to note that of all the 773 people initially brought to Guantanamo, there are about 15 left. All the others have been released. And there has been no problem. The single biggest indictment of Guantanamo is the fact that whenever people were released, they went back. Rafiq, when he was released, ended up in Tunisia. He was married, had a couple of kids, and was running a used appliance store in Tunis. All of them did that.
So they had the wrong people in Guantanamo from the beginning. That made things difficult for everybody. The problem was the torture once 9/11 happened. We decided we needed to find out who the people who did not like us were and what they planned to do to hurt us. The CIA were the ones trying to be the inquisitors, but they were humiliated by having missed 9/11, and they were desperate to prove how good and clever they were. But their problem was how to get information out, and there were a lot of meetings in September and October about who they could target. The debate was between the FBI and the CIA. The question was: who was the target? How could they deal with it? They all wanted to torture.
The problem is that everybody would like to have a magic bullet that will make people tell the truth. Of course, nobody trusts anybody. They end up feeling like they have to coerce. The American model ended up saying: We have got to find some way to find out the truth. As I have pointed out, the ancient Chinese, the Romans, the Florentines, Russians have tried to do that. The Nazis have tried to do that. The one problem they have is that it is not hard to make people talk. Everybody will talk. Al-Qaeda’s rule was: if you are caught, they are going to make you talk. But they needed to feel like they were doing something magical, having missed the opportunity. A lot of this was driven by the CIA’s desperate desire to find a way to discover truths through a magic secret that no one else has ever been able to do. That was a big part of it.
CJLPA: If we start talking about the techniques of torturing, we should also mention Dr James Elmer Mitchell, who developed a list of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. What distinguishes Dr Mitchell as the significant figure behind the Guantanamo Bay torture regime? What specific role did medical professionals serve in this context?
MD: Those are a lot of very good questions. Let me start by saying that it is not the Guantanamo Bay torture. It is the torture program. Much of the torture was done before they got to Guantanamo. In fact, by the time people arrived in Guantanamo, the torture was virtually over.
Now, Guantanamo would like you to believe they never tortured there. They would like you to believe it was never, for any moment, a dark side. But they were tortured there. It was a dark side for a while, something that is never confirmed objectively, but all circumstantial evidence makes clear that was happening. It is clear Mitchell was in Guantanamo.
Let’s talk about Mitchell and the CIA. The problem is that Mitchell worked for the Air Force. He worked for a program helping retrieve downed pilots. He had set up a program called Survive-Evade-Resist-Escape. So they are supposed to survive, evade, and then try to resist and escape, and resistance is avoiding interrogation. Michell was running that.
The thing that Mitchell was doing was teaching Americans how to resist being interrogated. But he was in the Air Force. Let me stop to make one point clear. All of the Mitchell activities that are relevant to torture began the weekend Abu Zubaydah was captured. On 27 March 2000, the night before he was captured, the CIA had a meeting with PowerPoints and descriptions of what would happen, and their key role was that they would be the only people interrogating. They specifically did not want the military or the FBI doing it. That is kind of shocking because the FBI knew how to interrogate. Ironically, the CIA did not. The CIA is in foreign countries. You cannot catch somebody, take them to jail and ask questions. Generally, the CIA buys spies or uses electronic materials and rarely interrogates them. When they did, like in Vietnam, they did terrible things that were also pointless.
The CIA hired Mitchell on 4 April. It is remarkable: on 27 March, they did not want the Defense Department or the FBI involved. By 4 April, they hired a former DOD person who was in charge of helping people resist interrogations. The Deputy Director of the CIA at that time was asked why they did it. And he said, ‘Well, we were in unchartered waters. We needed help’. This is pretty staggering if you realise that three days earlier, they said, ‘We do not want any help from anybody’. Then they admit, four days later, that they did not know how to do it. It may have been the first and maybe the last truthful thing they said about this.
The techniques that he developed were reverse engineering of this air force program. Most of the torture program after Abu Zubaydah was captured was a bureaucratic fight between the FBI and the CIA, and not enough has been made of this. Zubaydah was the first person the CIA ever caught in this area of the world. They shot him, and he was almost dying. The FBI agents were there. They were the first people to interrogate him and talk to him, partly because they had some Arab-speaking agents, whereas Mitchell is anything but an Arab. The CIA began to box out the FBI over and over again, in a variety of ways. The FBI was only around when Zubaydah was seriously injured, and needed some attention from people he was more comfortable with. He was being interrogated in April after he was captured, but most of the month, he was very ill. Then, in May, there was some further interrogation. On 2 June, the FBI quit. They pulled out.
One of the reasons that Mitchell and Bruce Jessen developed their techniques was not because they knew they worked. Their techniques had two components: they had to be so harsh that the FBI agents could not use them. Because the FBI is regulated by domestic law in the United States and anywhere in the world, they needed techniques that were too horrific for the FBI to be able to use. Once they permitted those, the CIA could use them, and the FBI would not. So, this dispute between agencies is crucial here.
When the FBI pulled out on 2 June, Abu Zubaydah was never interviewed again by the CIA or the FBI until he was tortured in early August. He was put in isolation in June until 4 August. The justification for torturing him was that he was claimed to be aware of imminent attacks on the United States, and that they therefore needed to get the truth from him quickly. They got that permission on 4 August, but of course, two months had gone by when they never even asked him a question, so it is quite clear that the techniques were not designed to get information from him.
That is understandable because the FBI has reports of the interviews in April and May, where he did not know much. The CIA eventually had to admit, when the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence established certain facts, that Abu Zubaydah had never been in Al-Qaeda, never run an Al-Qaeda camp, committed no terrorist acts, and attacked no one. However, he was the first one they caught, and they needed permission to use these techniques. If they did not have permission from the Justice Department to use these techniques, there was a very good chance the FBI agents would report them for using these techniques, because they were crimes were under American law.
In late June and early July, the CIA was asking the Department of Justice to agree not to prosecute CIA agents for the acts they had already done, as well as the acts they were planning to do. The CIA, with Mitchell, worked out a series of techniques that nobody could be permitted to use without permission from the Department of Justice, and indeed, the FBI could not, so there could be no competitors. All they needed to do was convince people that these harsh techniques were very successful because they could get information out.
Based on that, they put together a series of lies in which they claimed they had found things from Abu Zubaydah. The Senate Select Committee of Intelligence, in its mammoth report of 556 executive pages, which cites Abu Zubaydah 1100 times, made it clear that the CIA got nothing the FBI had not already gotten. So before they sent him in to be tortured, they knew everything there was to know.
My students ask me the question: How can it be that people wanted to invent a torture system to torture somebody who they knew did not know anything? That question is the hardest question I ever have trying to publish our materials. It is understandable why anybody, and certainly Americans, would be so horrified to find out that they picked somebody who was not an Al-Qaeda terrorist and got permission to torture him, in order to get information that the torturers knew he didn’t have. And the answer was simple: they wanted permission to use these techniques on other people, and they wanted to be sure that they could not be prosecuted for the techniques they had used. That is how the torture program began. In this sense, it does not have a lot to do with Guantanamo. One of my discoveries going through research on Guantanamo was that terrible things were happening everywhere else in the world. Guantanamo could not be worse if you looked at it, but it turns out other places could be far worse.
CJLPA: How would you describe the psychological and emotional toll on the detainees held in Guantanamo Bay? You previously told us that they sometimes thought it was not the worst prison they had been in, but the conditions there were far from humane.
MD: We are talking about Guantanamo. As the world knows, Poland had to pay hundreds of thousands of euros because they allowed the US to torture people there. Lithuania is the same way: countries that the European Court of Human Rights did not cover.
So, first of all, the worst torture always happened outside of Guantanamo. The worst of the worst in Guantanamo were brought in September of 2006. All the harm had been done then, and they were badly tortured. I do not mean them just being held in isolation. They were chained and could not walk. I have never seen my clients take a step. I only see them chained to the floor when I go into a room. It is hard to measure how isolated it is.
The torture we described was horrific, but it was constant. For instance, they were held nude almost all the time in brightly lit, white rooms. They were nude with loud music and air conditioning, and it was cold. Intermittently, they would be sprayed with water. The Department of Justice approved none of these things. These were inventions of the young men, thinking they could find a magic secret.
People should look at the report, which includes not only 40 drawings by Abu Zubaydah but also his descriptions of each of them. The government probably wishes we had not been able to get them. But we did. It is the history of what torture was, not the history of the program that was approved, because here was no connection. There were three or four pictures in there when somebody had been drowning in wooden boxes, put underwater and held there. They could barely breathe, and would have to urinate on themselves.
They would have all sorts of things. There were threats of anal rape. The Department of Justice approved none of these things. These were just people out there trying to find some new gimmick, Mitchell and Jessen primarily. Of course, there were other people, but we do not know their names. So, Mitchell ran the whole thing. He has made at least $100 million for this project, and the CIA was happy to pay him so they could control who the interrogators were and what techniques could be used. Now, the CIA is stuck, having failed to get useful information.
America, for the first time, officially and formally created a torture program. It is very difficult to absorb. For 15 years, I have taught many students who do not believe it when they walk in. When they come out, they are shocked.
What is the effect on those tortured? Sleep—they do not sleep. Some have gastrointestinal problems, some have headaches, and some simply have anger issues. It would be hard to imagine the emotional and physical problems that they do not have. You cannot just do that to people for six years or more.
Imagine 35-year-old people having broomsticks shoved near their anus, making things like they are about to be raped and never knowing if it was going to happen or not, whilst being chained to the floor with women watching, spraying water on them all the time in cold rooms.
Mitchell’s trick was called ‘learned helplessness’, which psychologists are aware of as a technique. It’s not a rational technique in this context. He wanted to make them feel so helpless that they could not resist telling the truth. The problem was that they had already told their truths over and over again. They wanted to find more truths that did not exist. The ‘learned helplessness’ comes down to sleep deprivation. If you look at each of the torture techniques, where they are confined in a small box, where they are put in a little cage, where they are being sprayed with water, or people threatening anal rape or being banged against walls and hit—all of the things they did, they were done consecutively and constantly. For the first 17 days Abu Zubaydah was held after their permission to torture him, they constantly went through all of the techniques, one after the other. They did not stop and ask him questions that you would think they would do. They did not do that. They were just trying to break him, so they could get him in a state where it would be easy to get him to talk.
For 17 days, 24 hours a day, they were doing this to him. So even what they got out of him would have been incoherent and irrational, and all of them agree, they would easily have talked. None of them believed you could resist it. It is impossible. You cannot resist somebody hurting you in some way of that nature. So, how much harm did it cause? I would not want to mention it, but I cannot measure it. It is hideous. That is horrible.
CJLPA: What were the primary legal and practical issues faced by attorneys presenting detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and how did you overcome them?
MD: There were no legal challenges to talk about because there is no law in Guantanamo. They have a right to a habeas corpus lawyer, but people cannot win habeas corpus cases because even if you win your case, the government can still prevent your client from being released to another country. There is no victory possible. Everybody released from Guantanamo has been released through political issues, some human rights organisations, countries wanting their citizens back, various things like that.
So, I do not want a misunderstanding: nobody should believe the legal system helped get anybody out of Guantanamo. They may have helped them see lawyers, but the system did not do anything, the system as we understand it.
The problem is dealing with people who are so foreign to you. When I was going down there the first time, I remember telling somebody, ‘You know, when you put a bunch of guys together in a room, and they do not know each other, what do they talk about?’ My friend said, ‘Well, we talked about politics, sports, sex, and religion’. I said, ‘What else is there?’ Hell, I’m about to meet a fundamentalist Muslim, and I cannot sit there and talk to him about religion. I cannot tell him about politics. I do not think I am going to be talking to him about sex. Maybe it is sports, but I do not even know what sports they have. So we started not knowing anything, but it turned out they were like everybody else: they wanted to talk about sports, politics, religion, and sex. It is the same there. It is a universality that continues, but it was very hard to establish a relationship.
They did not think you could help them. And we could not. All we could end up doing was having a relationship with them. Slowly, with the State Department’s help, you could find somebody to get out little by little. But the legal system should not get any credit for getting anybody out or stopping torture.
CJLPA: How, if at all, did Guantanamo Bay impact the US legal system?
MD: I do not know if it has any effect on the legal system. The most useful things were probably human rights organisations trying to use political power. Lawyers, with some political power, were quite effective at getting people out. I would have said that an informal, low-key political conversation about it would do it; it would be very hard to see how the legal system did it.
I think one problem is that it has damaged a lot of lawyers’ belief in the system. I have come to conclude that every country if it panics and gets scared, does stupid, crazy, and occasionally mean things. America panicked and was scared, and after 9/11, did many horrible things, thinking it was a good idea. Panic, fear and hysteria do not bring out the best in people. Every country when they are cornered like that, will do that, and we did.
I do not know, but I do feel like, slowly, people are looking back, saying, ‘We sure do not want another Guantanamo’. This kind of thing will not happen. But, in the Second World War, we locked up Japanese people on the West Coast, and we said that would never happen again. There is always something that will never happen again because it is a pretty ugly world out there. People just keep working. The legal system works well when the world and the system itself are going well. When it gets all blown up, the legal system is no better at stopping this than anything else.
CJLPA: People largely do not talk about Guantanamo Bay anymore. How do we make American citizens understand history, to ensure that these tragic events remain in the past and do not get repeated?
MD: Well, we have been writing reports about Guantanamo and torture. They have got some attention. We have collected some data, people have been looking at them, and PhD dissertations are going through materials that have been collected. I think there are a whole lot of facts out there that people are paying attention to. I do not know if it is enough, but it is significant. All we can ever do is just try to get the truth out and help people learn. I do not think there is a silver bullet to keep America from doing terrible things if it is scared and attacked again, either. That is true of every country.
CJLPA: Many thanks.
This interview was conducted by Angelina Spilnyk, a graduate of the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Ukraine, in 2022 with a major in International Public Law. Alongside her position as a Legal Researcher at CJLPA, she is pursuing a Master’s in Maritime Law at the University of Southampton.