Preamble
‘Tunisia will remain a state that will fight for the oppressed (or stand with the oppressed) and prevail for the victims of any kind of racial discrimination and does not accept that there be a victim of any form of discrimination against human beings, either in Tunisia or anywhere in the world’.[1] Statement by the Presidency of the Republic, 5 March 2023
A picture of the mother ‘Fatie’ and her daughter ‘Marie’, dead on the Tunisian-Libyan border went viral on social media.[2] Their fate, however, was an expected outcome of the hatred campaign against migrants (re)ignited by the infamous speech of the Tunisian president Kais Saied in February 2023. Saied, who rose to power in 2019 from outside the political sphere, took advantage of popular anger, frustrations, and rupture with the post-uprising political elites and became president with a large lead over his rival.
‘What has happened in Tunisia is a real revolution using the tools of legitimacy’.[3] In his inaugural speech of 23 October 2019, this is how Saied described the ‘new revolution’ for which he was responsible. Less than two years later, Saied would enact another revolution: the self-coup of 25 July 2021. He activated the state of exception, dismissed the Chief of Government, and froze the then-newly elected parliament. These early measures were but the tip of the iceberg in Saied’s political project.
The project unfolded quickly as a unilateral political course based on hostility towards and stigmatization of political and civil elites, inciting the ‘masses’ against these groups and institutions. President Saied presented himself as the saviour of the people, committed to protecting them from political parties, the corrupt, and the conspirators. In August 2022, Saied enforced the adoption of a new Constitution which he himself had written. A few months later, in February 2023, he designated himself as the people’s protector from the imminent dangers of migrants’ presence in Tunisia and consequent threats of socio-demographic engineering, arguing that such a presence should be understood in the context of a conspiracy instilled at the beginning of the century by ‘evil forces’.
The February speech was an obvious green light from the head of the state to address migration as part of his populist project. It marked the start of new, more violent, and unprecedentedly blunt violations against Sub-Saharan refugees, asylum seekers, students, migrant workers, and their families: verbal and physical assaults, evictions from homes, bans on movement, expulsions to borders, random stops, and other forms of digital and invisible violence against migrants and even black Tunisians. An atmosphere of terror prevailed among migrants. Sub-Saharan African countries were forced to evacuate their citizens from Tunisia, while others remained stuck, unable to return to their conflict-torn countries or to stay in Tunisia in such an agitated landscape. The state claimed that that these arrests, housing bans, and expulsions to the border came in the context of law enforcement. They relied on legal texts drafted tens of years ago that are now in contradiction with several articles of the constitution and of international agreements and regional conventions.
This starting point raises a number of questions: What was the political context that paved the way for the development of an anti-migrant discourse? How has the situation of migrants in Tunisia evolved since February, and what violations have they been exposed to? And how has the European strategy of border externalization contributed to the repression of migrants in Tunisia?
I. Tunisia: A Political Context in Crisis
According to the dominant narrative, Tunisia has succeeded temporarily in its transition to democracy through the organization of elections and a smooth transition of power following the 2014 and 2019 elections, having slipped into neither armed conflict and armed struggle (as in Libya, Syria and Yemen), nor into the return of authoritarian forces to power under new covers (as in Egypt). The discourse of exceptionalism was later reinforced by the launch of a dialogue sponsored by national organizations that united political parties around a roadmap that included the formation of a technocratic government, the ratification of the new constitution, and the organization of the 2014 elections. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet was awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.
However, Tunisia’s was an ‘unfinished revolution’: the emerging political elites were unable to offer economic and social alternatives that meet the expectations of vulnerable groups, who saw in the revolution as an opportunity to remedy years of deprivation, marginalization, and poverty.[4] Throughout the early years of democratic transition, Tunisia found itself embroiled in internal conflicts between the forces of the religious right—with rising waves of Islamic radicalism—and civil and democratic forces. The Tunisian street was shaken by the political assassinations of two leaders of the democratic left, as well as terrorist attacks on security forces and tourist sites.
Tunisians headed to the 2019 legislative and presidential elections with a notable abstention rate. As Arbi argues, ‘electoral abstention shows hostility towards political elites incapable of change and who have treated social groups, especially young people, by refusing negotiation, ignoring, rejecting and marginalising them, adding to this society’s aversion to partisan rivalries’[5] and resulting in a punitive vote. Tunisia’s nascent democracy was undergoing a serious crisis, which led to the emergence of new political elites and the decline of traditional parties. By setting himself apart through his hostility to the political and civil elites and rupture with traditional electoral practices, Saied succeeded in winning the second round of the 2019 presidential election. He subsequently declared that ‘what has happened in Tunisia is a real revolution using the tools of legitimacy’,[6] and began to implement his hostility towards all political, civil, and social media in practice.
Saied took advantage of popular resentment against the fragile performance of the political elites and their involvement in parallel conflicts to continue targeting them in all his media appearances. The parliamentary scene, despite its electoral legitimacy, seems hardly representative of the reality and expectations of society. In January 2021, Tunisia experienced a social shock due to the state’s mismanagement of the health crisis resulting from the Covid epidemic, which deepened the feeling of contempt and marginalisation among large sections of the population, particularly young people. The state and its apparatuses met the popular uprising in popular neighbourhoods with a repressive response from the security forces.[7]
On 25 July 2021, Saied took advantage of popular protests mobilised on social networks to announce exceptional measures, based on Article 80 of the Constitution, removing the Prime Minister and freezing the work of Parliament, turning against the crippled democracy. He closed the headquarters of the Supreme Anti-Corruption Commission in August 2021 and issued Decree 117, according to which the President of the Republic alone had the power to legislate in all areas. This ranged from the organisation of the justice sector and the judiciary to the media, the press, political parties, trade unions, associations, and professional organisations and bodies, as well as their financing, from the organisation of internal security forces and border control to electoral law, human rights and freedoms, personal status, local government, and the budget. The Presidency has gone even further, overriding the general rule of constitutional supremacy by considering the presidential order as the highest value.[8]
Saied subsequently dissolved the elected Supreme Judicial Council and replaced it with a temporary one on 12 February 2022, thus changing the mechanism from election to appointment. In March 2022, he announced the definitive dissolution of Parliament, and in April 2022 the dissolution of the Independent High Authority for Elections, modifying its law, and indemnifying seven of its members. Since July 2021, dozens of political and civil figures have been arrested on political charges, the most important of which is conspiracy against state security, intended to alter its structure. On 13 September, the President of the Republic issued Decree 54 of 2022 regarding the fight against crimes related to information and communication systems, according to which dozens of journalists and activists have been tried since its launch.
On the other hand, the President of the Republic launched a unilateral course that culminated in a referendum on a new constitution on 25 July 2022, which saw low turnout and aroused the ire of political and civil forces. This was followed by legislative elections on 17 December 2022, with a turnout of no more than 11%. Saied has been pursuing his project with determination ever since he took total control of the government and all the authorities, adopting a fiery rhetoric against all the political, civil, and economic elites. To achieve this, he has taken a path in which he has dismantled institutions considered as minor gains of the revolution. He reinforces himself with unlimited powers and security and military institutions, which he exaggerates at every opportunity in their praise, and among whom he has summoned personalities who occupy ministerial and advanced positions in the state.
II. Irregular Migration Dynamics in the Region
Migration dynamics in the Mediterranean experienced significant changes after the 2015 crisis, which brought remarkable inflows and subsequent measures to limit arrivals. Since 2016, irregular movement operations have begun to decline across the eastern Mediterranean, from 835,386 migrants in 2015 to 182,277 migrants in 2016 following an agreement with Turkey, before reaching the lowest level of 19,681 migrants in 2020. Meanwhile, the Central Mediterranean route is emerging, mainly starting from the Libyan coast, where the number of arrivals reached 153,946 immigrants in 2015 and peaked at 181,376 immigrants in 2016. Then the number gradually decreased, before going back up again in 2021.[9]
These figures reveal major changes in the Central Mediterranean Basin, where departure operations are mainly based off the Tunisian coast. This is due to the danger posed by the land route for migrants leaving sub-Saharan African countries once they arrive in southern Libya, where the violations to which they are exposed on land and at sea are intensified through detention, torture, and forced displacement back to sea. Since 2016, the European Union has gradually abandoned its core responsibilities of search and rescue off the Libyan coast, where thousands of migrants have been killed, and has instead provided money, ships, training, and air support to armed groups in Libya to prevent the arrival of migrants. Attempts to cross from Libya have become a terrifying adventure for those dreaming of crossing to the northern shore. The UN Fact-Finding Mission in Libya has announced that it has reasonable grounds to believe that a wide range of war crimes and other crimes against humanity have been committed, including sexual crimes against migrants.[10]
On the other hand, the western rout (Morocco and the Canary Islands), recording its highest numbers in 2018 with the arrival of 57,034 migrants, has shown a decline, reinforced by the Hispano-Moroccan rapprochement upon the reconciliation over the ‘Western Sahara’ issue and Morocco’s commitment to strengthening coastal control.[11] Consequently, migrants began to opt for safer places to depart. Tunisia’s geographical proximity to Europe is an incentive to explore as a route as the Italian island of Lampedusa is only 130 km from the Tunisian coast, compared to 290 km from the Libyan coast.
Attempts to explore the route through Tunisia began in late 2020 with the arrival of a small number of migrants across the Algerian border, mainly of Guinean and Malian nationality. Arrivals’ flow via the Algerian border evolved gradually, accompanied by tragic events such as the death of two women and four children from thirst in the Douz desert in the summer of 2021, and the discovery of the bodies of four migrants who died of cold and thirst in March 2022 in the governorate of Kasserine, near the border with Algeria. The number of arrivals then increased, reaching 2310 via Algerian borders in February 2023, and 998 asylum seekers via the Libyan ones.[12]
The crossings of sub-Saharan migrants to Europe from the Tunisian coast did not attract attention because they were infrequent, since migrants of non-Tunisian nationalities who were thwarted before leaving Tunisia accounted for only 9% in 2017.[13] This percentage rose to 33% in 2019.[14] In 2022, the rate of sub-Saharan migrants intercepted in Tunisia reached 61.76%. In the first nine months of 2023, this figure rose to 82.24%.
These quantitative data monitoring the transformation of migratory routes in the Mediterranean have prompted the Tunisian authorities to act swiftly to stop the movement of migrants through Tunisia. The manifestations of this shift have given further justification to the escalation of rhetoric arousing fear of migrants. This is what Tunisian officials rely on to reiterate the idea that Tunisia will be neither a stable nor a transit country for migrants.
III. February 2023, ‘The Big Transformation’
Usually, the National Security Council meets when convened by the President of the Republic, who sets the agenda, at least once every three months and whenever necessary—when an imminent danger threatens the national entity, security, or independence of the country, or when it is exposed to crises.[15] The meeting on 21 February was a one-off, held with the aim of ‘confronting the migrants’ danger’. During the meeting, Saied argued that the situation was not normal, suggesting that there was a criminal arrangement at play, which had aimed since the beginning of this century to change the demographic composition of Tunisia. He also suggested that certain parties had received huge sums of money after 2011 to enact this plan and settle irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Tunisia, implying that these successive waves of irregular migration had the undeclared aim of making Tunisia a solely African country, with no affiliation to Arab or Islamic nations.[16]
The Presidency’s statement was preceded by a security campaign entitled ‘Strengthening the security network and reducing the phenomenon of irregular residence in Tunisia’, targeting migrants from sub-Saharan Africa,[17] which resulted in the arrest of dozens of migrants. The press release was based on a report published by the Tunisian Nationalist Party entitled ‘Report on the Negro colonisation project and the dismantling of Tunisia’[18] and on a number of misleading facts that accompanied the campaigns on social media platforms. This party has played a key role in stirring up anti-migrant sentiment and racist rhetoric in Tunisia.
The Tunisian Nationalist Party was founded in December 2018 and organises its priorities around four focal points: linking insecurity to the presence of migrants; suggesting that their presence on Tunisian territory threatens the country’s identity and aims to destroy it; demonising human rights organisations and accusing them of imposing their visions of migration policies on governments; and the so-called ‘national priority’, according to which employment priority should be given to Tunisians.[19]
The Party led the security campaign mentioned above online and on the ground against migrants in Tunisia. The 21 February statement crowned this campaign and ushered in a new course of violations that affected all categories of migrants. State agencies recalled obsolete texts and laws which have long been the focus of criticism from human rights defenders and led campaigns targeting migrants. The General Labour Inspectorate, a supervisory body affiliated with the Ministry of Social Affairs, has called for the immediate suspension of all irregular migrant workers, and has threatened to punish anyone who contravenes this measure.[20] The judicial authorities also threatened to punish anyone renting accommodation to irregular migrants. Security forces continued their operations to track down migrants, stepping up surveillance operations in all public spaces. Hypothetical discriminatory rhetoric turned into hysterical field campaigns aimed at expelling migrants from their jobs and places of residence.
Calls for help were frequent, signalling evictions from houses, dismissals from jobs, and physical and verbal attacks. For fear of attacks, migrants—especially students and workers—were forced to stay at home. Civil society organisations and individual citizens have set up crisis cells to assist and intervene urgently to assist the injured or provide medical care and food. The Tunisian Association of Young Doctors communicated emergency numbers to facilitate contact with injured migrants or those in need of care.[21]
The President of the Republic’s racist speech in February 2023, in which he characterized the presence of migrants in Tunisia as a criminal scheme aimed at changing the demographic composition of the country, sparked many reactions. The African Union condemned Saied’s stance on migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and called on its member states to ‘refrain from any racist hate speech likely to harm people’.[22] The Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in turn responded that it was surprised by the African Union’s statement, rejecting what it called ‘unfounded accusations’, and claiming that the statement was based on a misunderstanding of the positions of the Tunisian authorities.[23] Guinea sent its Foreign Minister specifically to repatriate its nationals, the Ivory Coast and Mali did the same, and many African countries summoned their Tunisian ambassadors to express their displeasure at the President’s violent rhetoric and to demand further explanations.
In his annual report, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, criticised ‘the racist rhetoric targeting migrants, most of whom are from sub-Saharan Africa’.[24] The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has urged Tunisia’s highest authorities to condemn and distance themselves from racist hate speech delivered by politicians and public / nongovernmental figures.[25] As for the World Bank, it called—in an internal note—for the suspension of the partnership framework with Tunisia. It then postponed its board meeting, scheduled for 21 March, to consider a new strategic agreement with Tunisia until further notice.[26] Amnesty International announced that the President’s comments had contributed to an increase in racist violence against black people.[27] On the other hand, the far-right extremist who ran in the French presidential elections, Éric Zemmour, was quick to hail Saied’s speech as a role model and congratulate him on his work.[28]
On the national level, Tunisian civil society organisations considered Saied’s speech to be unprecedentedly racist and fascist, and called for demonstrations in the streets of the capital Tunis on 25 February 2023.[29] At the same time, pages and accounts on social networks adopted the position of the Presidency of the Republic and launched intimidation campaigns against migrants, portrayed as a threat to national security, as well as an economic, social, and sanitary threat. All migrants, regardless of their administrative status, and all those who support them, including organisations, associations and even black Tunisian citizens, have not been spared by the climate of terror that followed the February quake.
Under pressure, Saied tried to remedy the situation by making media appearances to justify his positions and describing as traitors all those who denounced them.[30] During his visit to the governorate of Sfax on 10 June 2023, a region where many sub-Saharan migrants gather, President Saied gave a speech using ‘yes…but’ phrases more than thirteen times. The following are the most striking excerpts, bearing witness to this rhetorical strategy, which constructs a humanist and humanitarian description of the migration phenomenon, but then cancels it out under the pretext of ‘maintaining order’:
The solution can only be humanitarian and collective, based on humanitarian standards, ‘but’ in accordance with the legislation of the state.
We are Africans, they are our brothers and we respect them, ‘but’ this situation that Tunisia is experiencing and has never experienced is an abnormal situation and we must put an end to these inhuman conditions.
They are victims of poverty, civil wars and the absence of the state, and they turn to Tunisia as a refuge. ‘But’ we are also a state that has its own laws and respects the law and human beings. ‘But’ everyone must respect the laws and sovereignty of the Tunisian state.
The solution must not be at the expense of the Tunisian state. We naturally preserve and protect these people and don’t let those who attack them walk away, ‘but’ they must also respect Tunisian laws.
We will not accept any attack against them, and we will protect them, ‘but’ they must be under legal conditions.[31]
In most of his media outings, Saied continued to attack all those who expressed a position against the decisions of the National Security Council, and with every reference to the issue of irregular migration, he reiterated:
The humane treatment these migrants receive stems from our values and character, contrary to what is promoted by colonial circles and their agents whose only concern is to serve these circles, and nothing is more obvious than that their positions are the same as those of the frenzied trumpeters abroad who are paving the way for a new type of colonisation, falsifying facts and spreading lies.[32]
The Tunisian state used laws, agencies, and rhetoric to defend its policies, but Saied’s speech in February 2023 marked a sea change in that direction. The authorities stuck to their strategies and continued to use this both internally in the internal political conflict between Saied and his opponents and externally in persuading the European Union to sign a memorandum of understanding, despite the pressure that was evident in the dissatisfaction of Tunisian civil society and the responses of sub-Saharan nations and international organizations.
IV. ‘Sovereign’ Violence
Migrants—from sub-Saharan Africa in particular—in Tunisia have been the victims of sporadic racist attacks for years. But the situation has worsened since the February speech. As Amnesty International summarized:
President Saied’s remarks at the National Security Council meeting on 21 February, characterised by unfair discrimination and hatred, have provoked an increase in racist violence against blacks. Groups of people took to the streets and attacked black migrants, students and asylum seekers. Police arrested dozens of migrants and deported them.[33]
Social media platforms exploded after the President’s speech demanding that migrants be expelled from their jobs and places of residence, and that they represent a real danger to Tunisians. Various accounts posted videos and photos documenting the forced expulsion of migrants from their homes, and their belongings being set on fire. Civil society organisations received dozens of distress calls from migrants who had been attacked and were unable to reach hospitals, especially as they do not trust the police to deal with their calls and complaints. Human Rights Watch said that between 24 February and 3 March, it
interviewed 16 citizens from West and Central African countries residing in Tunisia and documented their tales of the violence, robberies, and assaults they faced after the president’s speech. The 16 interviewees are distributed as follows: seven workers, including six undocumented workers and one legal resident, five students and four asylum seekers registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.[34]
The February speech did not mark the end of the crisis, but rather its development in the wake of the murder of a young Tunisian by migrants following a conflict that culminated in a campaign to expel migrants from the city of Sfax. The Tunisian authorities have used this situation as a pretext to carry out a campaign of successive arrests, followed by forced and illegal expulsions under threat, with the aim of ‘purging’ the town of anyone from sub-Saharan Africa by transferring them from the centre and delegations of the Sfax governorate to unknown destinations.
Video clips posted on social networks also revealed the arrival of a large number of buses carrying migrants, both men and women, from Sfax towards the Tunisian-Libyan border, with the intention of evacuating them to deserted areas, in temperatures of up to 50 degrees Celsius, in poor conditions and without any help or resources.[35] The National Guard and army expelled or forcibly transferred up to 1,200 people in several groups to the borders with Libya and Algeria.[36] Data from the National Institution for Human Rights in Libya has confirmed the transfer of migrants to the border by the Tunisian authorities in order to evade their moral, legal, and humanitarian responsibilities towards these migrants and asylum seekers on its territory and dump them in Libya.[37] This has led to the disappearance of dozens of people and deaths from thirst in the desert, as in the case of the migrant Fatie and her daughter Marie.[38] The Tunisian authorities have also transferred dozens of migrants to the Algerian border in an area of the Tozeur governorate known as ‘Wadi Al-Mghatta’, a place with no shade or grass, no water, no electricity, no Internet, and no means of communication, full of insects and far from hospitals and vital infrastructures.[39]
The Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights has documented the harsh human and climatic conditions, where ‘through hot weather, thirst and hunger, the migrants have no roof to shelter them from the heat o nor mattresses to sleep on, they are scattered here and there along the valley, seeking shade under the palm trees and rocks of the mountains’.[40] The Forum stressed that ‘approving the deposition of migrants at borders, in the desert, in mountains and valleys, and isolating them from cities, neighbourhoods and commodities, is a racist political move’.[41] Other migrants have also been expelled to other border provinces with Algeria under open sky, in order to force them to enter Algeria. Living conditions in border areas and delays in receiving humanitarian aid can constitute acts of torture within the meaning of the United Nations Convention Against Torture. The lack of water, food, medical assistance, and shelter in a desert where temperatures can reach over 45 degrees Celsius has caused severe pain and suffering, both physically and mentally, to women and children forcibly detained in the buffer zones.[42] Tunisian organisations urgently called for an end to mass expulsions and humiliating treatment of migrants, and for respect of their dignity and rights, regardless of their administrative status, yet in vain.[43] This was accompanied by evacuations by African countries of their nationals, while others were forced to flee by sea in rickety boats, a situation exploited by migrant smuggling networks. The result was a humanitarian crisis that left over 1,300 people dead or missing on the Tunisian coast.[44] The campaigns of violence did not spare women, as the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women announced that it had documented a case of rape.
The violence affected refugees, asylum seekers, students, and migrant workers, in various forms, as described below.
Institutional violence: State institutions and agencies took it upon themselves to discriminate against migrants under the pretext of enforcing the law. Police forces led a campaign to arrest migrants under the pretext of illegal residence. Police officers spread out to check documents and raid neighbourhoods inhabited by a majority of migrants. Dozens of arbitrary arrests were made, with no legal support. The General Labour Inspectorate prohibited all employers from hiring migrant workers without residence documents. Judicial authorities also threatened heavy penalties against anyone renting accommodation to ‘illegal’ migrants, while the Presidency continued to publish repeated statements linking migrants to violence and crime. The Tunisian authorities adopted expulsion to the border as a systematic policy to remove migrants from the Sfax region, in difficult climatic conditions, where temperatures during the summer period exceeded 40 degrees. It continued to rely on this policy for all migrants intercepted at sea, in order to punish all those who dared to attempt to leave by sea.
Digital violence or cyber-violence: Virtual space was invaded by images, texts, and video clips of hatred towards migrants demanding their immediate expulsion. Fake news and misleading images and videos were used. ‘Falso’, a digital research platform that works to monitor the quality of content on the Internet in Tunisia, observed several misleading pieces of information used during the campaign and documented them in a report published on 28 February 2023.[45]
Physical violence: This includes threats and physical actions to which migrants have been exposed, such as beatings and mutilation. It also includes forced eviction from homes and workplaces, and the destruction of migrants’ belongings. Dozens of injured people were unable to reach hospitals due to fear and panic. A house in the Sfax region inhabited by sub-Saharan migrants was also attacked by a group of young men on the night of 20-21 May 2023, resulting in the death of one migrant and serious injuries to four others.[46]
Verbal violence: Such violence is well known to migrants but it occurred more intensely after the February 2023 speech—particularly in public spaces, migrant workplaces, and accommodation. Even some black Tunisians were not spared.
Economic violence: The crisis exacerbated the economic violations to which migrants were exposed, as they were subjected to expulsion from their jobs, confiscation of their documents, and seizure of their remaining wages. Some employers took advantage of the situation to impose free labour in exchange for protection.
Sexual violence: Women’s rights organisations documented cases of sexual assault and harassment of migrant women.
Violence against children: Children were exposed to numerous violations due to the deprivation of health and medical services and the inability to access food, in addition to the conditions that accompanied expulsions to the borders, including high temperatures and lack of water.
V. Memorandum of Understanding between Tunisia and the European Union: Fortresses in the North and South
While hundreds of migrants were suffering in the desert and at the borders in harsh climatic conditions, dozens more were dying at sea in rapidly sinking steel boats, and Tunisia’s fragile space of free speech was being restricted following arrests that targeted political leaders, journalists, activists, and all those who expressed opposition stances, European leaders chose to come to Tunisia on Sunday 16 July 2023 to sign a memorandum of understanding on a strategic and comprehensive partnership.[47]
Characterising the negotiation phase was the absence of any information, particularly on the Tunisian side, which provided no feedback on the discussions, and the absence of any political or societal debate on the Tunisian vision of the negotiations. The memorandum of understanding included a general introduction and certain fundamental axes of varying importance: macroeconomics, economy, trade, green energy transition, rapprochement between peoples, migration, and mobility. With regard to the last axis, the most important in view of its scope and urgency, the memorandum referred in particular to the common desire of both parties to develop a global approach to migration, and also to develop regular immigration routes.
The memorandum confirms that Tunisia has renewed its position of refusing to be a country of resettlement for irregular migrants and to limit itself to the surveillance of its own borders, a clause frequently repeated in the speech of the President of the Republic. It underlined the European Union’s commitment in this context to providing additional support to Tunisia to acquire the equipment, training, and technical support needed to improve the protection of its borders. The two parties are also committed to enabling irregular migrants in Tunisia to return to their countries of origin, while respecting their dignity and complying with international law.
Clearly, the document signed does not constitute a full partnership aimed at the circulation or concerted management of migration with Tunisia, but rather a partnership focused on the ‘fight’ against irregular migration which, in the words of Mahdi Mabrouk, a sociology professor, ‘treats the symptoms and does not provide a solution to any problem’.[48] Amnesty International commented: ‘What is most worrying is that this agreement was reached without imposing any human rights conditions, without assessing or monitoring its effects on human rights, and without any mechanism for suspending cooperation in the event of violations’.[49] The risks inherent to the agreement can be identified as follows:
The growing violence against migrants in Tunisia and the criminalisation of solidarity: The signing of the memorandum was followed by further brutal attacks on migrants, who were expelled from the city of Sfax to the olive groves. The Tunisian authorities have also stepped-up mass expulsions to Tunisia’s borders, in places that are difficult to access, threatening to prosecute anyone who tries to help and criminalising solidarity. All those who provide help are accused of being part of migrant smuggling networks. Civil organisations see the agreement as an endorsement of violence against migrants by the European Union,[50] which encourages the adoption of ‘security measures’[51] and the use of forced repulsion operations at sea, where naval guards force fleeing iron boats to stop firmly through dangerous manoeuvres, attempts to ram engines, and the use of gas and sticks at sea.
The memorandum indirectly legitimises the use of whatever means the Tunisian side deems appropriate to stop the arrival of immigrants in the Schengen area. The state’s policies have not only created a hostile environment towards migrants, but aim to ‘dissuade citizens, men and women, from expressing solidarity with and helping refugees and migrants by threatening to use the 2004 law, exercising psychological harassment and withholding the papers of anyone providing assistance to migrants. Uniformed and plain-clothed police deliberately restrict solidarity with refugees and asylum-seekers’.[52]
The imposition of inadequate socio-economic reforms: The memorandum of understanding is part of a drive to promote so-called reforms aimed at facilitating Tunisia’s access to a new line of financing from the International Monetary Fund. These reforms are not agreed and are considered by trade unions and civil society to be of high cost to vulnerable groups, contributing to cuts in public spending on basic services and reducing the number of employees, freezing retirement benefits, and reducing the development budget, thus widening poverty, inequality, and unemployment.
Legitimising Tunisia’s status as a safe country: A country is defined as ‘safe’ if it enjoys a political and democratic system free from persecution, arbitrary violence, and armed conflict, and is able to protect its nationals from unlawful prosecution, as required by effective and active judicial and administrative laws to protect the people. This hardly applies to Tunisia in its current context, where political life and democracy have declined significantly, rights and freedoms are restricted, opponents, journalists and activists are subjected to trials for their opinions, and many are forced to leave their country for fear of persecution. The memorandum of understanding helps to encourage European Union countries to classify Tunisia as a reliable partner and a safe country, thus facilitating the automatic rejection of asylum applications submitted by Tunisians within the Schengen area.
Tightening visa procedures: The European Union wants Tunisia to open up further to Europe in terms of the movement of goods, services, and capital, but not in terms of the free movement of people. The memorandum therefore supports the intensification of control at European borders, determining who and what is allowed to cross them: alleged promises to facilitate entry and others to ease visa procedures under the slogan of ‘talent partnership’. These are nothing but false promises, as visa procedures are still extremely complicated for Tunisians wishing to travel to Europe, and instead widen the gap in social inequality and perpetuate inequalities between social classes in Tunisia (a small, economically fortunate group enjoys the right of movement, while excluded economically and socially marginalised groups do not).
Forced mass deportations under the cover of readmission: To achieve their goal of expelling migrants from Tunisia under the name of ‘voluntary return’, the Tunisian authorities intend to create a repugnant environment for migrants so that the only solution for them to survive is to agree to return, even if this also puts their lives in danger. The authorities have gradually created this environment through arbitrary arrests under the pretext of irregular residence, work bans under the pretext of applying the labour code, and bans on movement, by giving verbal instructions to public and private transport companies to prohibit the transport of migrants.
Anyone failing to comply with these instructions will be subject to traffic restrictions and fines. This forced hundreds of migrants to travel long distances on foot, or to surrender to the blackmail of some individuals seeking to make the most of the situation and accumulate wealth. The policy was a success, and the International Organization for Migration organised trips to Guinea, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast. These trips were made possible by European and British funding. At the end of a meeting between the heads of the Italian and British governments, the British Prime Minister declared that they ‘have committed to help fund a project to promote and assist the voluntary return of migrants from Tunisia to their country of origin’.[53]
The return of migrants requires bilateral agreements and logistical procedures that the European Union is committed to fund, which could in the future mean the construction of detention centres for migrants prior to the deportation process. Voluntary repatriation also applies to irregular Tunisian immigrants in Europe, as Tunisia has pledged further cooperation despite criticism. The European Court condemned the Italian government in a 31 March ruling in a case involving four Tunisian immigrants on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular article 3 of the Convention relating to Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, article 5 relating to the right to liberty and security and article four relating to mass forced deportations.[54]
In view of the above, it cannot be said that this memorandum will benefit Tunisia and the state of rights and freedoms to which the Tunisian people aspire, especially in the short term. Rather, it has been designed to serve the interests of European governments at the expense of the rights and dignity of Tunisian citizens and migrants in Tunisia and has been implemented in response to a crisis in receiving immigrants to Europe. The memorandum does not allow for mutual and equal freedom and dignity for the inhabitants of the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, and instead contributes to feed feelings of hatred and racism towards migrants in Tunisia.
Conclusion
Democracy is based on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of association, access and exercise of power under the rule of law, the holding of elections, freedom of political action, separation of powers, independence of courts, transparency, accountability, and media freedom. These conditions have been gradually disappearing in Tunisia since the advent of Saied’s rise to power as a result of a crisis in representative democracy since 25 July 2021.
Saied presented himself as the embodiment of the people’s desire for ‘sovereignty’. He used his populism as a weapon to confront his opponents, and even to create opponents for the people. After having consumed the discourse on corrupt elites, parties, organisations, and media, Saied presented his people with the ‘migrants’ as a new threat and adversary who supposedly wanted to alter Tunisia’s demographic composition and were to blame for its economic and social crisis. He has exercised his ‘sovereignty’ over vulnerable migrants. Expelling migrants to the borders, forcing them back out to sea, and preventing them from working, finding housing, and moving—under the pretext of an irregular administrative situation—has become the norm. This sovereignty has no objection to statements by Italian officials about imposing a naval blockade to prevent the arrival of migrants, nor to the French President’s proposal to send security personnel to help Tunisia, nor to agreements that fail to respect the rights and dignity of migrants. It is a sovereignty that ‘neither sees nor hears’ about the hundreds of corpses dumped on Tunisian beaches and struggles to ensure a decent burial for migrants’ bodies. It is a sovereignty that does not provide answers for the families of people who go missing during irregular migration. Saied’s ‘sovereignty’ was nourished by what remained of the dignity of people fleeing war, conflict, climate change, poverty, and harsh economic conditions.
Despite this violent climate against migrants, civic solidarity campaigns for them are growing and finding a base even among local communities who are also suffering because of the economic and social situation. Yet the future holds little signs of hope or a path to survival for migrants and refugees stranded in Tunisia. Indeed, developments in the countries of Central and West Africa and the war in Sudan could be the sign of more people fleeing and dreaming that Tunisia’s shores will be a door of escape. Europe could succeed in reinforcing the walls of its fortress by striving to circulate the memorandum of understanding with the rest of the southern Mediterranean countries and further militarising the Mediterranean Sea to prevent the arrival of migrants at all costs. The ‘sovereignty’ of Kais Saied may give him the opportunity to be re-elected, but the human and civilizational cost has been high, and Tunisians must fight fiercely to defend their ignoble democratic dream and erase the ‘shame’ of the February 2023 speech.
Romdhane Ben Amor
Romdhane Ben Amor is a human rights advocate who was an Internet activist prior to the Tunisian revolution and one of the bloggers who covered the 2008 mining basin events in Tunisia. He joined the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights FTDES organisation after the revolution and developed an interest in the dynamics of irregular migration as well as social mobility in Tunisia. He was a member of the World Social Forum’s organising committee, which met twice in Tunisia in 2013 and 2015. Currently, he is pursuing a Master of Research in Demography at the University of Human and Social Sciences of Tunis.
This article was written in January 2024.
[1] Statement by the Presidency (Republic of Tunisia Ministry of Social Affairs, 5 March 2023) <https://www.social.gov.tn/en/statement> accessed 22 January 2024.
[2] Photo published by Libyan journalist Ahmed Khalifa (Twitter, 19 July 2023) <https://twitter.com/ahmad_khalifa78/status/1681672974246584321> accessed 22 January 2024.
[3]l ‘موكب أداء القسم وكلمة رئيس الجمهورية المنتخب قيس سعيد’ (Facebook, 23 October 2019) <https://www.facebook.com/Presidence.tn/videos/914211068964108/> accessed 22 January 2024.
[4] ‘The unfinished revolution : bringing opportunity, good jobs and greater wealth to all Tunisians’ (The World Bank, 24 May 2014) <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/658461468312323813/the-unfinished-revolution-bringing-opportunity-good-jobs-and-greater-wealth-to-all-tunisians> accessed 22 January 2024.
[5] H Arbi, ‘Annual report on the 2019+ social protests’ 4 <https://ftdes.net/rapports/mvtssociaux2019> accessed 1 May 2024.
[6] Facebook (n 3)
[7] ‘Lettre Ouverte au: Rapporteur spécial sur les droits à la liberté de réunion pacifique et à la liberté d’association la Rapporteuse spéciale des Nations Unies sur la liberté d’opinion et d’expression’ [‘Open Letter to: Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression’] (FTDES, 25 March 2021) <https://ftdes.net/lettre-ouverte-au-rapporteur-special-sur-les-droits-a-la-liberte-de-reunion-pacifique-et-a-la-liberte-dassociation-la-rapporteuse-speciale-des-nations-unies-sur-la-liberte-dopinion-et-dexpress/> accessed 23 January 2024.
[8] ‘Joint Statement: Tunisia: Unprecedented Confiscation of Power by the Presidency’ (Human Rights Watch, 27 September 2021) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/27/joint-statement-tunisia-unprecedented-confiscation-power-presidency> accessed 23 January 2024.
[9] ‘Flux migratoires: les routes orientale, centrale et occidentale’ (Council of the European Union) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/infographics/migration-flows-to-europe/> accessed 23 January 2024.
[10] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya’ (OHCHR, 22 June 2020) <https://www.ohchr.org/ar/hr-bodies/hrc/libya/index> accessed 23 January 2024.
[11] ‘Infographic—Irregular arrivals to the EU (2008-2023)’ (Council of the European Union) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/infographics/irregular-arrivals-since-2008/> accessed 23 January 2024.
[12] ‘Tunisia Operational Map—Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ (UNHCR, March 2023) <https://reporting.unhcr.org/tunisia-operational-map> accessed 23 January 2024.
[13] ‘Annual Report Non-regulated Emigration from Tunisia 2017’ (FTDES, 8 March 2018) <https://ftdes.net/emigration2017/> accessed 23 January 2024.
[14] ‘Annual report: Non-regulated migration in Tunisia 2019’ (FTDES, 3 July 2020) <https://ftdes.net/ar/rapport-annuel-migration-non-reglementaire-en-tunisie-2019/> accessed 23 January 2024.
[15] Government Order No 70, 19 January 2017 on the National Security Council.
[16] Statement by the Presidency of the Republic, 21 February 2023; Lilia Blaise, ‘Tunisia’s President Kais Saied claims sub-Saharan migrants threaten country’s identity’ Le Monde (Paris, 23 February 2023) <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/02/23/in-tunisia-president-kais-saied-claims-sub-saharan-migrants-threaten-country-s-identity_6016898_124.html> accessed 23 January 2024.
[17] ‘Arbitrary arrests and hate campaigns against migrants of sub-Saharan origin in Tunisia’ (FTDES, 16 February 2023) <https://ftdes.net/ar/arbitrary-arrests-and-hate-campaigns-against-migrants-of-sub-Saharan-origin-in-tunisia/> accessed 23 January 2024.
[18]l ‘تقرير مشروع الإستيطان الأجصي و إزالة تونس من الوجو’ (Tunisian National Party, 3 February 2023) <https://bit.ly/4fJsbhy> accessed 23 January 2024.
[19] Najla Ben Salah, ‘الحزب القومي التونسي: العنصرية الزاحفة بمباركة الدولة’ (Nawaat, 14 February 2023)
<https://nawaat.org/2023/01/26/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b2%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d9%88%d9%85%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%88%d9%86%d8%b3%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d9%86%d8%b5%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%ad%d9%81/> accessed 23 January 2024.
[20]l ‘بلاغ جهاز تفقديّة الشّغل بكامل ولايات الجمهورية يواصل القيام بحملات مراقبة مكثّفة لتشغيل’ <https://www.social.gov.tn/index.php/ar/%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%91%D8%BA%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AB%D9%91%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%91%D8%A7%D9%84> accessed 24 January 2024.
[21] Organisation Tunisienne des Jeunes Médecins (Facebook, 23 February 2023) <https://www.facebook.com/OTJM.National/posts/3618424695053248?ref=embed_post> accessed 23 January 2024.
[22] ‘The Chairperson of the African Union Commission strongly condemns the racial statements on fellow Africans in Tunisia’ (African Union, 24 February 2023) <https://au.int/fr/pressreleases/20230224/le-president-de-la-commission-de-lunion-africaine-condamne-fermement-les> accessed 23 January 2024.
[23] See ‘ وزارة الشؤون الخارجية والهجرة والتونسيين بالخارج’ (Facebook, 25 February 2023)
<https://www.facebook.com/TunisieDiplo/posts/pfbid0k7RwaRyZD54JGFiUv1Z2usEPB86Vxvr9b3mMscMaDkjZzVNZxS2ufuAQGYb5dQdul> accessed 23 January 2024.
[24]l ‘مفوض حقوق الإنسان في خطاب شامل: قلق بشأن الوضع في دول عدة ودعوة لتعزيز الحقوق’ (UN News, 7 March 2023) <https://news.un.org/ar/story/2023/03/1118687> accessed 23 January 2024.
[25]l ‘لجنة أممية تحث تونس على إنهاء خطاب الكراهية والعنف ضد مهاجرين من جنوب الصحراء’
(UN News, 4 April 2023) <https://news.un.org/ar/story/2023/04/1119412> accessed 23 January 2024.
[26] Andrea Shalal and Angus Mcdowall, ‘World Bank says pausing future Tunisia work amid reports of racist violence’ (Reuters, 6 March 2023) <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/world-bank-says-pausing-tunisia-work-amid-racially-motivated-violence-2023-03-06/> accessed 23 January 2024.
[27]l ‘تونس: الخطاب العنصري للرئيس يُحرّض على موجة عنف ضد الأفارقة السود’ (Amnesty International, 10 March 2023)
<https://www.amnesty.org/ar/latest/news/2023/03/tunisia-presidents-racist-speech-incites-a-wave-of-violence-against-black-africans/> accessed 23 January 2024.
[28] Eric Zemmour (Twitter, 22 February 2023) <https://twitter.com/ZemmourEric/status/1628328739284176896?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet> accessed 23 January 2024.
[29]l ‘بيان مشترك: تونس لن تكون فاشية كما يريدها رئيس الجمهورية’ (LTDH)
<https://ltdh.tn/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85/> accessed 23 January 2024.
[30] Abdellatif Hermassi, Revolution and Calvary: An Approach from the Point of View of Political Sociology (Sotimedia Publications 2023) 268.
[31] Watania Replay, ‘ تحول رئيس الجمهورية قيس سعيد إلى ولاية صفاقس ‘ (YouTube, 10 June 2023) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M-MxKnUN-NQ> accessed 24 January 2024. See Khalid Tabbabi, ‘الحق لكن ‘القانون’: قراءة في الخطاب الرئاسي حول قضية المهاجرين’ (The Legal Agenda, 15 June 2023) <https://legal-agenda.com/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%82-%d9%84%d9%83%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%88%d9%86-%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a1%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ae%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%a8/> accessed 24 January 2024.
[32] See Présidence Tunisie (Facebook, 8 July 2023) <https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid0s28VUh7cUAxrjuXd7Y6sxajxQwS8A6JfGhb66eca3KEh2kD3ZSS4FrdzCYT9n2Qol&id=100064458289062&mibextid=qC1gEa&paipv=0&eav=AfYSpoVLe1yoF56c1JIjTUdqSV2M4m3Dg4NmsJSP_I-rhDflPDsKPGehLcdwDa8K6uw&_rdr> accessed 24 January 2024.
[33] Amnesty International (n 27).
[34] ‘Tunisia: Racist Violence Targets Black Migrants, Refugees’ (Human Rights Watch, 10 March 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2023/03/10/tunisia-racist-violence-targets-black-migrants-refugees> accessed 24 January 2024.
[35] ‘Situation à Sfax : Préserver la vie humaine : un principe baffoué au cœur de la tragédie migratoire’ (FTDES, 6 July 2023) <https://ftdes.net/situation-a-sfax-preserver-la-vie-humaine-un-principe-baffoue-au-coeur-de-la-tragedie-migratoire/> accessed 24 January 2024.
[36] ‘Tunisia: No Safe Haven for Black African Migrants, Refugees’ (Human Rights Watch, 19 July 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2023/07/19/tunisia-no-safe-haven-black-african-migrants-refugees> accessed 24 January 2024.
[37] See NIHRL ‘Communiqué de l’institution nationale des droits de l’homme en Lybie’ (Facebook, 8 July 2023)
<https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid022EVp9ksU1tAcPpfaJYcEUG33Bq3EeZQp2FwJTnUjJWWnQAbRCnSVMqvyfnqwzNeRl&id=100068959756519&mibextid=Nif5oz&paipv=0&eav=Afbf3MJGVJ-A_nfDvoV52gN61YQZ6zTd_L6vnuqs_Fqk5CB-a62J9hkg5AeGCN97u7Q&_rdr> accessed 24 February 2024.
[38] Nadjib Touaibia, ‘Tunisia: Fati and Marie, victims of Kaïs Saïed’s racist policy’ (L’Humanité, 2 August 2023) <https://www.humanite.fr/monde/tunisie/tunisie-fati-et-marie-victimes-de-la-politique-raciste-de-kais-saied-804963> accessed 24 January 2024.
[39] Khaled Tababi, ‘al-Mghaṭṭā Valley: An Open Space for Double Absence: A Story of Stranded and Forsaken Migrants at the Margins of the State’ (FTDES, 27 July 2023) <https://ftdes.net/migration-mgatta/> accessed 1 May 2024.
[40] ibid 38.
[41] ibid 47.
[42] World Organization Against Torture, ‘Les Routes de la Torture: Cartographie des violations subies par les personnes en déplacement en Tunisie’ (OMCT, 2023) <https://omct-tunisie.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Migration-et-torture-Finale-Planches-.pdf> accessed 1 May 2024.
[43]l ‘الطرد الى الحدود البرية والصّدّ بالقوة في البحر تعزيزا ‘للحصن’ الأوروبي’ (FTDES, 6 December 2023)
<https://ftdes.net/ar/expulsion-aux-frontieres-et-pushback-en-mer-pour-promouvoir-la-forteresse-europeenne/> accessed 24 January 2024.
[44] ‘Statistique Migration’ (FTDES, 9 November 2023) <https://ftdes.net/statistiques-migration-2023/> accessed 24 January 2024.
[45] See ‘رصد وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي في تونس: تطور المعلومات المضللة وتنظير المؤامرة حول المهاجرين من جنوب الصحراء’ <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1etYGrDPlnBy7QaLWGGy2UsFNZJ06nKqO/view?fbclid=IwAR1JcbPA-v-rYA_FxZkmWhsfHaBp4DzKXwqg4tEnQeAVioZqaMdtHH9GkzY> accessed 24 January 2024.
[46]l ‘خطابات الكراهية والعنصرية تشجّع على القتل’ (FTDES, 25 May 2023) <https://ftdes.net/ar/les-discours-haineux-et-le-racisme/> accessed 24 January 2024.
[47] See <https://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/memorandum?fbclid=IwAR1QPNHEMn_i6QSU_gcz8_vojXtEbi-bi1jn2M5SIgNZIBZOae3z_HPma4c> accessed 24 January 2024.
[48] Quoted in Larissa Tschudi, ‘اتفاقية الهجرة بين تونس والاتحاد الأوروبي لن تحل أي مشكلة’ (Swissinfo, 19 July 2023) <https://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/business/-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A9-/48667484> accessed 24 January 2024.
[49]l ‘في تونس، يكرر الاتحاد الأوروبي خطأ قديمًا وخطيرًا’ (Amnesty International, 25 September 2023) <https://www.amnesty.org/ar/latest/news/2023/09/in-tunisia-the-eu-is-repeating-an-old-and-dangerous-mistake/> accessed 24 January 2024.
[50] ‘Mémorandum UE-Tunisie : l’Union européenne approuve les rafles, les expulsions illégales et la violence à l’encontre des migrants’ (FTDES, 20 July 2023)
<https://ftdes.net/memorandum-ue-tunisie-lunion-europeenne-approuve-les-rafles-les-expulsions-illegales-et-la-violence-a-lencontre-des-migrants/> accessed 24 January 2024.
[51] Khaled Tababi, ‘Le Mémorandum entre la Tunisie et l’Union Européenne : vers un Renforcement de la Dépendance, de L’autoritarisme et de l’Europe Forteresse ?’ (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2023) <https://ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ECRE-Working-Paper-20_Le-Memorandum-entre-la-Tunisie-et-lUnion-europeenne.pdf> accessed 1 May 2024.
[52]l ‘التضييق على التضامن مع المهاجرين.ات تمهيدا للتجريم’ (FTDES, 24 March 2024) <https://ftdes.net/ar/solidarite/> accessed 24 January 2024.
[53]l ‘روما ولندن تتفقان على تمويل’ مشروع لإعادة المهاجرين العالقين في تونس إلى أوطانهم’ (Info Migrants, 18 December 2023)
[54]l ‘المحكمة الأوروبية لحقوق الانسان تدين الحكومة الايطالية’ (FTDES, 31 March 2023) <https://ftdes.net/ar/hudoc/?fbclid=IwAR3V_GsgAqqUM07BuzHqyloJHPyi8EqNL0qJ0jtvVyp6j78UDKGpWdC9j6Q> accessed 24 January 2024.