Dhondup Wangchen is a Tibetan filmmaker. As a self-taught filmmaker, he secretly shot Leaving Fear Behind  in response to the Beijing 2008 Olympics and the International Olympic Committee’s failed promise of improved rights for the Tibetan people. The documentary was cut together from footage smuggled out of Tibet and uncovered life in Tibet under Chinese communist rule. Dhondup was subsequently imprisoned for six years during the 2008 Tibetan uprising for subversion of state power. After his release from prison in 2014, he was placed under heavy surveillance, only escaping to the US and being granted asylum in December 2017, then testifying in front of the US Congressional Executive Commission on China.   In this interview, Dhondup Wangchen was aided by Norbu, who served as a translator. As the interview progressed, Norbu assisted in translating Dhondup Wangchen’s views, thoughts, and insights into English. CJLPA :   Welcome, Dhondup Wangchen. I would like to begin by thanking you both for taking the time to come and interview with The Cambridge Journal of Law, Politics, and Art  to discuss your work as a human rights activist . I want to begin by asking you about your life in Tibet and how it was growing up. What was life like for you and your family up until the IOC’s failed promise? Was the Chinese influence gradual or something that was consistently felt?   Dhondup Wangchen :  I grew up in the very rural Eastern side of Tibet. I grew up in an extreme sort of poverty because I grew up in  a very big family of 10 siblings. So, we always had severe financial hardship. Because of those financial hardships, I was not able to go to school. The trace of Chinese suppression is not something that just happened abruptly in 2008 during the Olympics— it has been happening for decades . My great-grandfather and great-grandmother were  subjugated by Chinese oppression during the Cultural   R evolution, the former being arrested. Even during those times, your crops were forcefully taken, taxed very unlawfully, and your property taken without any sort of regard for law. So it has been happening for decades and right up until 2008. In Tibet, we saw the Beijing Olympics as a global international platform to speak up.   CJLPA :   What is the nature of China’s oppressive interest in Tibet?   D W : So, China has a policy of trying to eradicate things through a ‘O ne China’ policy where they’re trying to turn all these cultures into one.   CJLPA :   Sinicization.   DW :  Exactly. And then from a financial  perspective, they have Tibet as a wealth of natural resources and a very strong global position. So, they implement very systemic policies to eradicate Tibetan culture and identity and take away all the natural resources. There’s a lot of geopolitical uncertainty happening around the world, especially if you look at the two biggest countries by population, India and China. And if you look at the border, which is between Tibet and India, China and India both are spending enormous amounts of money and resources building military camps and transporting huge amounts of weaponry and soldiers there. So, some sort of conflict is assured to happen in the coming years and that’s the reason why they’re investing heavily.   I think the interest is also because of Tibet’s wealth, vast major rivers flowing from Tibet Mountain. Obviously, when China took over Tibet, it was not just to industrialise and improve the infrastructure, but because they wanted something. So if you look at how many resources and how much they have gained from Tibet, it’s nothing compared to the infrastructure that they always talk about, and the prosperity of life that they’re claiming.   CJLPA : What prompted you to create  Leaving Fear Behind ? Could you give a bit of an overview of that time and your mindset and what shifted it and really gave you the motivation?   DW :  When the IOC, the International Olympic Committee, awarded China to host the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Tibetan people were in extreme shock and disbelief that such an event that encompassed the spirit of freedom, equality, and fairness was awarded to a  n ation that actually diminished all of those values, which has a record of disregarding human rights and abusing people through an authoritarian regime. To counter that, the International Olympic Committee made a claim that it would promote freedom of speech, freedom of journalists, freedom of expression, freedom of religion . But their promotion also suggested that Tibetan people are living a prosperous and free life . As  someone who is living in Tibet, I know that to not  be truthful. So to sort of counter that, we decided to make a documentary which  actually captures the actual raw opinion and expression of Tibetan people. We took a camera and travelled around Tibet to gather people’s actual impressions and what they think. That’s the premise of the film.   CJLPA :   When you decided to create the film and told your collaborators, did you have any doubts or any worries, was there anything holding you back? And if there was, how did you deal with this?   DW : There were two things that I was worried about. The first was whether the footage would actually be smuggled out of Tibet safely? Tibet suffers from extremely strong censorship—they can come and confiscate any of your property without your consent. So that was one of the big worries . And then the second worry is people: there are over a hundred people who have spoken in the film. So there’s a safety concern since I as an individual can’t guarantee any of them  safety. So thos e are two of the primary things  that I was constantly worried about.   CJLPA : But the importance of the message overpowered your concerns?   DW : There are many cases inside Tibet of human rights abuses, and  the information does not come out of Tibet. For instance, the disappearance and kidnap o f Panchen Lama in 1995, a nd then after that a series of political prisoners  who were actually disappeared or sentenced heavily without any justification. There are many of those things where we always wanted to speak, but the information is not coming out or it’s not firsthand information. With native film, it’s a tangible person that’s actually speaking directly to you and you can hear, can hear the voice, and see them. That message was important for us.   CJLPA : There were the five main points regarding cultural destruction and the Chinese policies that you wanted to speak about. The first relates to farmers and nomads being forced out of their land and forced to live regular lives, despite being farmers their entire lives, alongside Chinese internal migration and the creation of Chinese settlements.   DW : When they are forcing those nomads and farmers out of their land, one of the main points they make is environmental  protection. But in reality it’s a very uncoordinated, unplanned system, which often involves moving these farmers back and forth. It’s ultimately unsustainable. It also serves cultural and identity eradication mostly, especially with nomadic people, who live very isolated li ves  in the mountains and the slopes. They usually retain a lot of the Tibetan identity just because the way that their lives are very, very isolated. So, a vast majority of the Tibetan population is nomadic people. They try to integrate those nomadic people with Chinese immigrants. So, they try to force them out of the land on the basis of saying, ‘it is unscientific for those animals to graze a huge amount of grassland on the mountain slope’. They come up with a lot of nonsens ical  reasons to force people out, then barely pay them a living wage, or a lot of time they pay enough upfront where those people have no sort of financial education to properly use those resources and then they go bankrupt. And there are a lot of societal problems such as drinking and stealing. It’s not a big thing, but there are these  instances happening on a societal  level.   CJLPA :   Just out of curiosity, was your father living alongside Chinese settlers as well when he was young or is this a more recent thing?   DW : It’s not  a  recent policy or recent intention. It has been happening for many years. There are actually about 20 families living in a sort  of small town. And back in a few decades ago when they started implementing this, a lot of the Chinese immigrants had   problems adapting  to high altitudes. So, there  are  a lot of people who couldn’t survive or had  health issues so they had to move back. It has been happening for many years.    CJLPA :   The next two points are interlinked. Recently, China announced that by 2035, they want Mandarin to be their universal language . They claim it’s for protection , it’s for national security, and because they want to repress all forms of separatism. You have also spoken about children being sent to boarding schools, so they’re away from Tibetan culture and learn Chinese culture instead. Tibetan is  also restricted and hard to learn and hard to teach. We see that in the film , where  they’re teaching in secret. What are your thoughts on this policy?   DW : The policy regarding trying to make the Mandarin official language is nothing new; a lot of the policies that are happening now were planned decades ago. So when I was growing up, I would barely understand the Chinese language, and then the Chinese immigrants started coming into Tibet. Back then, they had to sort of integrate to the Tibetan people because they were the minority people. Chinese merchants or shopkeepers, for example, had to speak Tibetan to integrate into the community and the culture. Now, it’s a very different place because a lot of the younger generation, especially younger generation Tibetans, primarily speak Chinese because from a very young age in schools they replaced Tibetan teachers with Chinese teachers, children were encouraged to speak Chinese to have  a brighter future, instead of learning Tibetan. And a lot of the Tibetan scholars , professors, teachers were arrested or warned  that if you try to preserve the Tibetan culture, you’ll be arrested. Since 2019, many of  the Tibetan language rights activists have been sentenced for 15, 20 years. So they take it very, very seriously from their end. And if you look at the younger generation, many of them actually have a very difficult time speaking Tibetan language in their homes. So they have to often revert back to Chinese language as a primary means of communicating with their own family. China is trying to eradicate it on  a language level.   CJLPA :   Then there is restriction of religious freedoms. You mentioned recently how you now have to be 18 to go to a monastery and become a monk, and about the monasteries themselves being destroyed and also of course the Dalai Lama’s exile and not being able to be in his country. And he’s also recently made comments on his reincarnation not being in Tibet, and how China thinks that they can control who they choose for the reincarnation. How pervasive is this restriction of religious freedoms?   DW :   Tibetan monastery life is not like attending a university or high school. It’s a way of life. You have to ingrain all those principles from a very young age; it is not something obtained right away. And you have to learn a lot of religious texts  by heart, which also often starts at a very young age. If you look at the monastery life, the elder monks are often being looked after by the younger ones. So in adding this age restriction there’s a way of life that they are trying to completely decimate.   Religion is the hope for many of the Tibetan people. Often, there’s one monastery in each town, and when someone is sick, you go to the monastery for the elder monks’ blessings, or for their counsel on any sort of events that happen in your life. So a lot of time when they’re interfering with the monastery and the monks, it’s really conflicting  with the Tibetan people’s culture and their way of life. On top of this, a lot of the monasteries who actually stood up were heavily sentenced, whilst the infrastructure built around monasteries  is censured.   CJLPA :   Not only this, but the law is also  entirely controlled by China, and Tibetan people cannot be defended legally because of this.   D W : So there is the law that’s written on paper or in the constitution. The problem with the law  they have created is  that there’s no check on power. So they would often say that something is the law, or if you are trying to start a childcare centre, for example, they’ll say, ‘Hey, you need permission from the authorities ’. But when you go and seek the licence or the permission to operate, you are denied. And then if you obtain it and you want to teach, you can’t voluntarily teach, they’ll say you need a teacher’s licence to teach the Tibetan language. So when you go and try to obtain the licence, they would not give it to you. They use the law to their own advantage. When you want to get something done, they appeal to the law. But since they are in charge of implementing and forcing those laws, they can also break them with impunity. So there’s a huge power gap where you can’t sue the state. There is  the law , and there are the courts. So there’s nothing you can do. And if you look back at all the hardship when people are facing mass  migration, your properties or your land that your families have owned for generations are being taken away, there’s no one to whom you can go and lay out your case.   CJLPA :   Let’s move onto solutions and what the Tibetan people want or what they think needs to be done. So the ICT, the International Campaign for Tibet, has  called for unrestrained access to Tibet via independent media, independent monitoring, and civil society organisations. They think that that will help not just Tibet, but that it’s the right thing to do for global security and justice. What are your thoughts on this? Is that something that you yourself think is the right way?   D W :   I think the primary intent of this is just to have more openness and uncovering of the truth. So this will be effective if independent journalists or reporters are allowed, it will uncover a lot of truth as to what’s happening in Tibet. But if you look at even a regular general public, if someone wants to travel to Tibet, it’s a heavily restricted visa that you need to apply f or . And if you go to different regions, you need to apply for a different  visa. So a lot of the information is  not coming out and obviously China is trying to censo r the  truth and evidence. It may help slightly but there needs to be broader change.   CJLPA :   On a personal note, what’s next for your activism? What do you plan to do next?   D W : It’s my pledge to myself and to my people who have done activism work alongside me to continue the work that I have done. The situation is dire in Tibet and it’s only getting worse, and I want to continue. One of the main reasons  why I came to the United States was t o actually promote it on a more global scale .   CJLPA :   In terms of your activism, y ou’ve   been  able to release the film and smuggle it out successfully and now come to the United States away from all the restrictions you received after coming out of prison. You could easily see it as a successful thing, as a positive. And it is, but it’s come at such a price because you’ve had to leave your land, your home, behind and come to a somewhat distant place in America, which is a different culture. How h ave you dealt with that? Has it been difficult? I think people can easily just think, ‘it’s great that he’s out’. You are out now, but it’s a very high price to pay, I feel like.   D W : O n a personal  level it has always been a struggle. It’s not just you go to prison, but the implications and the ramifications of it. There have been  almost ten years away from my family, and the struggle of my parents who have endured not knowing what’s happening to their  son while in prison. And then after coming to the US, I was not able to meet my mom, who passed away a year after I came here. So that has always been one of my biggest regrets,  coming to a free country and not being able to travel to Australia to meet my mom. And then obviously the culture and the language hardship, not being able to work and having  to rely on my wife as sort of a primary source of breadwinner for the family. And I still have a problem with my travel documents, when if I’m invited to speak in another  country, it always has been a problem to acquire the travel documents. So there has been a problem on the smaller personal level, but you need to make those sacrifices, putting the personal cost to the side.   CJLPA :   Finally, is there anything you want to say to any other Tibetan activists who are thinking to begin to do something or maybe are having doubts about their activism, and also to people who are unaware of the struggle?   DW : As  a global citizen, I think each and every person has a duty and a responsibility to everyone else. Everyone is intertwined and entangled with each other. From that perspective, it’s important to speak up for the truth and defend human rights, not just for your people, but for any other people. If you look at Tibet’s role in the current dire geopolitical circumstances, it can play a crucial role in creating a peace and balance between two of the biggest populations , India and China , and a peace balance between those two countries. And if you look at Tibet’s culture and Tibet’s Buddhism, that brings a message of peace, prosperity, and happiness. So it can help a lot of other people across the world. I think it’s important to not forget this, because there are many global conflicts happening . This interview was conducted by Nancy Lura. As a final year Film and Literature student at Warwick University, Nancy combines her passion for the creative arts with a keen interest in pursuing a career in the film industry. Alongside this, she advocates for human rights and believes strongly in the transformative power of the arts in driving social progress.

KV Duong was born in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, in 1980. He emigrated to Toronto, Canada with his family in 1987 and moved to London, UK on his own in 2010. His art practice spans painting, sculpture, installation, and live performance. In 2022, KV had a solo exhibition titled ‘Too Foreign for Home, Too Foreign for Here’ at the Migration Museum in London, followed by ‘No Place Like Home’ at the Museum of the Home in 2023, a group exhibition of eight artists from the Vietnamese Diaspora that KV co-curated and artistically led.   Originally trained as a structural engineer, KV enrolled in the MA in Painting Programme at the Royal College of Art, London, in September 2023 to further push his artistic investigations and was awarded the Vice Chancellor’s Achievement Scholarship from Royal College of Art in 2024. He is presently exploring latex as a painting medium. Gabriella Kardos: You’ve always been fascinated by material exploration, experimenting with concrete, fibreglass, and polystyrene in the past. Why did you turn your attention to latex?   KV Duong : Latex holds a complex web of connotations deeply rooted in the historical dynamics of rubber plantations during the era of French colonisation in Vietnam, where I was born. Latex also embodies a queer individual’s experience, evoking sexual fantasies and intimacy. Laden with symbolism, I’m using this glue-like substance to act as a signifier and protagonist, fusing together materials of importance in my life to help shape and contextualise my identity and ancestral past.   By using latex as a conceptual material to do the heavy lifting of the two main narratives of my life, this has allowed me more freedom of expression to focus on painterly explorations.   GK: How did growing up in Canada as a Vietnamese-Chinese person shape your identity and worldview?   KVD : I moved to Canada with my family when I was seven years old. We were fortunate that there is a sizeable Vietnamese-Chinese community in Toronto where we settled. Despite the culture and climate shock initially, I assimilated well as a young person. It wasn’t until adulthood, travelling abroad to Europe, that I faced scrutiny for my appearance and origin. This realisation of being perceived as ‘the other’ expanded my worldview and fostered a commitment to understanding diverse perspectives, particularly amidst escalating cultural tensions worldwide. GK: Ethnicity aside, you also had to come to terms with your sexuality. How was your coming out experience, and how did this inform your artistic voice?   KVD : I came out to my close friends and siblings when I was 28, then to my parents when I was 32. To date, the latter is still the most challenging and high-risk situation that I’ve had to navigate in life. I had laid everything on the line and prepared myself for the worst-case scenario, which thankfully didn’t happen. But because I had this mindset going in, everything else afterwards seems like a bonus. This experience gave me the courage to stand up for social injustice and shaped my voice as both a person and an artist. GK: How does your queer identity and cultural background influence the themes and issues you explore in your artwork?   KVD : As a queer individual from an immigrant minority background, I’ve spent much of my life feeling like an outsider. Viewing the world from the perspective of ‘the other’, I’ve developed a keen awareness of my political and physical surroundings. This perspective has deeply influenced the way I navigate life and has guided my artistic explorations. Themes such as cultural assimilation, suppression of free speech, border control, and cultural conflict are central to my art practice.   I frequently reflect on the concept of home and grapple with the complexities of being a person of colour with a diasporic background living in a predominantly white society.   GK: Let’s delve into a few specific works: Untitled (Nation – Green No 1 & No 2) Can you explain the motif of a door in relation to identity politics?   KVD : The motif of a door or a portal has recently emerged to represent access or inaccessibility. I’m interrogating this access through breaking down the door frame either by removing some of the panels or wooden structure. With reference to the latex, I aim to critique the access or rights for immigrants or migrants and the LGBTQ+ community. The lines of the door frame also denote physical boundaries and human-made borderlines that I’m trying to dismantle. After completing this work, I visited the Vietnamese archive at the V&A where I came across photographs of Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong from 1989/1990. The structure of the refugee camp security gate had an uncanny resemblance to the aforementioned piece.   When I made these doors, I was thinking about the colonial history of Vietnam. But when shown publicly in London, the context has inherently shifted towards the small boat crossing crisis and illegal people smuggling that the EU has been experiencing for nearly the past decade. The lorry tragedy in Essex back in 2019, when 39 Vietnamese migrants died, has remained in my thoughts since.   GK: Can you describe the context of Playground Comrade ’? We have here an earlier appearance of the door motif. What are we looking at?   KVD : During the Vietnam War (the reference photo was taken in 1972), female Viet Cong activists (Communist North Vietnam) would meet up in Nam Can forest (South Vietnam) to strategize about the war. They wore masks to hide their identities from one another in case of capture and interrogation.   This painting was created as part of the ‘Unhomely’ series from 2022 where I created imagined landscapes using historic Vietnam War images juxtaposed with uncanny scenes of contemporary everyday life. Through the device of a room, time and space are delineated. The physical separation creates a sanctuary to work-through and work-over the past within a safe present-day haven. I’ve been thinking about space, in particular The Poetics of Space  (by Gaston Bachelard) for a few years now. The current latex doors are a full circle moment using the latex material.   GK: Is there a project which stands out to you as the most significant within the body of work you’ve done so far?   KVD : ‘No Place Like Home’ (Museum of The Home, 2023) stands out as a collaborative exhibition co-curated and led by myself and Hoa Dung Clerget. Exploring the concept of home through the perspectives of eight Vietnamese diaspora artists, it drew a record number of visitors to the museum over its three-month duration.   Within the context of the UK narrative, this exhibition offered a rare opportunity for Vietnamese artists to showcase our perspective in a Western institution. We also created a safe platform for exchange, not only for the Vietnamese community but also for the broader East and Southeast Asian diaspora, with the hope of increasing visibility and fostering community building among our peers. As artists of the global majority in the UK, we encounter obstacles in gaining recognition for our artistic voices. We genuinely hope that this exhibition is our catalyst for amplifying our collective voice, providing a contrasting perspective to the dominant narrative, and contributing to a more inclusive artistic landscape.   GK: Why is LGBTQ+ visibility and representation important to you?   KVD : It sounds cliché, but growing up, I wished I had met the current version of myself, to show me that it is possible to be a gay Asian person making work and holding public discussions about my upbringing and the challenges that I’ve faced, without feeling ashamed or feeling that I’m taking up space. Visibility and representation cannot be overstated particularly when it comes to LGBTQ+ rights. While significant progress has been made in the Western world regarding LGBTQ+ rights, there remains more work to be done.   GK: Your live body painting performances are raw and intimate. How do you prepare yourself for these performances?   KVD :   Let me tell you, I wouldn ’ t have been able to do these before coming out. Now, I feel completely comfortable in my own skin, and the process of coming out, revealing all, take it or leave it, contributed to the person you see now. I liken live performances to public speaking or playing tennis under pressure. The more you do it, the easier it gets, and the better you become. I get into the zone of a performer; the actions and direction are still very much me and about my life, but I almost become an observer outside of my body. Having black paint all over my body helps.   I continue to perform because it ’ s really fun, but it also serves as a great outlet for expression in a different format. Additionally, it brings visibility and representation to my work and to people who can relate to my stories. This interview was conducted by Gabriella Kardos, an artist and art historian. In 1976 she escaped communism with her family, fleeing Ceausescu’s regime in Romania and emigrating to Montreal, Canada in search of freedom. Here she studied Fine Arts at Dawson College and Art History at Concordia University. She went on to teach Art Theory in the Painting and Drawing Department of Concordia University and Painting in the MA course of Vermont College of Norwich University, USA. She holds an MA from Central St Martins, London and has exhibited at the Czech Museum of Fine Arts, Prague, Anglia Polytechnic University in Ipswich, UK, ROSL, Victoria & Albert Museum, and WCPF in London. She lives in London where she is pursuing her art practice in painting and printmaking.

1. Historical Overview of Wartime Collaboration   In situations of armed conflict, it is almost inevitable that there will be instances of civilians or combatants cooperating with the opposing side. The parties involved in the conflict often attempt to gain an advantage by turning their opponent's people against them. At the same time, individuals may collaborate with the enemy for various reasons, including personal conviction, desperation, or coercion.[1] As historian Gerhard Hirschfeld says, wartime collaboration ‘is as old as war and the occupation of foreign territory’.[2]   There is ongoing debate about the precise definition of collaboration.[3] However, common practices can be categorised as wartime collaboration, such as sharing information with the opposing side, defecting to fight for the enemy’s forces, engaging in propaganda activities on behalf of the enemy, or providing administrative support to an occupying power.[4]    Notably, international humanitarian law, which applies in armed conflicts, does not explicitly prohibit these activities or the recruitment of collaborators.[5] However, it does forbid the use of coercion for such purposes, particularly against prisoners of war or civilians in occupied territories.[6] The repercussions for those involved in collaboration may not become apparent until after the armed conflict has ended. This delay in consequences typically occurs when evidence of their actions becomes known, power dynamics shift, and a relative sense of stability returns, making it possible to hold these individuals accountable for their actions.[7]   There are well-documented cases of wartime collaboration in various parts of the world during the tumultuous era of World War II (WWII). Notably, countries like Norway, France, and Poland grappled with the complex issue of collaboration in the face of occupation and conflict. Wartime collaboration manifested differently, blurring the lines between cooperation and coercion.   In Norway, the collaborationist government under Vidkun Quisling collaborated with the Nazi occupiers, while a robust Norwegian resistance movement (Motstandsbevegelsen) actively opposed them.[8] This divergence in responses and allegiances raised intricate questions of justice, accountability, and reconciliation in the post-war period.[9] France, too, witnessed a multifaceted landscape of collaboration during WWII. The Vichy regime, ruled by Marshal Philippe Pétain, collaborating with the Nazi occupiers, stood in stark contrast to the French Resistance (La Résistance), exemplifying the ideological and geographic divisions within the country.[10] The aftermath of the war led to a complex web of legal proceedings, reflecting the challenges of distinguishing between voluntary collaboration and collaboration under duress.[11] Similarly, Poland’s experience during WWII was marked by diverse responses to the occupation. The Polish Underground State (Polskie Państwo Podziemne), including organisations like the Home Army (Armia Krajowa), actively resisted the Nazi occupation and Soviet influence.[12] However, collaboration, whether driven by opportunism or coercion, coexisted alongside this resistance. Post-war Poland grappled with the legal complexities surrounding collaborators, shedding light on the intricacies of determining the extent of collaboration.[13] It has taken two generations for most countries that Nazi Germany occupied to admit that it was the resisters, not the collaborators, who were the minority.[14]   During WWII, there were movements of wartime collaboration with Nazi Germany in Ukraine. By September 1941, the German-occupied territory of Ukraine had been partitioned into two new German administrative entities: the District of Galicia under the Nazi General Government and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Initially, Ukrainians showed support for the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[15] Still, the majority turned away from wartime collaboration when they witnessed the brutal and inhumane policies of the German occupation regime. In response, some Ukrainians decided to resist the German occupying forces and joined either the Red Army or irregular partisan units engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Germans. Ukrainian nationalists held the hope that their enthusiastic collaboration with Germans might eventually lead to the re-establishment of an independent Ukrainian state.[16]    Between 1945 and 1987, the Soviet Union made concerted and extensive efforts to depict Ukrainian nationalists as war criminals and to convince Western nations of their guilt. Some research has indicated that it was the Stalinist policies in Western Ukraine, particularly the imposition of Russian culture and language, that compelled local Ukrainians to resist the Soviet regime.[17] Following Ukraine’s independence in 1991, numerous nationalists who had been unjustly convicted were politically rehabilitated and even glorified as heroes of a sovereign Ukraine.[18]   2. Russian Invasion of Ukraine   Who could have imagined that in the 21st century, Ukraine would once again have to confront the issue of wartime collaboration? In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and initiated a war in eastern Ukraine.[19] Then, on 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an act of aggression recognised by a United Nations General Assembly resolution supported by 141 countries.[20] This is the largest conflict in Europe since WWII and has triggered a massive migration crisis[21] and the deaths of many civilians.[22] As of now, Russia continues to occupy approximately 16% of Ukrainian territory.[23] Like any major armed conflict, this war has seen instances of wartime collaboration.   In response to the Russian invasion, the Ukrainian Parliament swiftly enacted laws that introduced amendments to the Ukrainian Criminal Code regarding wartime collaboration.[24] These amendments were passed by a majority of parliament members, even without prior discussion, and they imposed strict penalties for collaboration, including up to 15 years of imprisonment. The potential collaborators' scope is quite extensive, according to the new amendments. During the occupation, people were trapped in a terrible situation. They sometimes needed to collaborate with the occupying forces to survive, although some willingly sided with the occupiers. However, wartime collaboration is not always clear-cut. This scenario has led to debates among academics and activists regarding the interpretation, principles, legal clarity, enforcement, fairness of punishment and ethical implications for wartime collaboration under the new Laws. Adopting such legislative changes and introducing new categories of crimes have led to numerous appeals from residents of occupied territories to human rights organisations, asking them to clarify whether their activities on the occupied territory can be considered collaboration.[25]   The situation in Ukraine became increasingly complex, especially after the liberation of Kharkiv[26] and parts of the Kherson[27] regions in September-November 2022. Many people who had lived under Russian occupation for over six months became potential collaborators. This posed a challenging dilemma: how to distinguish innocent civilians from collaborators? The liberation of these regions was followed by a period of uncertainty and the need for careful scrutiny.[28] The situation in Ukraine was further complicated by Russia's annexation of certain territories and its policy of ‘passportisation’, where Russian passports were forcibly granted to thousands of Ukrainians.[29] This move by Russia aimed to solidify its control over these regions and further blurred the lines between collaboration and coercion.   To identify potential collaborators, Ukrainian authorities and local communities faced the daunting task of conducting investigations. It's crucial to recognise that not everyone who lived under occupation during this period became a collaborator, and distinguishing between those who were forced into cooperation and those who willingly collaborated was essential. Compassion, due process, and adherence to human rights principles are vital to handling these complex situations. Also, considering the fact that according to Freedom House, Ukraine's Freedom Rating dropped from 61 points in 2021 to 50 in 2023, reflecting various issues, including the rule of law in the country.[30]   On 16 March, the Movement Chesno launched the ‘Register of State Traitors’, a platform where activists voluntarily provide information about politicians, media figures, judges, officials, priests, and celebrities who harm the state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and informational security of Ukraine.[31] As of September 2023, this Register includes 1,304 individuals. Also, the Kherson’s ‘Collaborators database’ has been a platform where anonymous sources publish information about individuals suspected of having connections with Russian authorities.[32] Daily, the channel releases between one and five new ‘dossiers’ containing such allegations. By the end of July 2023, the channel had already identified at least 2,000 alleged collaborators in the Kherson region alone.[33] This initiative has raised concerns about privacy and the potential consequences of such accusations on the lives of those named in these dossiers. In contrast to the previous Registry, it is noteworthy that most individuals on this list are not politicians, judges, or government officials; they are ordinary citizens. This shift in the list’s composition underscores the broad reach of these accusations, affecting ordinary people in the Kherson region.   The issue of wartime collaboration is quite a debatable topic.[34] Also, it was a central focus during the Ukrainian Recovery conference in London in June 2023, where the international community engaged with Ukrainian government representatives and civil society.[35] While advocating for a tough stance on collaborators is widely supported, it is crucial to consider the potential drawbacks of such an approach. Adopting an uncompromising stance may inadvertently hinder Ukraine's immediate endeavours in integration and reconstruction. Moreover, it could pose a long-term threat to social cohesion within the country.[36]   In short, this article aims to investigate the underlying factors behind the introduction of recent legislative amendments on wartime collaboration to the Ukrainian Criminal Code of Ukraine; to conduct a comprehensive analysis of both investigation and judicial practices; to compare the legal provisions within different articles; to identify distinctions and similarities in the various collaborationist activities; to highlight the inherent challenges and shortcomings in the newly implemented legal provisions, emphasising potential issues and ambiguities, and to formulate possible solutions and recommendations for refining the legal framework. The article aims to shed light on the recent legislative innovations in Ukraine concerning wartime collaboration and its implications. Furthermore, it will contribute to the ongoing discourse on balancing the need for legal accountability with preserving human rights during times of conflict.   3. Legal Analysis of Legislative Innovations of 2022   Ukraine has previously attempted to criminalise wartime collaboration. Since the Russian Federation's (RF) aggression began in 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament made three attempts between 2019 and 2021 to amend Ukraine’s Criminal Code regarding wartime collaboration.[37] However, all these efforts proved unsuccessful. Therefore, up until Russia’s invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s Criminal Code contained only one provision addressing collaboration with the enemy—article 111, ‘High treason’.[38]   However, the situation took a dramatic turn with the full-scale invasion of Russia. On 3 March 2022, the Ukrainian Parliament passed Law No 2108-IX,[39] amending the Ukrainian Criminal Code with Article 111-1, ‘Collaborative Activities’. This article introduces criminal liability for various conduct that may be classified as wartime collaboration. According to the explanatory note to this Law, ‘[t]he existing provisions of the Criminal Code did not fully address the new issues arising from the full-scale invasion, necessitating the introduction of a new article to delineate the boundaries of permissible and prohibited conduct for Ukrainian citizens present in temporarily occupied territory’. Article 111-1 is divided into eight  parts, which address various aspects of wartime collaboration and are differentiated by the punishment, ranging from deprivation of the right to hold certain positions for ten  years to life imprisonment if people died due to such collaboration. No official English translation is available, but you can refer to the Analytical Note of the Coalition of Ukrainian NGOs, which provides a comprehensive translation.[40]    As can be discerned from the article, activities formally fall under its purview, such as measures aimed at addressing humanitarian issues in the occupied territory, providing medical services, involvement in pipeline transportation, and the operation of grocery stores etc. Consequently, residents of the occupied territory, particularly those under the temporary control of the Russian army, face the risk of being held criminally accountable for actions that are not socially dangerous but may come under Article 111-1.   However, the Ukrainian Parliament did  not  stop there. In March and April 2022, Parliament passed two additional laws, No 2110-IX[41] and No 2198-IX,[42] introducing new articles into the Ukrainian Criminal Code. These laws added two new articles: Article 111-2, ‘Aiding and abetting the aggressor state’, and Article 436-2 ‘Justification, recognition as legitimate, denial of the armed aggression of the RF against Ukraine, glorification of its participants’.[43]   The amendments to the Ukrainian Criminal Code in March-April 2022 and the practical application of Article 111-1 have revealed several significant issues. These include the complexity in distinguishing between crimes outlined in Article 111 and the ‘new’ articles, namely 111-1, 111-2, and 436-2.   It is also interesting to note that, according to Article 216 of the Ukrainian Criminal Procedure Code, investigative authority for cases under Articles 111-1 and 111-2 falls under the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).[44] According to part 4 of Article 216, the investigative bodies of the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) conduct pre-trial investigations into crimes committed by special subjects, such as judges or law enforcement officers. Jurisdiction over cases of this category is not assigned to the Ukrainian National Police (NP). However, in practice, SBU, DBR, and NP conduct pre-trial investigations for such cases.   4. Some Issues with Legal Qualification   The following statistics emerged from introducing ‘new’ articles into effect until September 2023 (Table 1). During this period, a total of 13,405 cases were opened, but only 3,164 were forwarded for court review. In other words, out of all the cases opened for wartime collaboration, only approximately 24% of them made it to court. At the same time, information on the number of open proceedings under certain parts of these articles does not exist. Article Total number of cases opened Suspicion indictment served Cases forwarded to the court 111 3011 1018 584 111-1 6869 2236 1398 111-2 938 175 78 436-2 2587 1308 1104 TOTAL 13405 4737 3164 Table 1. Compiled by the author based on information from the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine .[45]   However, in investigative practice, there is a complexity in distinguishing crimes outlined in Articles 111, 111-1, 111-2, and 436-2. As a result, similar conduct can be categorised under different articles, even within the proceedings handled by a single regional prosecutor's office. Let’s examine a few examples.   4.1. Part 1 Art 111-1 vs Art 436-2 The person, following the announcement by the Russian President on 24 February 2022 regarding the commencement of a so-called ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine, expressed support for this decision in the presence of others. This person had repeatedly endorsed the unlawful actions of Russian military personnel.[46]  His actions were qualified under Article 111-1 , punishable by the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for ten to 15 years. Another person, in the presence of fellow villagers, justified the actions of Russian military personnel and expressed the opinion that the Russian President acted correctly in relation to Ukraine.[47] Her actions were qualified under Article 436-2 , punishable by arrest for up to six months or up to three years in prison.[48] From the outset of the full-scale Russian invasion, a resident of Kharkiv publicly posted calls for support to the aggressor country on his social media page. In his posts, the person referred to Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel as ‘Nazis’.[49]  His actions were qualified under Article 111-1 , punishable by the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for three to 15 years. Immediately following the invasion, the person shared a post on their Telegram channel containing glorification of the participants of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. This information became accessible to an unrestricted audience. Subsequently, she posted another piece of information on her Telegram channel in which she justified and acknowledged the legitimacy of the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine.[50] Her actions were qualified under Article 436-2 , punishable by five to eight years in prison with or without property confiscation.   4.2. Part 4 Art 111-1 vs Art 111-2   In February-May 2022, a 60-year-old man who was serving as the acting head of one of the state-owned enterprises in the Lugansk region engaged in a criminal conspiracy with the Russian occupying forces and representatives of the so-called ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (‘LPR’). The person voluntarily transferred material resources from the subsidiary to the Russian armed groups and the illegal armed formation of the ‘LPR’. Subsequently, he willingly assumed the head position at the farm and conducted economic activities related to mixed farming.[51]  His actions were classified under part 4 Article 111-1 , punishable by three to five years in prison with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for ten to 15 years with confiscation of property. The head of the milk canning factory in Kupyansk established stable working and ideological ties with representatives of the RF during the occupation of the town. The person continued doing business and concluded supply contracts with the so-called ‘Military and Civilian Administration of Kupyansk District’ representatives’. The head instructed his subordinates to hand over dairy products to the occupiers. In addition, he managed to establish working relations with the Ministry of Economic Development of the RF on the dairy products supplies to the territory of the so-called ‘Donetsk People Republic’ (‘DPR’).[52]  His actions were qualified under Art 111-2 , punishable by ten to 12 years in prison with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for ten to 15 years and with or without confiscation of property.   4.3. Part 5 Art 111-1 vs Art 111-2   After the town was captured by the Russian army and the illegal authorities began to function, the former employee of a Ukrainian bank entered into a criminal conspiracy with representatives of the Russian occupation administration. In March 2022, the occupation authorities appointed her as the head of the so-called ‘Novopskov branch of the state bank of the LPR’.[53]  Her actions were qualified under part 5 of Art 111-1 , punishable by five to ten years in prison with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for ten to 15 years and with or without confiscation of property. The person in the temporarily occupied territory of the Kherson region voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the occupation authorities. He agreed to take up the position of bank manager.[54] His actions were qualified under Art 111-2 , punishable by ten to 12 years in prison with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for ten to 15 years and with or without confiscation of property. In May 2022, the person voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the Russian occupation authorities and accepted the offer to take the pseudo-position of ‘head of the civil-military administration’.[55]  His actions were qualified under part 5 of Art 111-1 , punishable by five to ten years in prison with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for ten to 15 years and with or without confiscation of property. Also, in May 2022, the person supporting the illegal actions of the occupiers agreed to act as the so-called ‘head of the village’.[56]  His actions were classified under Art 111-2 , punishable by ten to 12 years in prison with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for ten to 15 years with or without confiscation of property   4.4. Part 6 Art 111-1 vs Art 436-2   After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a student from the Kharkiv region took part in propaganda projects by Russian media. In her speeches, she said that she had consciously decided to ‘help Russian soldiers’ and ‘want to serve Russia’. In a video interview, she expressed support for the actions of the aggressor country. She called for assistance to the Russian armed forces.[57]  Her actions were classified under part 6 of Article 111-1 , punishable by ten to 12 years in prison with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for ten to 15 years with or without confiscation of property. In May 2022, the person publicly expressed her position in support of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Thus, the person gave an interview to the Russian TV channel Zvezda. In the interview, she said she supported the Russian army and felt safe about its arrival. Her actions were classified under part 3 of Art 436-2 , punishable by five to eight years in prison with or without confiscation of property.   4.5. Part 7 Art 111-1 vs Art 111   The person, formerly dismissed from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, accepted the offer of cooperation from representatives of the Russian armed forces and was appointed ‘head of the fire and rescue station’.[58]  His actions were classified under part 7 of Art 111-1 , punishable by 12 to 15 years in prison with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for ten to 15 years with or without confiscation of property The person was interviewed by Russian representatives and voluntarily took a ‘senior position’ in the so-called ‘Ministry of Emergency Situations’ in the temporarily occupied Luhansk region. In May 2022, he was appointed ‘Head of the Regional Fire and Rescue Unit of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the LPR’.[59]  His actions were classified under part 2 of Art 111 , punishable by 15 years in prison or life imprisonment with confiscation of property. Therefore, after analysing these examples, it becomes quite challenging to pinpoint the exact principles by which the prosecution distinguishes and qualifies crimes under different articles. Most likely, it is done at the discretion of individual prosecutors since identifying significant case circumstances that would warrant different qualifications under the specified articles is difficult. This creates issues of dual classification and violates the principle of legal certainty. Furthermore, there are cases in which a person's actions were simultaneously classified under two different articles. For instance, the person agreed to an offer from representatives of the occupying administration and assumed the position of ‘assistant prosecutor’ in the ‘LPR’. Her actions were classified under both part 2 Article 111 and part 7 Article 111-1.[60]    What is also concerning is that the articles, the distinction between which is primarily at the discretion of prosecutors, prescribe very different sanctions for the commission of the same act—ranging from the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of ten to 15 years (part 1 Article 111-1) to imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without property confiscation (part 3 Article 436-2).   To summarise, the main difficulties of applying the article on wartime collaboration are: (a) the lack of criteria for distinguishing between the qualification of acts under Articles 111, 111-2 and 436-2 and Article 111-1, which creates problems of double qualification and violates the principle of legal certainty; (b) the disproportionate punishment for acts that can be qualified under the ‘new’ articles: in some cases, the punishment is too severe, in others, it does not fulfil the function of correction and prevention of new criminal offences.   5. Judicial Practice   In this section, we invite you to examine the status of wartime collaboration cases in the courts. As of September 2023, the Unified State Register of Court Decisions illustrates the situation, and you can find the details in Table 2.[61]  Article Total judgements 111 409 111-1 691 111-2 7 436-2 715 TOTAL 1410 Table 2. Compiled by the author based on information from the Unified State Register of Court Decisions. [62]   Approximately 51% of judgements (353) under Article 111-1 were delivered specifically under part 1, which addresses the public denial of armed aggression against Ukraine and public calls for support for the decisions of the aggressor state. Interestingly, at least one judgement under part 7 Article 111-1 involved a minor Ukrainian citizen. Judgements under all parts of Article 111-1, except parts 1 and 2, are delivered in absentia . Moreover, more than 50% of judgements in cases involving part 3 and part 5 Article 111-1 were delivered in absentia . For Article 111-2, 3 out of 7 judgements were delivered in absentia . In many cases, under Article 111-1, the accused entered into agreements to acknowledge guilt. Such agreements are present in cases involving all parts of Article 111-1. Notably, no agreements acknowledging guilt were established under Article 111-2. It is also worth mentioning that entering into such agreements, as well as the consideration of cases in absentia , precludes further appeals under Ukrainian law.   Thus, since the beginning Russian invasion, the Ukrainian judicial system has already handed down 1,410 judgements on wartime collaboration. Interestingly, under ‘new articles’, the court can impose penalties that don't involve imprisonment, such as a suspended sentence or a prohibition from holding certain positions. Individuals sentenced in this way fall under probation. In other words, they might not end up in prison but instead serve their sentence on probation, typically in their place of residence, and participate in a rehabilitation program. Currently, there are 235 wartime collaborators on probation in Ukraine.[63]   5.1. Violation of the Principle of Legal Certainty   Articles 111-1 and 111-2 contain certain formulations that can be interpreted broadly, leading to significant discretion for prosecutors applying these provisions. Among such formulations are the terms ‘material resources’ and ‘interaction with the aggressor state’ in part 4 Article 111-1, as well as ‘intentional actions aimed at assisting the aggressor state’ in Article 111-2. Additionally, the definition of ‘economic activities’ is blurred and interpreted extremely broadly and inconsistently. According to judicial practice, this category may encompass both food products and engaging in any work activity in the occupied territory. The lack of clarity in these provisions provides prosecutors with a wide range of interpretations and raises concerns about the potential misuse or abuse of these legal terms. It is essential to ensure that legal definitions are precise and specific to prevent arbitrary application and uphold legal certainty and fairness in proceedings.   According to most recent judicial practice, part 2 Article 111-1 has become a universal provision for penalising those who did not hold leadership positions in the occupational administrations but agreed to continue working in the occupied territory. However, the actual harm from such activities to the local population and the Ukrainian national security is quite questionable. For example, it may include persons who continued or agreed to work as school guards,[64] social workers,[65] or even as ‘heads of street representatives’ (a person representing the residents of a particular street in relations with occupation authorities).[66]   It is noteworthy to mention the overly broad formulation of Article 111-2, which could encompass workers in critical infrastructure facilities and medical institutions. In some cases, even employees of critical infrastructure[67] and medical institutions[68] have been sentenced under this article, despite international humanitarian law stating that they should not be held accountable as they are responsible for ensuring the population’s livelihoods in the occupied territory. Perhaps some clarifications, notes, or narrowing down the scope of individuals subject to responsibility are needed for Article 111-2.   5.2. Unclear Distinction Between Corpus Delicti    As mentioned earlier, Articles 111-1, 111-2, and 436-2 were introduced into the Ukrainian Criminal Code with a one-month difference in their enactment, without sufficient coordination and differentiation between them that may cover collaboration with an aggressor state. Additionally, these articles differ in their writing techniques, further complicating their distinction.   Article 111-2 is comprehensive and encompasses all actions aimed at supporting (abetting) an aggressor state through the implementation or endorsement of decisions and actions of the aggressor state, which can include any activity on the occupied territory. Similarly, Article 111-1 provides a list of activities considered wartime collaboration, such as publicly supporting the actions of the aggressor state, holding leadership or non-leadership positions in the occupation administrations, and implementing the education standards of the aggressor state. All these actions, among others, may fall under the definition of actions aimed at supporting (abetting) the aggressor state. Moreover, Article 111-2 also includes the voluntary collection, preparation, and/or transfer of material resources or other assets to representatives of the aggressor state, directly intersecting with part 4 Article 111-1, which establishes criminal liability for the transfer of material resources and/or conducting economic activities in collaboration with the aggressor state.   For instance, the actions of a person who, while holding the position of the head of the education department, supports the decisions and actions of the aggressor state in implementing Russian educational standards in the temporarily occupied territory, were classified under Article 111-2.[69] Although the third part of Article 111-1 outlines a separate element of the offence—actions by Ukrainian citizens aimed at implementing the education standards of the aggressor state in educational institutions. In another scenario, the actions of a person who organised the collection of funds on a bank card for subsequent transfer to be used by representatives of the Russian armed formations were qualified under Article 111-2.[70] However, such actions also fall under part 4 of Article 111-1.   The distinction between part 1 of Article 111-1 and Article 436-2 seems to be also complicated. While the formulation of part 1 of Article 111-1 explicitly includes the criterion of the public nature of denial of aggression and support for the actions of the aggressor state, under which, according to practice, all forms of spreading such statements on social media fall, these same actions are also classified within the scope of Article 436-2 in judicial practice. One of the methods proposed by the Ukrainian Supreme Court for differentiation is through the object of encroachment.[71] Specifically, actions within part 1 of Article 111-1 affect national security, while within Article 436-2, the object of the crime is peace, humanity, and international order. In this context, the concept of ‘humanity’ is broader and encompasses ‘national security’ as well. In judicial practice, drawing such distinctions proves to be quite challenging. As a result, the same actions are classified differently in some cases, falling under part 1 of Article 111-1, which entails the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in specific activities for a term ranging from ten to 15 years. In other cases, the actions are categorised under Article 436-2, where the penalties are significantly harsher, ranging from corrective labour for up to two years to imprisonment for up to five years, with or without property confiscation, or imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with property confiscation or without, specifically for public officials.   Another example of interpretation divergence lies in distinguishing between part 7 of Article 111-1 and Article 111. Particular actions fall under part 7 of Article 111-1 for persons who did not serve as law enforcement or judicial authorities’ employees before the occupation but assumed positions under occupation. However, if a person exercised corresponding powers and continued to do so under occupation, it is considered a shift to the enemy's side, consequently falling under Article 111. Some judges argue that voluntarily assuming a position in illegal law enforcement agencies should be qualified under part 7 of Article 111-1. In contrast, subsequent activities in that position should additionally be classified under Article 111.   The judicial practice has also demonstrated the complexity of distinguishing between part 1 of Article 111-1 and Article 436-2. These articles coincide in terms of denying armed aggression, with the primary distinction being the ‘level of publicity’. Article 436-2 predominantly addresses posts on social media.[72] For example, a person was sentenced to two years in prison for a post on Telegram,[73] another person was sentenced to five years in prison for reposting on Russian social media Odnoklassniki.[74] However, considering the similarity in the wording of the articles, the issue arises from the fact that part 1 of Article 111-1 is a misdemeanour, while Article 436-2 deals with a crime. This discrepancy is reflected in the penalties prescribed by these articles.   Therefore, the ambiguity in formulating Articles 111-1, 111-2, and 436-2 makes it difficult to distinguish them when qualifying certain actions. Understanding which actions fall under criminal liability according to these articles becomes challenging, contributing to inconsistent application of the law and the imposition of punishments disproportionate to the committed offences.   5.3. Custody Seems to be the Only Choice for Pre-trial Detention   The judicial practice has demonstrated that when a prosecutor requests the imposition of a preventive measure, such as pre-trial detention, the court often grants such a request without conducting a detailed examination of the risks associated with the alleged crimes. These risks are considered sufficient grounds for the imposition of such an exceptional preventive measure. In essence, the court must assess the presence and realism of these risks when determining the preventive measure. However, an analysis of court judgement on the imposition of preventive measures suggests that risk assessment is often formal. Furthermore, the accused person's residence or origin in a temporarily occupied territory significantly influences the severity of the alleged crimes. It becomes a decisive factor in choosing pre-trial detention as a preventive measure. In this context, judges often refer to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) practice, citing several cases.[75] However, these references often have a formal nature. Phrases with references are repeated from decision to decision, making it challenging to assess whether the court genuinely analysed the relevant ECtHR practice or if the references serve as an attempt to showcase formal compliance with European standards without real application.   Typically, when a preventive measure, such as detention, is chosen, it is extended until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The use of bail as an alternative preventive measure is limited. Nevertheless, for instance, in the case of a person suspected of committing a criminal offence under part 4 of Article 111-1,[76] the court determined a preventive measure in the form of bail at 53,680 hryvnias.[77]   5.4. Lack of Exculpatory Judgements and Standards of Evidence   In wartime collaboration cases, there is a noticeable inclination towards accusatory perspectives. This is evident in the scarcity of acquittals, with only two exoneration judgements identified— one under Article 111-1[78] and the other under Article 111-2.[79] Both are grounded in the insufficiency and inadequacy of evidence gathered during pre-trial investigations. It is worth noting that in at least two cases observed by journalists, the judge handed participants a fully printed judgement text within an hour or less of deliberation in the council chamber. This suggests that the verdict may have been drafted before the judicial debates took place. Additionally, the judicial practice has revealed a remarkably low standard of evidence and the inadmissibility of certain proofs, including the consideration of evidence that does not genuinely attest to the commission of the act.[80] This raises concerns about the fairness and transparency of the judicial process, as it seems some decisions may be predetermined or influenced by factors beyond the scope of the trial itself.   Among the primary pieces of evidence utilised by prosecutors in such cases to substantiate guilt are documents from occupational administrations, publications in Russian media, and social media. Many court verdicts also reference statements or appointments to positions as evidence of guilt. However, questions arise regarding the admissibility of such evidence, considering the complexity of establishing its authenticity. Additionally, according to Law[81] any act (decision, document) issued by authorities on the temporarily occupied territory is invalid and does not create legal consequences.[82] Meanwhile, documents regarding acceptance to a position or other documents from occupying authorities are unquestionably used as proper evidence for the prosecution.   5.5. Asymmetric Between Violation and Punishment   The difficulties in distinguishing between Articles 111-1, 111-2, and 436-2, along with unclear formulations, also result in the imposition of punishments disproportionate to the established violations. Specifically, when differentiating between the elements of crimes outlined in Articles 111-1 and 111-2, a significant disparity in sanctions between these articles becomes apparent. In the cases examined above under Article 111-2, actions that also fall under parts 3 and 4 of Article 111-1 were qualified. On the one hand, part 3 of Article 111-1 provides for penalties such as corrective labour for up to two years, arrest for up to six months, or imprisonment for up to three years with the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a period of ten to 15 years. On the other hand, part 4 of Article 111-1 stipulates penalties in the form of a fine or imprisonment for three to five years with the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a period of ten to 15 years, along with property confiscation.   Article 111-2, under which actions were qualified, entails punishment in the form of imprisonment for a period ranging from ten to 12 years, with the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a period of ten to 15 years, and with or without property confiscation. The inconsistent application of sanctions and the disproportionate nature of penalties are also evident in cases that fall under the same section of Article 111-1. This raises concerns about the fairness and uniformity of the legal system, reflecting a need for a more consistent approach to sentencing and the application of sanctions.   In a particular case, a person who voluntarily slaughtered two sheep and personally delivered the ‘material resources’ to Russian representatives, thus ‘facilitating their occupation activities in the village’, was sentenced to one year and three months of imprisonment.[83] Meanwhile, a person who voluntarily provided ‘material resources’ to the servicemen of the Russian occupation forces, including preparing meals, washing clothes, and instructing local residents to slaughter sheep for her to cook meals for the Russian Armed Forces, was fined 17,850 hryvnias.[84] Additionally, she was deprived of the right to hold elected positions in government and local self-government for ten years, with the confiscation of all her property. In both cases, the accused parties entered into agreements acknowledging their guilt.[85]   In another case, a person who repeatedly and voluntarily provided ‘material resources’ to Russian occupation forces, such as food products and alcoholic beverages, and even cooked meals for them, was sentenced to three years of imprisonment.[86] This came with the deprivation of the right to hold positions in state authorities, state administration, local self-government, or provide public services for ten years, along with the confiscation of half of her personal property. However, another person who freely handed over ‘material resources’ to unidentified Russian Federation servicemen, specifically 20 kg of pork in two polyethylene bags, was sentenced to four years of imprisonment and the deprivation of the right to hold positions in state authorities and local self-government for 12 years.[87]   6. Final Brushstrokes   From March 2022 to September 2023, eleven draft laws have been registered in the Ukrainian Parliament to address the issues arising from the legal practice with the ‘new’ articles on wartime collaboration.[88] These legislative proposals aim to alter the jurisdiction of cases, increase the severity of punishments, expand the scope of individuals who could face criminal charges (eg foreigners), extend the rehabilitation period for criminal records, and introduce other changes. Essentially, all these draft laws seek to criminalise wartime collaboration further. However, one exception, Draft Law No 7570, aims to clarify the differentiation between Articles 111-1, 111-2 and 436-2.[89] This Draft Law appears to be most effective in the context of delineating articles. Additionally, it suggests excluding liability for publicly calling to disregard the spread of Ukraine's state sovereignty on temporarily occupied territories from Article 111-1. The Draft Law also recommends removing Article 111-2 to eliminate the multiplication of articles within the Ukrainian Criminal Code containing the same criminal elements but with different sanctions imposed on them. Streamlining the legal framework this way could create a more coherent and efficient legal system. I will not  delve into a detailed analysis of each individual document separately.[90] As of September 2023, all these draft laws are still under consideration and have not been put to a vote.   In my view, the existence of at least eleven draft laws proposing amendments to wartime collaboration legislation, coupled with the fact that none of the registered draft laws have been adopted, underscores the imperfections in the legal framework and the necessity for its revision. This also reflects a lack of unified understanding regarding the specific changes required for the effective and proper implementation of provisions concerning wartime collaboration. A comprehensive review and consensus-building process are essential to address these shortcomings and ensure a more coherent legal approach to collaboration activities.   Examining investigative and judicial practices reveals the complexity of distinguishing the qualification of actions that may fall under wartime collaboration. Despite introducing ‘new articles’ into the criminal legislation over a year and a half ago, their broad formulation and intersection of dispositions do not allow for developing a proper practice of differentiation in their application. Judicial practice confirms that there is a difference in the interpretation of the articles by different prosecutors, leading to their varied application in practice. The application of the ‘new articles’ also indicates an inconsistency in the violation and punishment, particularly in the context of differentiating actions falling under the provisions of articles 111-1, 111-2, and 436-2, whose sanctions significantly differ. Additionally, there is a varied application of sanctions for the same actions. Implementing these ‘new articles’ lacks uniformity and coherence, posing challenges in interpretation and application within the legal framework.   One of the major issues identified revolves around the broad interpretation of articles 111-1, 111-2 and 436-2. This stems from the ambiguity in their formulation during the development phase. The articles include concepts such as ‘material resources’, ‘economic activity’, and ‘interaction’, for which legislators have not set clear boundaries. These terms fall within the discretion of prosecutors, violating the principle of legal certainty. Individuals in occupied territories lack a clear understanding of permissible actions, potentially exposing them to criminal liability. This lack of clarity adds additional pressure and fear among the Ukrainian population in occupied territory. The wide discretion granted to prosecutors also poses corruption risks. The absence of a clear definition threatens reintegration processes and undermines public trust in the Ukrainian justice system. Addressing these issues is crucial to ensure a more transparent and trustworthy legal system.   The near absence of ‘not-guilty’ judgements in wartime collaboration cases and the low evidence standards lead to a lack of competition between the parties. Additionally, there is the unquestioned application of pre-trial detention as a preventive measure. Also, from the practical aspect of investigating wartime collaboration, the consideration of documents issued by occupying authorities contradicts the official Ukrainian policy of non-recognition of such documents.   It may be necessary to draft a new law amending legislation on wartime collaboration. This law would aim to clarify broad formulations and clearly delineate the elements of crimes specified in articles 111-1, 111-2, and 436-2. Specifically, a clear list of actions that would incur criminal liability should exist. These actions should encompass not only the formal execution of specific work or holding a certain position in occupational administrations but also the negative consequences of such activities for Ukrainian national security. The court should systematically assess these consequences.   The Ukrainian parliament should consider the societal danger and consequences of actions outlined in Articles 111-1, 111-2, and 436-2. It is essential to devise proportional and fair punishments for such violations. Specifically, exploring the possibility of reclassifying the least severe category of offences from the realm of criminal justice and implementing measures of lustration is worth considering. Additionally, contemplating the development of legislation regarding amnesty could be a viable option. These measures would not only bridge the gap between the societal peril of action and the corresponding punishment but also contribute to relieving the burden on the justice system. Moreover, they could facilitate the reintegration processes of Ukraine's de-occupied territories and its residents, fostering a more cohesive society.   Additionally, for an effective investigation of wartime collaboration cases, it is crucial to develop a unified strategy for investigation agencies dealing with this category of cases. Such a strategy should outline collaboration frameworks among different agencies to prevent redundant actions, clearly define distinctions between various charges, and provide interpretations of broad concepts to reduce the discretion of certain prosecutors and the inconsistency in applying the law. This strategy should also include criteria for proving voluntariness and identifying evidence that does not meet the criteria of relevance and sufficiency. In determining approaches to holding individuals accountable for cooperation with occupying authorities among Ukrainian citizens residing in temporarily occupied territories, it is essential to consider the subsequent reintegration of liberated territories. The goal is to ensure the full return of the population of these territories to the legal, informational, and cultural framework of Ukraine. This requires a thoughtful approach that considers the broader context of post-conflict reconstruction and the reestablishment of normalcy in the lives of those affected by wartime collaboration.   7. Conclusion   The analysis of Ukrainian laws regarding wartime collaboration has revealed numerous weaknesses. It is imperative to persuade Ukrainian leaders to amend the collaborationism law. The international community can play a constructive role in assisting Ukraine in reintegrating communities under Russian control.   Additionally, international stakeholders could advocate for amendments to Ukraine’s collaboration law to make it more precise and align it with international humanitarian law, which mandates that the occupying power ensures essential services. This means that individuals providing key services in healthcare, administration, or education are generally allowed to continue their professional duties, even under occupation. Until the collaborationism law is reformed, international institutions may encourage the Ukrainian government toward its reasonable application. Specifically, they can incentivise the emerging trend of applying the full force of the law only to influential criminals whose collaboration may be linked to significant harm or who coerced others into collaboration. Mass accusations of wartime collaboration may breed suspicion between liberators and the liberated and burden the Ukrainian judicial system. A clearer definition of what constitutes wartime collaboration could help those currently living under occupation make informed judgments about their options and what awaits them after liberation. This would be a crucial step towards ensuring that people still living under occupation become valuable participants in the country’s future recovery.   A rigid stance by the Ukrainian judiciary on collaboration may ultimately lead to human rights violations and the emergence of conflicts that hinder the recovery of Ukrainian communities. It is essential not to overlook the fact that a nuanced approach to wartime collaboration will be a key component of sustainable peace in Ukraine. As Ukraine navigates the complex circumstances of Russian aggression, scholars, policymakers, legal experts, and international stakeholders must engage in ongoing dialogue to refine and adapt legislative approaches. A balanced and thoughtful response is essential to address wartime collaboration while fostering reconciliation and ensuring justice without jeopardising the broader objectives of national recovery and stability. Artem Nazarko Artem Nazarko is a Doctoral Researcher at the London South Bank University School of Law and Social Sciences. Artem is a Legal Researcher at the Platform for Peace and Humanity, Slovakia. He was formerly a Consultant at Global Right Compliance, The Netherlands. Artem holds a Master’s degree (LLM) in International Law from the National University Odesa Law Academy, Ukraine. Artem is also a member of the National Ukrainian Bar Association. E-mail: nazarkoaa@onua.edu.ua & s4239455@lsbu.ac.uk . ORCID ID 0000-0002-4190-7288. The author wishes to thank Dr David Birchall and Dr Ozan Kamiloglu for their ongoing support and significant and insightful advice provided throughout my research. The author expresses gratitude to the editorial team of this journal for their valuable feedback on the draft version of this article, which contributed to its improvement. [1] See generally US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual  (2015) 1056-57; UK Ministry of Defence, The Joint Service Manual of Armed Conflict (Joint Service Publication 383, 2004) 63. [2] Gerhard Hirschfeld, ‘Collaboration in Nazi-Occupied France: Some Introductory Remarks’ in Gerhard Hirschfeld and Patrick Marsh (eds), Collaboration in France: Politics and Culture During the Nazi Occupation, 1940–1944  (Berg 1989). [3] Stathis N Kalyvas, ‘Collaboration in Comparative Perspective’ (2008) 15(2) European Review of History 109; Henrik Dethlefsen, ‘Denmark and the German Occupation: Cooperation, Negotiation or Collaboration?’ (1990) 15(1-2) Scandinavian Journal of History 198. [4] See eg, István Deák, Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance, and Retribution during World War II  (Westview Press 2015) 257. [5]  Se e generally Shane Darcy, To Serve the Enemy: Informers, Collaborators, and the Laws of Armed Conflict  (Oxford University Press 2019). [6] Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 1949 Art 17; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1949 Art 31. [7] Shane Darcy, ‘Coming to Terms with Wartime Collaboration: Post-Conflict Processes & Legal Challenges’ (2019) 45(1) Brook J Int'l L 80 . [8] See Maria Fritsche, ‘Spaces of encounter: relations between the occupier and the occupied in Norway during the Second World War’ (2020) 45(3) Social History 360, 370-373. [9]   See   Preeta Nilesh, ‘Norway and World War II: Invasion, Occupation, Liberation’ (2012) 73 Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 1117. [10] See Fabian Lemmes, ‘Collaboration in wartime France, 1940–1944’ (2008) 15(2) European Review of History 157. [11] See Kim Munholland, ‘Wartime France: Remembering Vichy’ (1994) 18(3) French Historical Studies 801. [12] See Joshua D Zimmerman, ‘The Polish Underground Home Army (AK) and the Jews: What Postwar Jewish Testimonies and Wartime Documents Reveal’ (2020) 34(1) East European Politics and Societies 194. [13] See Jochen Böhler and Jacek A Młynarczyk, ‘Collaboration and Resistance in Wartime Poland (1939–1945)–A Case for Differentiated Occupation Studies’ (2018) 16(2) Journal of Modern European History 225. [14] Michael Ignatieff, ‘The Question of Collaboration’ ( Project Syndicate , 16 August 2023) < https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/wartime-collaboration-remains-a-complex-question-by-michael-ignatieff-2023-07 > accessed 10 March 2024. [15] The majority of Ukrainians in the western regions opposed Soviet rule for various reasons, especially after the 18-month period of Soviet occupation in Ukraine from 1939 to 1941. The Soviet Union had forcefully occupied eastern Ukraine in the years between the two World Wars. The Soviet Union was responsible for the devastating famine known as the Holodomor in the early 1930s, resulting in the deaths of millions of Ukrainians. [16] Throughout various periods of WWII, from August 1939 to May 1945, various armed formations composed of Ukrainians were created and collaborated with Germans. These included the Ukrainian Nationalist Military Units (Bergbauern Hilfe), bataillons Nachtigall (Bataillon Ukrainische Gruppe Nachtigall) and Roland (Battalion Ukrainische Gruppe Roland), the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police (Ukrainische Schutzmannschaft), the Ukrainian Liberation Army (Ukrainische Befreiungsarmee), the 14th SS-Volunteer Division ‘Galicia’ (14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS [Galizische Nr 1]), and the Ukrainian National Army (Ukrainische Nationalarmee). [17] See David R Marples, S talinism in Ukraine in the 1940s (Palgrave Macmillan 1992) 64. [18] See Georgiy Kasianov, ‘Nationalist Memory Narratives and the Politics of History in Ukraine since the 1990s’ (2023) Nationalities Papers 1. [19] See Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll, ‘Ukraine's Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022’ (Cambridge University Press 2023). [20]  U nited Nations General Assembly Resolution ES‑11/1 of 2 March 2022. [21]   UNHCR, ‘Ukraine refugee situation’ ( Operational Data Portal Refugee , 2022) < https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine > accessed 7 April 2024. [22] OHCHR, ‘Ukraine: civilian casualty update 24 September 2023’ ( OHCHR , 26 September 2023), < https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/09/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-24-september-2023 > accessed 7 April 2024. [23] Pierre Breteau, ‘War in Ukraine: Russia now controls only 16% of Ukrainian territory’ Le Monde  (Paris, 6 January 2023) < https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2023/01/06/war-in-ukraine-russia-now-controls-only-16-of-ukrainian-territory_6010578_8.html > accessed 7 April 2024. [24] Law of Ukraine No 2110-IX 3 March 2022; Law of Ukraine No 2108-IX 3 March 2022; Law of Ukraine No 2198-IX 14 April 2022. [25] ‘Criminal liability for collaborationism: analysis of current legislation, practice of its application, and proposals for amendments’ ( Zmina , November 2022) < https://zmina.ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/12/zvit_zmina_eng-1.pdf > accessed 7 April 2024. [26] Sian Norris, ‘“We Are on the Frontline”—a Year on from Kharkiv Oblast Being Liberated, Its Residents Tell’ ( The Ferret , 13 October 2023) < https://theferret.scot/kharkiv-oblast-liberated-its-residents-tell-stories > accessed 7 April 2024. [27] Sergei Kuznetsov, ‘Ukraine Liberates Kherson in Another Stunning Defeat for Russia’ ( Politico , 11 November 2022) < https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-liberates-kherson-army-war-defeat-russia-dnipro/ > accessed 7 April 2024. [28] Tim Tolsdorff, ‘The Question of Wartime Collaboration Is Extremely Sensitive’ ( Robert Bosch Stiftung , 26 April 2023) < https://www.bosch-stiftung.de/en/storys/question-wartime-collaboration-extremely-sensitive > accessed 7 April 2024. [29] Lily Hyde, ‘Forced to fight your own people: How Russia is weaponizing passports’ ( Politico , 1 January 2023) < https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-citizenship-war-russia-weaponize-passport-passportization-mobilization-draft/ > accessed 7 April 2024. [30] ‘Ukraine’ ( Freedom House , 2023) < https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-world/2023 > accessed 7 April 2024. [31] ‘Zрадники країни’ ( Movement Chesno , 2022) < https://www.chesno.org/traitors/ > accessed 7 April 2024. [32] ‘База зрадників Херсону’ Telegram channel < https://t.me/Kherson_kolaborant > accessed 7 April 2024. [33] Igor Burdyga, ‘The problems with Ukraine’s wartime collaboration law’ ( Open Democracy , 16 August 2023) < https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-kherson-wartime-collaboration-law-problems-amendments/ > accessed 7 April 2024. [34] See James Verini, ‘Some Ukrainians Helped the Russians. Their Neighbors Sought Revenge’, The New York Times (NYC, 1 November 2023) < https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/01/magazine/ukraine-kherson-collaboration-russia.html >; Joshua Yaffa, ‘The Hunt for Russian Collaborators in Ukraine’, The New Yorker  (NYC, 30 January 2023) < https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/02/06/the-hunt-for-russian-collaborators-in-ukraine > all accessed 7 April 2024; Leonid Belkin et al, ‘Problems of Responsibility in Modern Ukraine for Collaborative Activities’ (2022) 21 Ekspert: Paradigmi Ûridičnih Nauk Ì Deržavnogo Upravlìnnâ 51. [35] Patrick Wintour, ‘NATO allies back fast-track membership for Ukraine, says Cleverly’ Guardian  (London, 21 June 2023) < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/21/ukraine-recovery-london-conference-volodymyr-zelenskiy-eu > accessed 7 April 2024. [36] Simon Schlegel, ‘What will Ukraine do with Russian collaborators? Revenge would be a mistake’ Guardian (London, 26 June 2023) < https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/26/ukraine-russia-collaborators-revenge > accessed 7 April 2024. [37] Namely: the Draft Law of Ukraine No 2549 of 06 December 2019, the Draft Law of Ukraine No 5143 of 24 February 2021, the Draft Law of Ukraine No 5135 of 2 March 2021. [38] Criminal Code of Ukraine 2001 A rt 111 ‘High treason’ . [39] Law of Ukraine No 2108-IX 3 March 2022. [40] ‘Criminal Liability for Collaborationism: Analysis of current legislation, practice of its application, and proposals for amendments’ Analytical Note (2022) < https://zmina.ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/12/zvit_zmina_eng-1.pdf > accessed 7 April 2024. [41]   Law of Ukraine No 2110-IX 3 March 2022. [42] Law of Ukraine No 2198-IX 14 April 2022. [43] Criminal Code of Ukraine 2001 Art 111-1, 111-2, and 436-2 Unofficial translation of Articles available at < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4782115 > accessed 7 April 2024. [44] Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Art 216. [45]   Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, ‘On registered criminal offences and the results of their pre-trial investigation’ < https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/pro-zareyestrovani-kriminalni-pravoporushennya-ta-rezultati-yih-dosudovogo-rozsliduvannya-2 > accessed 7 April 2024. [46] Sumy region Prosecutor’s Office (26 April 2022) < https://sumy.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=312758&fp=180 > accessed 7 April 2024. [47]   Sumy region Prosecutor’s Office (3 June 2022) < https://sumy.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314326&fp=130 > accessed 7 April 2024. [48]   Later, this person was sentenced to six months of arrest according to information from the Sumy region Prosecutor’s Office (29 June 2022) < https://sumy.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=315472&fp=100 > accessed 7 April 2024. [49] Kharkiv region Prosecutor’s Office (22 August 2022) < https://khar.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=318376&fp=91 > accessed 7 April 2024. [50]  Kharkiv region Prosecutor’s Office  ( 13 June 2022) < https://chrg.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314664&fp=80 >  accessed 7 April 2024. [51]  Luhanks region Prosecutor’s Office  ( 3 November 2022) < https://lug.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=322364 >  accessed 7 April 2024. [52]  Kharkiv region Prosecutor’s Office  ( 27 October 2022 ) < https://khar.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=321990&fp=30 >  accessed 7 April 2024. [53]  Luhanks region Prosecutor’s Office  ( 22 August 2022 ) < https://lug.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=318531&fp=30 >  accessed 7 April 2024. [54]  Kherson region Prosecutor’s Office  ( 7 September 2022) < https://kherson.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=319339 >  accessed 7 April 2024. [55]  Zaporizhia region Prosecutor’s Office (31  May 2022 ) < https://zap.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314102&fp=130 >  accessed 7 April 2024. [56]  Kherson region Prosecutor’s Office  ( 25 October 2022) < https://kherson.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=321876&fp=10 >  accessed 7 April 2024. [57] Luhanks region Prosecutor’s Office (24 October 2022) < https://lug.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=321772&fp=20 > accessed 7 April 2024. [58] Zaporizhia region Prosecutor’s Office (3 August 2022) < https://zap.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=317287&fp=60 > accessed 7 April 2024. [59] Luhanks region Prosecutor’s Office (15 September 2022) < https://lug.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=319784&fp=60 > accessed 7 April 2024. [60]   Luhanks region Prosecutor’s Office. 21 October 2022. < https://lug.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=321681&fp=20 > accessed 7 April 2024. [61] Table 2 includes only judgments that are publicly available. [62] State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, < https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/ > accessed 7 April 2024. [63] ‘235 засуджених колаборантів в Україні перебувають на пробації’ ( Suspilne , 5 April 2023) < https://suspilne.media/436287-235-zasudzenih-kolaborantiv-v-ukraini-perebuvaut-na-probacii-direktor-centru-probacii/ > accessed 7 April 2024. [64] Judgement in case No 485/480/23 [26 June 2023] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/111767016 > accessed 7 April 2024. [65]   Judgement  in case No 766/4291/23 [28 August 2023] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/113289416 >  accessed 7 April 2024. [66] Judgement in case No 202/3884/23 [15 August 2023] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/112856417 > accessed 7 April 2024. [67] Judgement in case No 574/369/22 [21 December 2022] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/107991214 > accessed 7 April 2024. [68] Judgement in case No 953/7265/22 [19 December 2022] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/107934917 > accessed 7 April 2024. [69] Judgement in case No 337/414/23 [30 May2023] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/111172842 > accessed 7 April 2024. [70] Judgement in case No 496/350/23 [25 May 2023] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/111089967 > accessed 7 April 2024. [71] ‘How to distinguish between collaboration and related criminal offences' ( Supreme Court of Ukraine , 26 July 2022) < https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-center/news/1299973/ > accessed 7 April 2024. [72] In total, out of 715 judgements under Article 436-2, 559 judgements pertained to posts/shares/likes on social media platforms. Specifically, there were 425 cases on Odnoklassniki, 36 on VKontakte, 33 on Facebook, 42 on Telegram, 11 on Viber, 6 on YouTube, 3 on WhatsApp, and 3 on Instagram. For more see Mykola Komarovskyi and Denys Volokha‘Prison for ‘likes’ in the social networks? How people are punished in Ukraine for justifying Russian aggression’ ( Human Rights in Ukraine , 30 October 2023) < https://khpg.org/1608812978 > accessed 7 April 2024. [73] Judgement in case No 749/274/23 [26 September 2023] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/113724365 > accessed 7 April 2024. [74] Judgement in case No 607/13194/22 [19 July 2023] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/112330287 > accessed 7 April 2024. [75] Such as Fox, Campbell and Hartley v The United Kingdom  [30 August 1990] Appl No 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86; Murray v The United Kingdom  [28 October 1994] Appl No 22384/93; Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v Ukraine  [21 April 2011] Appl No 42310/04; Mirosław Garlicki v. Poland  [14 June 2011] Appl No 36921/07. [76] Decision in case No 646/4400/23 [06 September 2023] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/113278894 > accessed 7 April 2024. [77] Approximately 1,400 US dollars. [78] Judgement in case No 279/1883/22 [10 February 2023] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/ Review/108894798> accessed 7 April 2024. [79] Judgement in case No 529/1660/22 [1 September 2023] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/ Review/113253801> accessed 7 April 2024. [80] Such as witness statements based on third-party accounts. [81] Part 3 Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine No 1207-VII of 15 April 2014 ‘On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime on Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine’. [82]  Except for documents confirming birth, death, or marriage registration (dissolution) on the temporarily occupied territory. [83]   Judgement  in case No 588/713/22 [18 August 2022] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/ Review/105808995 > accessed 7 April 2024. [84]  Approximately 450 US dollars. [85] Judgement in case No 588/672/22 [6 September 2022] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/ Review/106096380> accessed 7 April 2024. [86] Judgement in case No 545/5177/22 [10 November 2022] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/ Review/107246755> accessed 7 April 2024. [87] Judgement in case No 577/3465/22 [15 November 2022] < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/ Review/107375149> accessed 7 April 2024. [88] Namely: Draft Laws No 7223 [28 March 2022]; No. 7279 [12 April 2022]; No 7329 [29 April 2022]; No 7570 [20 July 2022]; No 7646 [08 August 2022]; No 7647 [08 August 2022]; No 8077 [26 September 2022]; No 8301 [23 December 2022]; No 8301-1 [05 January 2023]; No 8301-2 [09 January 2023]; No 10136 [09 October 2023]. [89]  Draft Law No 7570 [20 July 2022 ]. [90]  For detailed analysis see ‘Collaborationism and abetting the aggressor state: practice of legislative application and prospects for improvement’ Analytical report (Zmina, 2023)   < https://zmina.ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/10/colaboration_web_ukr-1.pdf >  accessed 7 April 2024.

My Story   Ten years old and wishing I was dead. Sitting on my bed, staring at my hand—wondering whether I was invisible or not. I never want another child to feel invisible, worthless, and so terrorised that they can’t swallow. So filled with fear that their very breath feels choked and smothered. Let me take you on a journey back 50 years, to my childhood.   My mum had run away from her Mafia boyfriend, a Greek man who was already married. Upon hearing my mum was pregnant, he took out a gun and put it to her stomach, saying: ‘Get rid of the baby or I will kill you both’. There was no fairy-tale ending, as my mum had hoped, of him leaving his wife, marriage, and having a baby together. There was only the stark reality of running in fear—homeless, with no money and no work. My mum ended up living in a homeless shelter in the UK, traumatised and addicted to alcohol. I was born two months early. As my mum couldn’t look after me, I went to live with an aunt. In the meantime, my mum met a smooth-talking man in a pub who groomed her, said he loved her and asked her to marry him. She did marry him, and when I was two she took me back and I lived with them.   My stepdad was evil; he was an alcoholic and a psychopath. He had severe mental illness and hated me with every fibre of his being. He was obsessively jealous and saw me as a part of the man who my mum first loved. Life as a child was hell on earth. My stepdad was drunk and aggressive daily and beat my mum most weeks. I saw her kicked, punched, stabbed, screamed at, and constantly verbally and emotionally abused. My stepdad would chase her down our street with a knife and punch her in front of the neighbours; yet not one person stepped in to help. The attitude was to turn a blind eye and not interfere with the business of others.   One night I witnessed my mum being kicked in the stomach and strangled and I watched in fear as an ambulance took her unconscious, battered body to hospital. The neighbours had phoned the police when they heard the screams—the first time the neighbours had actually helped. My stepdad was arrested, but the next morning he got let off and came home. My stepdad told me my mum was dead, and when I started to cry, he took out a knife and said he would cut me in pieces and put me in the freezer. Three days later my mum walked in the door, bruised and with a hoarse voice. I ran to her immediately—all I wanted was to be hugged and comforted. I had just endured three days of hell thinking she was dead. Instead she pushed me away and said, ‘We don’t talk about it’.   My stepdad was in a gang of men, a gang that included both a doctor and a policeman. They would come to the house and buy me with money or sometimes give my stepdad a bottle of whiskey. I cannot look at a bottle of whiskey without being triggered by the trauma of what happened to me. I often had the thought: ‘I am only worth the value of a bottle of whiskey’. The gang would abuse and rape me. Sometimes I would be taken in a car to places where other men and children were located and be abused there, but it is all a blur for me now—they gave me meds to keep me quiet.   Many times as a child I would end up in the hospital for different injuries. At the age of 13, I was admitted for a forced abortion. I was terrified of both the hospitals and the doctors, and throughout the visits my stepdad was with me, glaring me into silence. He and the gang would often tell me they would kill me if I ever spoke about things or ever told anyone. So how could I speak up and ask for help? They told me I was stupid and that no one would ever listen to me. My voice was stolen from me, and I lived in a lonely, invisible, silent world. Not once do I remember a doctor or nurse at the hospital asking me if I was okay, or if I was safe. I was a traumatised and underfed child, small for my age, with constant injuries and yet no one spotted red flags for abuse.   Many hours and days I was locked in a small, under the stairs cupboard as punishment and told that it was my coffin and that I would never come out. It was pitch black, dusty, and hard to breathe. I would go to my imagination and imagine beautiful scenery. I would often imagine sheep, a shepherd, and the sunlight from the words of Psalm 23, which I used to sing about while in a church choir. These pictures gave me hope and took me out of this dark and traumatic situation.   At school the same thing happened, not one teacher ever saw my suffering or my trauma (or they didn’t want to see?). I might as well have been invisible. I walked three miles to school every day through wind and rain. I never brought a packed lunch as I never got one given to me and sometimes had not eaten all day, even at home. Yet the teachers punished me for ‘forgetting my lunch’ time and time again and would say I was stupid and would end up in the gutter. The teachers never questioned my many absences due to hospital visits, or asked why I had a plaster cast on my arm for the second time or why I had bruises again or why I was falling asleep in the class (as I had been awake late with men abusing me in my room and then could not sleep because of the pain in my stomach and body).   When I was thirteen my mum ran away to live with another man, and I didn’t find her until I was fifteen. She was scared to tell me where she was as my stepdad would have killed her. At home my stepdad became more aggressive and would tell me daily that I was worthless and should not have been born. One birthday I said that I wanted a camera. I always saw things as pictures and compositions and longed to capture the things that I saw through photos. My stepdad laughed and said I would be too stupid to understand how to use a camera—so I never got one.   When I was fifteen, I was depressed and anxious and could not cope anymore. I was addicted to alcohol as I would drink alcohol that was at my house just to feel calm and be able to cope. I ended up running away one evening and found myself standing on the edge of a train track where fast trains would go past London. I stood in the dark and a train was speeding towards me. I was just about to jump when I heard a clear voice inside of me saying; ‘don’t jump, you have a future, and in that future, you will see people lost in the dark invisible to others, you will see them and help them’. I did not jump. At that moment I had never felt so lonely.   I ended up taking a train to London and walked about till late at night. I found myself near Waterloo station and met a group of homeless people who called me and asked why a young girl was walking about so late at night. I was fifteen years old but looked about twelve. I will never forget the kindness of this group of people, people who saw me and asked me if I was ok. People often judge the homeless as being dangerous, yet I found them to be kind and a safe place for me. It was inside houses on normal streets that most danger lurked!   I stayed a few weeks with them, and they shared food and blankets and alcohol. When I got drunk, my trauma came flying to the surface and I would be scared and aggressive and fight and damage things. One evening someone called the police. Seeing a big policeman looming over me scared me and I kicked him. I was arrested and put in a cell overnight. I threw up half the night from the alcohol and the other half of the night felt happy. I was inside, warm, and dry. The next morning the policeman threw me out onto the street and threw my shoes out the door at me, one hitting my head. I remember begging him to re-arrest me and put me in prison. He laughed at me and said I was not worth the time and I should go.   Life was not easy and getting to the place I am now in after experiencing many bad things has been hard. I got off the streets and am now married to an amazing man who helped restore my faith in men. I have two awesome children who are both married, and next year I will become a grandma. Life actually feels good now.   I spent three years in trauma therapy with a trauma psychologist who was excellent at his job. He helped me understand why people do such evil things and he helped me understand my own broken emotions. He encouraged me to take up photography as a way to express my hidden emotions as I found it hard to express them after years of being scared to even cry. Photography was the key to unlocking my feelings and thoughts. I became a photographer and won a lot of awards and had many publications in books and magazines which was amazing. It only takes one person to encourage another to unlock talent and potential.   I am now a member of the International Survivors of Trafficking Advisory Council (ISTAC) from the Organisation for Security in Europe (OSCE)’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). At ISTAC, we advise governments from 57 states and work on policies and speak at events. It has given me back my voice in a unique and powerful way.   I am an international speaker and author and work as a consultant for the World Health Organisation and United Nations and for the Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre. I am now setting up a survivors committee in collaboration with the organisation Hope for Justice to promote survivor inclusion. I have just begun working on a project in Romania with an amazing organisation called eLiberare, writing and implementing training on trafficking awareness, identifying potential cases, and instructions for health care workers to follow. I am setting up programming in collaboration with the World Health Organisation in Cyprus, Italy, and Greece. However, on the part of the United Kingdom and many other countries there is a lack of funding being given to modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT) projects and work. Things need to change in the UK and globally if we want to see the fight against modern slavery and human trafficking improve.   Serious Concerns and Areas that Need Improvement   I have serious concerns with how victims of trafficking and slavery are being identified. Less than 0.5% of victims are being identified and this is shocking. Things need to change and the alarm needs to be sounded. I want to inspire change by making the invisible visible. However, we can only do this together by finding the weaknesses and strengthening them. There are a few major areas, in my opinion and from my experience, that could be vastly improved and would lead to more effective identification of victims. Given the current lack of knowledge, lack of trauma-informed methods of working and collaboration and sometimes sheer incompetence, victims are being missed, falling through the cracks, or being re-trafficked. We need to connect the dots by working together with governments, NGOs, first responders and survivor leaders.   1)     Ethical Survivor Inclusion   One effective way to increase identification is to listen to the voice of survivors and work with them. Not in a tokenistic or a tick the box exercise way like is the fashion nowadays, but to include survivors’ voices in all aspects of anti-trafficking work, in a multidisciplinary and in a survivor-centred way as the survivor knows the mind and methods of traffickers and can share this knowledge and expertise. We should be aware that not all survivors want to be asked or want to work in anti-trafficking but those that do and are a good fit should have opportunities for good positions in anti-trafficking organisations and work alongside policy makers and be the policy makers themselves.   A survivor leader is a survivor of trafficking or slavery who has decided to stand up and be a powerful voice in the anti-trafficking movement and use their unique and valuable insights. They should have a voice and a seat at every table at every level. I know many survivor leaders who are doctors, lawyers, authors, or consultants and have degrees and expertise, so their voices should be heard and used.   I would like to see national survivors of trafficking councils set up in every country advising governments, stakeholders, NGOs, and first responders. These councils could be dot joiners, bridges closing the gaps where victims are falling in. Survivors should also be paid in an ethical way as now they are often exploited to share their story for free or for an insulting gift voucher, to a room full of strangers to make money for the charities and organisations and feel used and tired and vouchers don’t pay their cost of living.   2)     First Responders and NRM Implementation   I became a first responder with the Salvation Army and Home Office implementing National Referral Mechanisms (NRMs). An NRM is a framework for identifying victims of trafficking and slavery, making sure they get the help and support they need. Once completed by a first responder, an NRM is submitted to the Home Office and a decision is made on whether or not that person is a victim. I worked in this role this for two years and was so disheartened and shocked at the way NRMs were being implemented. The training I got was very basic. It was half a day of learning statistics regarding trafficking and info about the countries it happened in. We also completed an hour of role-play interviewing, but this was more designed to teach how to fill out a form. Learning numbers does not motivate or teach!   I was never given trauma-informed training or trauma-informed interview skills. I was never told there about the NRM handbook[1] or the Trauma-Informed Code of Conduct (TICC).[2] These are both excellent tools and guides for the proper, trauma-informed way to identify, report and undertake an NRM. When the NRM is done properly it is an excellent identification tool and it should be used in every country in the world. An NRM report should not even be done without the use of the NRM handbook, which is written by survivors of trafficking from ISTAC together with experts such as Tatiana Kolykarenko and Rachel Witkin.   In my work as a first responder, I would first receive contact details of a potential victim of modern slavery or human trafficking. They could be in a safe place, in a prison or even at a police station as they had just been rescued. I had one hour to interview them and write an account of their story onto a form. Sometimes there were other people in the room—an interpreter, maybe a police man or prison guard—all strangers to the potential victim. Many times the potential victim was too traumatised to speak or had only fragmented memories of events.   It is almost impossible for a victim who is scared, traumatised, and feeling ashamed and overwhelmed to be able to tell their traumatic story under the pressure of time, stress and in a room full of people. I observed other first responders act with impatience, lack of trauma-informed knowledge and frustration. This led to victims closing up and the referral form being filled out with the words ‘not collaborating’, which in turn led to the Home Office rejecting the referral. The victim would not receive help and end up being lost in the system. Many of them truly were victims of modern slavery or human trafficking and would end up being re-trafficked or having to stay in prison where they did not belong.   Imagine now as you are reading this, that you are in a room full of strangers and you have to tell, under pressure in the next hour: every horrible and traumatic thing that has ever happened to you, your deepest secrets, things which you are ashamed that you have done, or even what you recently did in bed with your partner. Could you easily do this on command or would you feel blocked, embarrassed, and awkward? I am guessing you would not be able to do this. This is what we are asking of people who are traumatised and scared. It is not trauma-informed to treat people in this manner. First responders are not receiving proper training in trauma-informed interviewing to understand how trauma works on the brain, for example only remembering things in a fragmented way or being triggered at the mention of it. These are all influences which stop a person being able to tell their story in a room full of strangers.   Empathy and compassion are also needed. Can you imagine your daughter, son, mum, or friend being treated in this way after they have experienced such horrific trauma? It is imperative that first responders receive proper trauma-informed and survivor-centric training. Installing a council of survivor leaders to advise and give this training would be, in my eyes, the way forward to better identification of victims.   3)     Mandatory Training for Healthcare Workers and Medical Students   90% of victims of modern slavery and human trafficking will end up in a health care setting, and only about 10% of doctors and health care workers would be able to identify the red flags and the proper steps to take. There needs to be drastic change in order to identify and save victims of trafficking. Governments need to make training of trafficking awareness, identification and next steps mandatory in every medical school and hospital and for every health care worker. Only then will we see a change in how many victims are successfully identified and helped.   Last year in Wales, I spent a week with 2nd year medical students at Cardiff Hospital. I gave the training with Alison Fiander, a gynaecology professor. We started the training off by asking the students what they knew about MSHT. The students knew absolutely nothing, to my shock and surprise. They did not so much as realise they would treat patients who were victims of modern slavery and human trafficking in the hospital when they were qualified as doctors. They all thought slavery and trafficking happened in other countries and not in the United Kingdom. They told us that if they realised a patient was a victim of modern slavery and human trafficking, they would not know what to do. In fact, they had never heard of the National Referral Mechanism and therefore would not know how to report even if they did realise.   The government needs to step up and give funding for mandatory modern slavery and human trafficking training in health care settings. It is not rocket science that if 90% of victims of MSHT end up at some point in a health care setting, and health care workers do not know how to identify victims and have not had any training, then victims will not be identified—and identification is one of the major factors in the fight against MSHT.   4)     Mandatory Lessons and Training in Schools for Children and Teachers   Schools should give awareness training on MSHT to its pupils and teachers to educate, equip and empower. County-lines drugs, sexual exploitation, grooming, and sextortion are alarmingly growing crimes and targeting our young people: awareness, protection, and prevention are paramount. If we educate and protect our children now, then going forward identification of victims will be much faster and more effective and more preventable. Our children will be more aware of the dangers and be able to speak up for themselves and on behalf of their peers. The teachers will also have a better insight into what is happening and be able to identify and act faster. Nothing has changed in the last 50 years! Now is the time for a paradigm shift.   When I was a victim of child sexual exploitation and trafficking, I ended up in the hospital many times with many injuries. I was traumatised, yet not one doctor or nurse asked me if I was ok or even noticed me. I felt invisible. No one identified me as a victim. Teachers did not identify me as a victim and neither did the police on the streets when I was a homeless 15-year-old. This was a terrible missed opportunity and would have saved me years of torture, abuse, and terror. I have spoken to many survivors and victims from many different countries over the last few years, and most of them tell me about hospital visits where they also felt invisible, and no one identified them. I was invisible in a hospital 50 years ago and victims are telling me that even the last few years they have had the same experiences I did. Nothing much has changed in the last 50 years for MSHT victims in healthcare settings. We need to change this now .   Call to Action   It is time to take action, fight for better funding, demand mandatory training in healthcare settings, medical schools, and schools. We need trauma-informed training for first responders and to have survivor leaders as equals at every table at every level; advising, speaking, training and writing policies and guiding policymakers. We need more collaboration, to set up national survivor councils and networks, and to use the National Referral Mechanism to its full potential using the NRM handbook and TICC guide. It is unacceptable to only identify 0.4 % of victims globally and not change the way we work. The system is obviously not working now, so it is time for change, and we are the change we want and need.   I challenge you to step out and step up and break the cycle of apathy and attitude that someone else will do it. Let us do this together or else the next 50 years will be the same! We need to inspire others to take action. We can be the changemakers.   Part III—Photos   The following is a collection of photography taken and curated by Jane Lasonder. This collection depicts beautiful moments as seen by Jane and illustrates the world through her eyes. 1) MARRIAGE IS A MARATHON RACE Description: Wedding photo of runners on a track. This was a real wedding photo I took of a couple who were runners. The man was a professional runner. I wanted to show marriage as a marathon that needs to be worked at to win. This photo won me the title of Sports Photographer of Overijssel, a county in the Netherlands.  2) MAKE A DIFFERENCE  Description: Trumpet player in the dark.  I took this photo at a concert. This trumpet player was on the edge of the stage in the dark. All eyes were on the singer and band in the middle of the stage. I wanted to show that what we do when no one sees can still bring hope and make a difference. 3) GRACE AND STRENGTH Description: Football player Feyenoord vs Malaga. I took this and loved the grace and strength combined of the player. He almost looked like a ballet dancer. 4) COLD LONELINESS Description: Scene of frost in Zwolle, the Netherlands This took place in Zwolle, where I used to live. It was freezing cold, and most people were inside missing the beauty of this frosty scene. It also made me feel lonely, as it was cold and empty. 5) INNOCENCE Description: Children playing on a beach.   These kids were playing, not a care in the world yet there had just been a sea rescue and the emergency helicopter was flying above their heads. I wanted to show the contrast between the innocence of children playing and the dramas of daily life going on around. 6) GOSSIP TIME Description: Geese in frost. The geese were honking at each other, and one walked off like they were having a fight. 7) LOVE Description: Family photo. My most treasured thing ever—my family. My husband Rob, son Jesse, daughter Hannah and our dog. The love for them wins everything. It is why I wake up every day. This was taken in Zwolle, the Netherlands. 8) PEACE Description: Arab and Jewish man shaking hands in the desert. I was with my family driving from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea on holiday and suddenly saw the strangest sight ever! in the middle of the desert an Arab man with his camel shaking hands with a Jewish man. 9) DESPAIR Description: Victim of trafficking sitting near car park stairs I met this traumatised woman living outside on her mattress, on a pile of garbage underneath some car park stairs. She was a victim of human trafficking. She wanted me to take this photo to show the world the face of trafficking. After I took it, I and another woman from an anti-slavery organisation took her to a shelter for food, clothes, and water, and they tried to help her. Sadly, she died a few months later. 10) UNITY Description: Youth concert. This was a concert I took photos for on EO Youth Day, where 20,000 youth in the Netherlands were having a good time together. I call it ‘Unity’, as they were from different cultures and backgrounds yet came together as one. 11) LIGHT Description: Children playing with light. I was taking pictures at a Christmas concert. On the side in a dark place away from the stage I saw two children enjoying the light. I loved the contrast of light and dark. 12) JOY Description: Bedouin child at side of road. Driving from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea, I spotted this Bedouin child at the side of the road. We stopped and gave her some sweets and water and she was so happy. 13) PERSEVERANCE Description: Basketball players scoring a goal. This photo tells me never to give up going for the goal, no matter how hard it is. 14) PRECIOUS MEMORIES Description: Ice skating in the winter. I took this in Zwolle, the Netherlands on a wintery icy day and the rivers and ponds had frozen and families were skating together. I took my kids, and we made memories. Time a family spends together making memories is precious. 15) FRIENDSHIP Description: Dog and bird together. My little dog is in my garden making friends with a little bird. 16) HOPE Description: Group of runners during sunrise. The members of the group of friends running this marathon each raised 10000 Euros for an organisation called Compassion. The money was given to a village in Indonesia, Sumba, to help the children go to school and have food and clothes. In this village, children were being sold into the sex industry—the money from this marathon would stop children being sold by their parents in poverty. The runners ended the marathon as the sun rose to show light coming out of the darkness and hope. Jane Lasonder Jane Lasonder is an international speaker and author. She is also a survivor of child trafficking, who wants to be a powerful voice for those without a voice. Jane is a member of the International Survivors of Trafficking Advisory Council of OSCE/ODIHR, and of the Interparliamentary Taskforce on Human Trafficking. She has written an autobiography titled Jane , a book about awareness around human trafficking titled Red Alert , translated into three languages, and is now writing a third book, a guide for health care workers who come into contact with victims of trafficking. [1] National Referral Mechanisms – Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of Trafficked Persons: A Practical Handbook  (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2022). [2] Rachel Witkin and Katy Robjant, ‘The Trauma-Informed Code of Conduct’ (Helen Bamber Foundation) < https://www.helenbamber.org/sites/default/files/2022-01/HBF%20Trauma%20Informed%20Code%20of%20Conduct%202nd%20Edition.pdf > accessed 24 December 2023.

Jessa Crisp is a licensed professional counsellor, public speaker, and anti-trafficking activist. A victim of sex trafficking as a child, Jessa is now working on a PhD in Counsellor Education and Supervision. She is the former CEO of Bridge Hope, an anti-trafficking non-profit within the Denver-metro area and has worked with hundreds of individuals who’ve experienced trauma, depression, grief, and anxiety. CJLPA : Welcome, Jessa. I would like to begin by thanking you for taking the time to share your story as a heroic and courageous survivor of human trafficking. I want to start the interview by asking you to tell us about your childhood and how you first became a victim of sex trafficking.   Jessa Crisp : I was born into a family that I use the word evil to describe. They perpetrated a lot, my childhood had a lot of sexual abuse connected to it. I have seen images of my child pornography, for which technically the term is child sexual abuse material, from when I was a really small child, I would say a toddler. So I would have to assume that my trafficking started when I was very young, because, at least in the US, the federal definition of child sexual abuse material is human trafficking. And that is a huge part of my early childhood experiences and setting the stage for other people to purchase me. I experienced a lot of extreme abuse and traumas. I was not allowed to go to school as a child. When I was 17, I was taken to a hotel in Indianapolis where I was labour trafficked during the day and sex trafficked at night. That was a huge part of what I knew as my ‘normal’. I did not know anything else, just those extreme abuses. That truly lays the foundation for the person that I am today, where my passions exist, how I see myself, but also just how I see humanity. I have experienced the very worst of humanity, I have experienced that gross indignity of what humans have the ability to do. But on the other hand, I have also experienced so much joy and beauty, so much healing through humanity as well. So for me, holding that disparity between such stark experiences has really given me this desire to go, ‘how can I be able to be that kindness, that verse of good in the lives of others, but also create change around the globe, and how human trafficking is seen and engaged with?’   CJLPA : Thank you for sharing this difficult past. You were so young when you were subjected to these heinous crimes. And the people you would trust the most, the people that were meant to protect you, your parents, were the ones that subjected you to these unforgivable crimes. At such a young age, did you know what was happening?   JC : For me it was just such a normal part of how I saw life, all I knew was people using and abusing me. My body hurt so, yes, I knew that something was not right. I remember looking out my window at an elementary school just beyond my backyard and seeing kids play in the playground and seeing kids walk to school with lunches. I remember just being so curious about that mystery, the mystery that lay beyond the confines of my own realities. I remember having those big existential questions as a child, but yet it was also so normal that I did not know how else to question it. So I always wanted to figure out what it would look like for me to have a day at that school. What would that be like? But I also did not know anything else. And it was not until years later—I am still in this process of realizing how abnormal my childhood was, and how all of that abnormality has continued to impact my life. I am still on that journey, trying to conceptualize what that means and what that looks like. But that was all I knew. And so it was my normal.   CJLPA : Were there any bystanders to this abuse, people around you who knew or suspected something was wrong, but kept their eyes closed? For instance, the fact that you were not in school—were there questions posed by neighbours or social services?   JC : I do not recall any neighbours posing questions, although I do remember one time trying to get help. My brother and I ended up crawling onto the roof of our house. We lived in a suburban neighbourhood, and I remember crawling onto the roof of that house and really hoping that a neighbour would see and that a neighbour would be able to help us. Instead, we got into extreme trouble from that, because a neighbour did see, but the question was ‘why are your kids on the roof?’ It was not ‘what is going on? What is deeper? Why aren’t you in school?’ That kind of thing. My family was very religious and we went to a religious community, a church. Since my escape and since I have entered into this new life, I have actually have had people from that church reach out to me and just acknowledge that they knew something was not right, something was wrong. And yet, they didn’t know what it was. They have apologized. It has actually been super healing to be able to receive that acknowledgement. To receive the gift of people going, ‘I am so sorry’. I have never had any of my exploiters or buyers apologise for what they’ve done. Yet, there was such a gift that took place when these individuals [from the church] acknowledge that they knew something was not right. That in their gut, they just did not know what to do, and that they are really sorry but also really proud of where I ended up and what I am doing today.   CJLPA : Reflecting back in your story, can you think you can think of any signs that they should have picked up on? Or were you completely isolated from your community?   JC : I was very isolated, and I think isolation in and of itself could have been a sign. I think also my inability to be alone, or to go places alone, could have been a sign as well. I think the ways that I dressed, the fact that I was wearing my mother’s maternity clothes as a teenager would have been a sign as well. I think the fact that I had no education, the fact that I was so disconnected from society and reality could have been a sign as well. And yet I also hold so much compassion, because even though I can look back retrospectively and go, ‘those are those are signs’, or at least in my experience, those are definitely elements that should have given red flags that this is not right, I think I cannot hold that against them. Because back when I was a child, nobody was talking about child sexual exploitation and child trafficking. So the fact that nobody was talking about it back then means that these individuals in my life, who saw that something was wrong, had nothing by which to conceptualise a framework by which to even put together those things that they were seeing. And I think that is the good element of how we have progressed within the anti-trafficking movement and within the human rights movement. It is being able to now say, ‘these are signs and these are not normal’, and provide options and the ability to say ‘this is what we can do about this’.   CJLPA : And in your childhood, did you ever attempt to reach out for help growing up to anyone?   JC : I mentioned the roof incident already. Another thing that my siblings and I did, we allowed their grass to grow longer in the backyard and we lived close to an airport. We took the lawnmower, and we wrote the word ‘help’ in the grass, just really hoping that an airplane or pilot would see that. I felt so betrayed, that nobody saw that. I tried to go ahead and speak up and yet now looking back, I can see that what I thought was a scream for help was something that was not vocalized. I mean that in a very abstract way, meaning me trying to say ‘I am suicidal’ was me going ‘I am not okay, I need help’. But because of society and where people were at [during that time] with mental health care and understanding trauma, traumatisation, and neglect of children, they did not necessarily put those pieces together. So once again, I hold a lot of compassion for that. I did try to reach out for help, and help fell on deaf ears. That is really sad. And yet, I did eventually get help. And I know that we will be talking about that in a bit. But I did get help. It was definitely later than it should have been. I am out and I hold a lot to be grateful for.   CJLPA : As you were just saying, you did eventually get help. Can you please walk us through how that happened?   JC: I did experience rehabilitation after my familial trafficking. The term ‘familial trafficking’ is the term within the anti-trafficking field to describe the exploitation and human trafficking, whether it its labour trafficking, sex trafficking, or both, within a familial relationship. That is my experience. That was my first trafficking, which included the labour trafficking. And then my second trafficking was pimp-controlled trafficking. I am going to focus on my escape from the familial trafficking.   I was actually at a hotel in Kansas City, and there was a person who knew the red flags because they were a survivor who had opened a safe house for other survivors of trafficking, which was like a leading edge at that time. When I met her in 2008, she saw me at this hotel and she recognised the red flags of trafficking and exploitation. She recognized I am not alone, that I did not have control of my own ID, things like that—hyper vigilance, extreme complex trauma responses. So when I was in the bathroom at this hotel she gave me her phone number on a piece of paper, and basically told me that she could help me if I wanted help. Now, I tell people who give out their contact information that is not safe. Back then—things have changed, we now know that’s not safe to do—I memorised this phone number and threw out that piece of paper and when I was able to get back to Canada I called her.   Some of those first phone calls were just so dramatic. They did not last long—like literally only a couple of minutes—but they left such an imprint on me. In one of the first phone calls she told me that I did not have to be defined by sex, which was such a new concept for me. She told me that at the age of 21, I could make my own choices. Once again, this was such a new concept for me even though I was 21. I was at the end of 2008. I had never conceptualised this because I had been so controlled—what I can eat, what I can wear, what I can listen to, what I do, when I do it. So the fact that somebody was telling me that I was an adult was mind-blowing. And so those phone calls continued and she eventually was able to go ahead and help me put together an escape plan. I was able to leave, which was really painful. It was extremely hard because I had younger siblings, and when I left I could not tell them that I was leaving. There is still a lot of grief and pain associated to that, but I was able to go ahead and get to Colorado where this woman had created the safe house. And I truly looked at her as being like that instrumental point in my life where she was able to intersect my exploitation and give me another choice. During those days where it was so hard to be able to wake up each day or to do things, to have her to be able to talk to and walk me through that process. I really am grateful to that individual. CJLPA : Transitioning away from that, it must have been all the more difficult to then integrate in society. What was this new experience like? How did your life change after you escaped human trafficking?   JC : It was so hard. The way that I conceptualise it is that during my trafficking and exploitation, I knew what to expect, I have been trained to know exactly how to survive even though I was walking into dangerous situations. I had been trained to go ahead and believe this is my normal, which is psychological manipulation and mind control, and I also had this whole conceptualization of ‘if I do x, y, and z, then I will be okay’. When I was able to escape, all of the formulas that I had come up with, ‘if I do x, y, and z, I will survive’, completely disintegrated. I was in this big brand-new world all by myself, and I had no idea what the rules to the game were. That was really, really hard. Not only did I have to learn how to sleep, how to engage as a normal person in society, the talk, the ways of acting—which, for those who are interested, there’s a word called code switching, which basically means like learning how to go ahead and engage in one situation, verbiage, language, and knowing what’s appropriate in another situation—I had to learn language, verbiage, ways of being, the ways of living and freedom. That was really, really hard.   I remember one day in particular where I was sitting outside, just so scared by everything around me. It is almost easier to live in that box than it is to live with all of these options and choices. I remember just taking a pen and drawing a little picture of a balance beam. And underneath the balance beam was this ball. On one side of the balance beam, I put a little stick figure to represent myself. Then I drew this magnet, to conceptualise a magnetic pole [pulling me] back into that box that I know, even though [what I know] is so painful, so traumatic, so damaging, versus trying to figure out what it would look like to live and what it would look like to go through all of the anxieties. All of the fears, all of the memories, all of the grief. That was definitely something that has taken years to process. It is because of therapists in my life and other people who have been able to walk that journey with me, to whom I have been able to say ‘let’s go and do this new thing together’. Doing new things together was really fun, and it built new neural pathways, it built new experiences, it built the ability to go ‘Oh, not everything is as scary as I thought it was’.   The new things that I tried were as simple as like a root beer float. And that was like an excitement in my mouth. Having that soda with ice cream together was so new. But it also was new things like learning how to take notes in school, learning how to study, how to read textbooks, how to go to a job, and finding out that you have to actually show up on time. There are guidelines for work and you just cannot leave whenever you want to, and things that were just new experiences and building my CV. All of that has taken a lot of time. I have been out for over 13 years now and life I would say is still never has gone [back] to that place of what I thought normal was. I still feel like I do not fit into society, I still feel like it is hard to belong, I still feel like the odd duck out or the odd person. But I have also had had to come to this place of, it is okay for me to be me, and it is okay for me to be awkward. I am going to embrace those elements of who I am. But it has taken a long time to get there.   CJLPA : That is truly remarkable Jessa. It is so difficult to even imagine what that process must have been like, when you have never known anything different from that, how you made that choice to enter this new life. And as scary as it was, you continue to thrive. What advice would you give to other survivors who are in that particular moment where they are being pulled by this magnet?   JC : I would just encourage them to not give up. It is normal and it is okay to feel feelings, it is normal to question, it is normal to have those ups and downs. And it is also okay to just keep taking steps ahead. It is okay to know that it is not always going to be this way, to know that the waves of emotion will eventually pass. It is okay to dream. And it is okay to see life beyond the confines of the abuse, the exploitation, the trafficking. It is okay to begin to take baby steps towards trusting safe people or trusting people who are showing themselves to be safe, showing themselves to be safer than the people who perpetrated their crimes. I would just encourage them to keep on going, it is worth it.   CJLPA : I now want to discuss your new life and what you have gone on to do. Since escaping human trafficking and finally beginning your life, you have proceeded to inspire the world with your courage and motivation to help other victims. In 2015 you cofounded Bridge Hope, an anti-trafficking organisation that has worked with over 457 survivors of trafficking and modern slavery as well as providing training for organisations and governments on what human trafficking is and how to spot it and combat it. Now, Bridge Hope has merged with the National Trafficking Sheltered Alliance. Can you tell us what it was like to create an organisation like this? It must have been very difficult to remain so close to this crime and constantly talk about it and relive it with other survivors.   JC : I first cofounded the organization with my husband, because we saw the gaps in society surrounding marginalised individuals: LGBTQ+, boys, individuals with disabilities, individuals with medical conditions. We founded this organization to truly try to meet those gaps in a trauma-informed, survivor-centred way, as well as provide trauma-informed education to empower other organisations and nonprofits to work with survivors. It was a hard process. You are so right, that having that [experience of] my own exploitation [while] engaging with the exploitation of other people really hurt. I think I also have a gift where, because of my exploitation and trafficking, I see things, I am able to build trust and relationship with survivors. It actually gave me a huge gift to be able to provide resources and services that met the true needs of survivors, while also empowering all these other organisations to do so as well. So I really see actually my exploitation as being an asset to the organization, but with that asset it was difficult and it was challenging.   I definitely needed to do a lot of self-care, still need to do self-care. But I think the beauty really exists around my exploitation and trafficking. I took preventative steps such as going to therapy each and every week, doing my own self-care, having that awareness and being able to tell staff that we need to take time off because we need to take care of ourselves, versus individuals who maybe do not have the same kind of history, don’t have the same kind of self-awareness. They might say ‘everything was good, I do not need help’. That vicarious trauma, coming from a lack of self-awareness actually can create further damage and harm both the personal and the individuals that they are trying to serve and help. It can create damage and re-traumatisation for those individuals. So I actually really see that as a huge help, utilising my lived experiences to meet the needs of those that we are working with and trying to serve.   CJLPA : You are now no longer running Bridge Hope, but are still involved in the fight for eliminating human trafficking. Can you further discuss the work that you do now?   JC : I left Bridge Hope about a year and a half ago, and I’m currently a mental health therapist in the state of Colorado. I work with those who have experienced complex trauma and I do a lot of work with survivors of human trafficking. I love that I am able to use my professional training and my licenses and certifications to be able to really meet the needs of survivors in a very different way than what I did in direct services. I am still doing a lot of education and training. I am a consultant for the Expert Consultant Network for the Department of State Trafficking in Persons Office. I do a lot of speaking and lecturing around the globe on issues and topics related to human trafficking. I am a PhD student in a counsellor education and supervision program. Some of my research there is looking at the multicultural and social justice approaches to being able to educate and train counsellors, mental health therapists, and people in the healthcare fields to be able to work with those who have experienced human trafficking. I have also done a lot of research on the mental health implications of human trafficking. So I am really trying to meet these needs in a very different way than what I did when I was in direct services. I really love being able to still engage in the fight against human trafficking and being able to provide resources and services and prevent exploitation, just in a different way. I think that is pretty amazing. CJLPA : What are your dreams for the future, and how are you taking steps towards those dreams?   JC : I have so many dreams: being able to finish this PhD and maybe pursue further education, be in academia, be known as a researcher researching the implications of human trafficking, but also to empower clinicians to truly meet the needs of those who have experienced this. That all comes together with the dream of being able to write my autobiography someday and have it published by a large publishing house like Penguin or Random House to truly help individuals. No matter what one has experienced their past, it does not define them. Yes, I have experienced the worst of humanity. And yet a lot of people experience trauma, a lot of people experience very negative elements of humanity. Yes, on that continuum of trauma, my trauma might be on that extreme end. And yet I really believe that my story and my experiences can give hope to anybody who has experienced hurt, challenges, trauma, and can give them hope that they too can go ahead and take those courageous steps. They too can find that inner bravery to move into a future that they’re proud of, to move into the future of excitement, dreams, hope, beauty, love. And so I really that is one of my hopes, to write that book. CJLPA : I wanted to now transition towards better understanding human trafficking, the causes, and the ways we can continue addressing it. Human trafficking remains a massive issue, not only in developing countries, but also in Western countries. What are the main causes of human trafficking, or factors allowing it to occur?   JC : It is really hard to delineate just one main cause. There are so many different typologies of trafficking, there are so many different ways that trafficking emerges in the community. But I think one of the things specifically as it relates to labour trafficking is the very demand that society has created for cheap products, for the consumerism of buying one thing, and then moving on and just needing to buy another thing. It really lends itself to a situation where labour trafficking is going to continue to exist to the extent that society is demanding cheap products. I think that is one fundamental issue that we have. When it comes to sex trafficking, just as the demand continues to take place, we are also going to see the continuation of the exploitation of humans for sex and we are going to see sex trafficking continue. If there are people who are going to purchase humans, there will always be people who will seek ways to meet these demands through criminal means and criminal actions. I think that really ties together.   One element of just sex trafficking specifically that I want to just address is the way that pornography really ties into sex trafficking. Lots of pornography is created by those who are being trafficked. And that is something that I think is difficult for a lot of people to understand. I do not know of any ethical means or ways to go ahead and purchase pornography. Individuals who are being utilised in pornography may sign a contract, but are coerced or forced, or made to do things that are not in that contract. That is a form of human trafficking, that is exploiting them within that environment and situation and putting them in a really hard place. If a child is used in pornography, we have that child sexual abuse material and that is automatically human trafficking. So at least in the US, under the federal definition of human trafficking one does not need to prove force, fraud, and coercion. If somebody is a minor, they are automatically a victim of human trafficking if commercial sex acts are taking place. I think we just need to wrestle with that. I know that that can be a really difficult topic for people to talk about, and a really difficult element of this conversation. Yet I think we would not be doing justice to this conversation if we did not talk about some of these streams that impact and perpetuate exploitation.   Some of the questions that I think about within this kind of conversation are just asking people, ‘what are your values?’ What are you willing to sacrifice for pleasure, for having a new outfit, for the chocolate that you enjoy, for the coffee that you enjoy? It boils down to the question of, ‘what is the worth of humanity to you?’ What is the worth of humanity—that is so valuable for each individual person to wrestle with. I think, after wrestling with that, we can then begin to take tangible steps to create change. So for instance, one of the things that I have done is that I will not eat chocolate unless I know it has been ethically sourced. My love for chocolate, my cravings for chocolate—humanity is worth more than all of that. So for me, the fact that I make that daily choice of going ‘okay, I might want to have chocolate right now, but I am not going to have a piece of chocolate unless I am going to make sure that I only purchase the ethical chocolate’. That is just a small little choice that I have made, and other people don’t need to make that choice. But I think just being aware of what is being consumed, being aware of what is being used, being aware of the demand for humanity, the demand for humans can lead us to begin to decide what kind of changes we each need to make to put humanity higher than our own cravings or needs.   CJLPA : What other red flags are there that medical professionals should know, teachers, peers, but also the community as a whole, in order to see human trafficking in its early stages and to ensure that it is no longer enabled in society?   JC : This could take us the whole day to talk about. I specifically do trainings for medical professionals online on what red flags look like. I do 90-minute trainings for just educators, and even trainings for familial trafficking and red flags. To condense it all is really challenging. But I think some of the things that individuals need to be aware of, at least for medical professionals, is looking at when individuals who come into the emergency room or for treatment. What are the things that they are saying, are you taking the time to listen? As an example, tampons that are stuck in the vagina with strings cut off, or makeup sponges, would be an indicator to me of possible exploitation and trafficking. We might see a lot of somatic complaints that do not necessarily line up with what has been presented on a physiological level. With data that’s been gathered, we might, on a medical level, have individuals coming in for regular STD checks and asking for evidence of the results to presumably show to other people.   Just one red flag does not mean that it is a human trafficking. You need to have multiple red flags to be able to say that something deeper is happening here. It is not our job as civilians, it is not our job as medical professionals or as educators to go ahead and be the detective. We can see things and then make the reports as our countries, as our areas or counties ask us to. That is something that I just want people to remember, it is not our job to be the detective, versus it [being our job] to see things and then to say, what we are seeing is trauma to the vagina, the penis, the rectum. You might have a teenager who is coming in with extensive rectal bleeding. To be really frank, that is not normal for most teenagers if they do not have any underlying biological reason for that. So just being able to go ahead and just have that awareness and just that overall perspective, saying ‘okay, something’s not adding up. With what I am seeing, there are red flags of potential sexual abuse, potential traumas’.   Medical providers might also see, in regard to labour trafficking, individuals who have chemical exposure where they don’t have any need to use that chemical or machinery. There are different things that we can see on that level. We might see students sleeping and eating at school instead of learning. We might see young children not able to actually sit down. It might look like they are just being disrespectful. It might look like they like they have ADHD, but it is very possible that if they’ve been sexually abused and are being sexually abused, to where, literally, that part of their body is in so much pain that they cannot stay still and cannot sit down. So to just have that awareness, I like to say that trauma-informed awareness of going ‘okay, through a trauma lens, what else could be happening other than that this is a student who is just not wanting to listen?’   We might see changes of grades, we might see people not go to school like me. I did not go to school until I was in my 20s, when I was able to get a GED and enrol within college classes here in the US after I had escaped. You might see people who just really struggle academically, peers might see a lot of cell phones or a lot of cell phone numbers, especially if it was given in secret, or a safe adult does not know. You can get burner phone apps now for our phones. You might see a lot of numbers that way. But a lot of teens or peers will actually be given a separate device, whether it be a computer, tablet, or cell phone, because then it is hidden secret and parents do not know. So if parents take away a cell phone, they do not know about these other devices that are still being utilised to communicate with people with ill intents.   We might see a lot of 16-year old people [in these situations] which actually can be defined, at least in the US, under human trafficking as well. Because if that 16-year old is being utilised to coerce somebody into doing sex acts, ‘you do this blow job on my friend, and I won’t show that picture, I won’t send that picture to everybody in the school’—it has been utilised as a means of control, which is human trafficking, under that federal definition. We might see insecurities, people being called sluts at school, everybody knowing who the ‘school slut’ is, seeing lots of cars in the neighbourhood or a lot of people going in and out of homes, or an unusual number of people living in a home. For instance, in labour trafficking situations you could have like 20 people living in a home with two bathrooms. That is not normal. You could see somebody picking everybody up and taking them to their place of work. You might see lots of boys and girls who went home with a manager or a person and something just feels really off, it is not a social or group home for social services. Rather, something just feels off—in my situation, us not going to school and being outside should have been a red flag to my neighbours. It should have given some indications that some things were not right.   Boys do not have what are traditionally known as pimps, they have market facilitators who help facilitate the transactions between sex and money. In the US, as high as 50% of kids who are being trafficked for sex are boys. We also see a lot of boys and men being trafficked for labour. So we need to add boys and men to the conversation. Some boys experience familial trafficking, which often starts at a younger age, and then they leave the house. But you can also have families who go ahead and say, ‘Oh, you are gay, or you are trans, you need to leave, you cannot live here’. And so those throwaway kids are also at high risk for exploitation and trafficking. Familial trafficking is so huge in the US. Statistics are showing that familial trafficking is one of the highest forms of exploitation and trafficking, but it is also one of the most hidden typologies of trafficking because a child does not go missing. That child is in that family and the brainwashing that that family does to go ahead and keep everything hidden is so extreme. We need to just have that awareness. People need to get trained and educated and familial trafficking. Then we could talk about labour trafficking, we could talk about domestic servitude, all of the different typologies and other professions. But in a nutshell, those are just some of the red flags.   CJLPA : What was going through my mind as you were listing these red flags is the follow-up or next step. Is it, in your opinion, best to specifically speak to the [person you are concerned about] and directly ask them? Or is it more of being that lending ear, having those discussions of ‘how are you, are you okay?’, and hoping that they will say something if they need help? Or is it just a matter of accepting that maybe they are so manipulated and traumatised that they are afraid to speak up, and you just should report it immediately?   JC : I really believe that relationships are so vital, being able to help a person feel safe and to begin to share their truth, or begin to tiptoe closer to sharing their truth. And so part of that, I think, is that it is not always safe to approach a potential victim, so being aware of the environment and situation. With medical professionals, I encourage them, if they think that they are working with somebody who is experiencing traumas and experiencing potentially human trafficking, to say ‘we are going to do an X-ray’, as other people typically are not allowed in areas where radiation take place. That is a great excuse to get the person away from those other people and ask ‘what’s going on? Are you okay?’   We cannot make an adult leave a traumatic situation and environment. If it is a child, we are mandated reporters in the US. So being able to provide resources and say ‘if you need a safe place to talk through this or keep talking through this, you can come back’ is vital. If they are an adult, they might have to go back out and keep on working. And that is literally for their own survival. I think every profession has unique abilities to go ahead and build those relationships, plant seeds of hope, and be able to go, we are here, if you want to reach out again, and we are not going to go anywhere, and it is okay to go ahead and contact us again, or come back. Those are just some of the ways that I think are so beneficial. I love empowering law enforcement to build relationships with survivors, because that then becomes a safe relationship. For a lot of survivors of human trafficking they have had very negative experiences with law enforcement, or with individuals who are policymakers. So being able to build those relationships, then enables them to think, ‘they are human too, and they actually truly want to help me, and they will be there when I want to get out, and they can connect me to resources’. I think that is so powerful in an educational setting. For educators to create that safe space for people is vital.   CJLPA : Following up on the available resources, can you discuss the gaps in the current legal framework and where we require policy reform to mitigate and prevent human trafficking occurring around the world? From your experience, what is missing?   JC : The gaps that I will be sharing are from my personal experience domestically and internationally, so this is a broad picture of those arenas that I see. I believe that frontline officers need to be trained on Trafficking in Persons. There need to be standardised operating procedures in place for identification and collaboration between countries, when victims and survivors are crossed over borders, but also for when a victim self-identifies and begins to walk that journey of becoming a survivor to being a thriver. It is also necessary on a prevention level to recognise the ways that, on a socio-ecological level, different systems intersect with each other. I think we need to look at creating prevention [opportunities] through empowering a community organization to see the red flags and to build relationships with vulnerable individuals. It creates prevention and protection from future harm. All of that is to say that I think being able to go ahead and have global conversations is absolutely essential. I think it is necessary for us to incorporate trauma-informed, survivor-centred approaches into those conversations and to talk about next steps, about what we can do as we learn more about the impact of trafficking within our communities.   CJLPA : What specifically would you like to see from the international community, such as politicians or diplomats, to better address and eliminate these human rights violations that are occurring?   JC : I would really love to see more collaboration. I would love to see people talking and engaging together. I would love to see more trauma-informed and survivor-centred approaches. Right now, I think trauma-informed is a buzzword that is coming out, at least within the anti-trafficking movement. And yet the incorporation of trauma-informed principles is still lacking. Being able to create a foundation globally with trauma-informed approaches and what it means to be survivor-centred, and then incorporate that into the global and international work being done. I would love to see more mentorship of survivors, empowering them to also become professionals in the field, which is really, truly the amplification of lived experience experts. I would love to see more unity or kindness. And I really also see that we need to have more dedication to the prosecution, the protection, and the prevention of exploitation and trafficking.   CJLPA : On a final note, what is a lasting message you think readers and viewers should know?   JC : Even though I do not know your story, I believe that there is a reason why we are all passionate about making a difference in this world. That is very sacred, for us to be able to have that passion and desire to make that difference. That leaves us with a choice, do we pursue the value and the worth of the human and humanity? Or do we allow our hearts to become hurt and cynical to the injustices that are taking place globally? I really want to just encourage people to think through that question, to really ponder where they stand in the midst of that, and then to go ahead and really tend that garden that they have within themselves and tend it with kindness, personal kindness, and personal care. Because it is only from that place of wellness and health that we can truly go ahead and begin to continue to make that difference in that area that we are passionate about, and be able to find these crimes, be able to continue to raise awareness. And so as we do so we then create light, and that light truly overpowers darkness. This interview was conducted by Nadia Jahnecke, Legal Editor and Founder of CJLPA: The Human Agenda. In addition to her role at CJLPA, Nadia is a qualified lawyer in England & Wales specialising in public international law.

Knuckle dragging, low-slung, dead pig-eyed, A belch or a growl passes for thought, Ogres, tramping through dirty snow fields To sniff out banks of flowers in the cold: Carnations, roses, violets, chrysanthemums, Anemones. Monument to a man without a needed grave Or headstone: an activist who went for one walk Too many. Dying conveniently of sudden death syndrome, Among the silver birches of a mind frozen land. The flowers are feverishly demolished By the men in uniform black: black Down to their leaden souls, stuffing Diaphanous petals into shiny plastic Sacking: trodden on for good measure, Never to see the sun again. But what is this? A jackboot stamps. There is something pushing strong under-foot, A lone green sprout, and then a yellow flower. Out of every thug footfall, flowers press upwards, in perfumed beauty, exploding, To chase the slack jawed back to their endless shadow. In the helping snow, the flowers fuse and grow Until, Across the waiting city, They bend into a dissident smile. Paul Pickering Paul Pickering is the author of seven novels, Wild About Harry , Perfect English , The Blue Gate of Babylon , Charlie Peace , The Leopard’s Wife , Over the Rainbow and Elephant . The Blue Gate of Babylon was a New York Times notable book of the year, who dubbed it ‘superior literature’. Often compared to Graham Greene and Evelyn Waugh, Pickering was chosen as one of the top ten young British novelists by bookseller WH Smith and has been long-listed for the Booker Prize three times. Educated at the Royal Masonic Schools and the University of Leicester, he has a PhD in Creative Writing from Bath Spa University where he is a Visiting Fellow, presented his doctoral thesis to the Bulgakov Society in Moscow, recently completed a Hawthornden Fellowship Residency on Lake Como and is a member of the Folio Prize Academy. The novelist J.G. Ballard said Pickering’s work is ‘truly subversive’. As well as short stories and poetry, he has written plays, film scripts and columns for The Times and Sunday Times. He lives in London and the Pyrenees. A major theme of his novel Elephant , published by Salt in 2021, is innocence. His new blackly comic, absurdly realist novel Lucy , about obedience and rebellion, political and sexual, is published on July 15 by Salt. He is working on a new novel, CONVERSATION WITH A LION , about how things fit together and fly apart. The novel tries to explain the impossible absurdity of living, impossible like a conversation with a lion.

Roshi Rouzbehani, a London-based Iranian illustrator, uses her captivating artwork to champion social causes. Beyond captivating aesthetics, her editorial and portrait illustrations address critical issues like gender equality, women’s rights, and mental health awareness, sparking conversations and advocating for positive change.   CJLPA : Thank you for taking the time to interview with The Cambridge Journal of Law, Politics, and Art to discuss your work as an illustrator and artist with your pieces having been featured in publications such as The New Yorker , the  Guardian , The Washington Post , and numerous others. Your illustrations and portraits are known for advocating for the rights of Iranian women. Could you share the specific experiences or events that initially drew you to this cause?   Roshi Rouzbehani :   I have always felt a deep connection to the advocacy for the rights of Iranian women, shaped by my upbringing in the oppressive patriarchal regime of Iran. In this societal framework, women often find themselves lowered to second-class citizenship, confronting various challenges and injustices. The struggles faced by political prisoners within my family and circle of friends exposed me to the harsh realities of existence under such a system.   Having resided in Iran until my early twenties, I closely witnessed the profound impact of religious dictatorship on every facet of life. This firsthand experience ignited a determination within me to employ my illustrations and portraits as a powerful tool for highlighting these pervasive issues. Through my art, my objective is not only to encapsulate the strength and resilience of Iranian women, but also to catalyze change and advocate for a society that is more just and equitable, enabling women to fully embrace the rights and freedoms they rightfully deserve. CJLPA : In light of recent events, such as the cases of Mahsa Amini and Armita Geravand, how do you see your role in raising awareness about human rights issues in Iran, and more specifically, women’s rights?   RR : I feel responsibility to amplify the voices of the oppressed and to challenge the societal norms that maintain gender inequality in Iran. Illustrations have the power to evoke emotions and create a sense of empathy transcending language barriers so that everyone can understand without the need for translation. Through visually portraying the experiences and struggles of Iranian people, I can contribute to raise awareness about their rights. My work serves as a catalyst for social change, aiming to inspire a transformative impact on the collective consciousness.   CJLPA : Can you describe a specific piece of your work that has been particularly impactful in highlighting the challenges Iranian women face in terms of their rights and freedoms?   RR : On the first anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in custody, I curated a series of ten images titled ‘Mahsa Amini and a Year of Brutality and Courage in Iran’ which was published in the Guardian . One of these images, titled ‘An Eye for Freedom’, pays homage to Niloofar Aghaei, a midwife who lost sight in one eye during last year’s protests. The image portrays the harsh reality of security forces using live bullets, metal pellets, and tear gas to injure several individuals. Niloofar Aghaei, a woman dedicated to bringing new life into the world, bravely took to the streets in the fight for freedom. Her story serves as a powerful reminder of the Woman, Life, and Freedom motto. CJLPA : How do you balance the cultural and religious sensitivities in your illustrations when addressing women’s rights issues in Iran?   RR : I approach my work with great care, striving to present a range of perspectives and avoiding oversimplified portrayals. My focus is on showcasing the diverse experiences of women in Iran, grounded in the real stories of Iranian women to prevent stereotypes and ensure accuracy. Rather than sparking conflict, my intention is to initiate conversations. I use art as a means for positive change, always mindful of the cultural and religious sensitivities in Iran. Yet, I align with the idea expressed by Cesar A Cruz, later echoed by Banksy, that ‘Art should comfort the disturbed and disturb the comfortable’.   CJLPA : Iran has faced accusations of violating human rights, particularly those of women. How do your illustrations contribute to the global conversation on addressing these violations?   RR : Illustrations can serve as powerful tools for advocacy and raising awareness, effectively capturing the audience’s attention and leaving a lasting impact that increases engagement with the relevant issues. The emotional resonance they carry establishes a deep connection to various causes, nurturing a collective understanding of humanity among individuals from diverse geographical and cultural contexts.   My illustrations, created with the intent of amplifying conversations on human rights, have found a broad audience on social media platforms. This widespread sharing extends their reach to people with varied perspectives, contributing to a more inclusive and global dialogue on women rights issues. These visuals have become resources for activists and organizations, providing them with visual content for use in campaigns and protests. An example is my short graphic novel featured in ‘Feminism in Pictures’, a recent collection published by the Heinrich Böll Foundation. This graphic novel delves into the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, exemplifying how illustrations can convey complex narratives and contribute to the international discourse on feminism and human rights. CJLPA : Your recent book, 50 Inspiring Iranian Women , focuses on extraordinary Iranian women. How does this work connect to your broader mission of advocating for women’s rights through art?   RR : Beyond merely showcasing individual achievements, 50 Inspiring Iranian Women  aims to challenge stereotypes, broaden the recognition of diverse accomplishments, and contribute to a more inclusive global discourse on outstanding women. I identify this book as a form of advocacy, pushing against societal norms and promoting a reflective appreciation for the capabilities and potential inherent in every woman. Its purpose is to serve as a source of inspiration for people worldwide, shedding light on the active pursuit of dreams and ambitions by Iranian women—a reality deserving greater acknowledgment. By amplifying the visibility of these women’s achievements, I aim to provide inspiring role models for future generations. My aspiration is that this book not only motivates its readers but also acts as a catalyst for change, challenging stereotypes, and fostering a deeper understanding of the significant contributions made by Iranian women to humanity. Within the pages of this book, I extend an invitation to readers to take a journey of discovery, enlightenment, and, above all, celebration of the limitless potential residing within every woman.   CJLPA : Could you share any collaborations or projects where you’ve worked with organizations or individuals to further the cause of women’s rights in Iran through your artwork?   RR : I’ve contributed a chapter to Woman Life Freedom: Voices and Art from the Women’s Protests in Iran , an anthology expertly edited by Malu Halasa and published by Saqi Books in 2023. This remarkable collection links narratives of women’s resistance in Iran, employing a powerful combination of text, art, and photography. It serves as a universal call to action and a proud commemoration of the women whom the regime has attempted, unsuccessfully, to silence. In my chapter, titled ‘Keeping the Revolution Alive’, I presented a curated selection of my illustrations and delved into the details of my mission to shed light on the invaluable contributions of Iranian women in the protests through the medium of art.   CJLPA : Iran has seen widespread dissent and opposition actions taken by women, such as women cutting their hair in protest. How does your artwork play a role in capturing and conveying the spirit of these movements?   RR : In Iranian culture, women have historically cut their hair off in mourning. This act in the Woman, Life, Freedom movement became a symbol of protest, signifying a reclaiming of bodily autonomy by challenging established notions of femininity and standing in defiance against the oppressive regime. My artistic efforts are dedicated to capturing the essence of these protests and expressions. For instance, in a piece created for the Guardian Weekly cover, I depicted a defiant Iranian woman boldly raising her fist while clutching strands of hair. The flowing hair and scarf symbolize the winds of change. Additionally, in a personal artwork later featured in Woman Life Freedom , titled ‘My Hair is Not Your Battleground’, I portrayed an Iranian woman actively cutting her hair. This imagery conveys a powerful message: Iranian women reject the politicization and ideological control of their bodies. CJLPA : In your opinion, what is the current state of women’s rights in Iran, and where do you see opportunities for improvement?   RR : In addition to the challenges imposed by compulsory hijab and restrictive dress codes, Iranian women face discrimination both in legal frameworks and daily practices significantly impacting their lives, particularly in areas such as marriage, divorce, and custody. However, they consistently actively assume roles as agents in the pursuit of their rights, demonstrating commitment to driving change. I hope to witness a future where Iranian women can enjoy true freedom. However, given the current complexities in the socio-political landscape, this transformation may not occur quickly. Despite these uncertainties, ongoing advocacy and collective efforts provide a source of hope for gradual progress towards a society where Iranian women can genuinely live freely.   CJLPA : As an Iranian artist based in London, how do you navigate the complexities of advocating for women’s rights in Iran while living abroad?   RR : Technology, particularly through social media, online campaigns, and collaborations, plays a crucial role in my remote advocacy efforts. This approach not only facilitates engagement with audiences in Iran and worldwide but also enables connections with like-minded individuals and organizations, forming a collective force for change. The use of these platforms allows me to transcend geographic limitations and contribute to a broader conversation about women’s issues. Through various channels, such as social media, art exhibitions, and online campaigns, I strive to showcase the realities faced by Iranian women. This serves as a call for justice and equality, amplifying their voices to a global audience.   It is crucial to note that I approach my work with caution, recognizing the potential risks to the safety of women in Iran. Residing outside of Iran, I am mindful not to encourage actions that could jeopardize their well-being, such as advocating for street protests. Instead, my art serves as a medium to echo and reflect their stories, emphasizing the importance of unity and amplifying their experiences to the world.   CJLPA : How do you see the role of international awareness and support in addressing human rights violations in Iran, particularly women’s rights, and how do your illustrations contribute to this global dialogue?   RR : International awareness and support play a pivotal role in addressing human rights violations in Iran. This global solidarity provides a platform for collective action, empowering individuals, organizations, and governments worldwide to stand in support of Iranian women. It serves as a catalyst for advocacy efforts, urging positive change and holding the Iranian government accountable for its actions.   The global spotlight becomes a powerful tool in shedding light on issues related to women’s rights in Iran, including gender-based discrimination and restrictions on personal freedoms. By bringing these issues to the forefront, an international environment that is more supportive of women’s rights protection can be fostered, encouraging a collective commitment to addressing these challenges. In this context, my illustrations serve as a means of contributing visually compelling and emotionally resonant narratives to the global dialogue on women’s rights. Through these artistic expressions, I aim to encourage understanding, empathy, and a shared dedication to promoting the rights and well-being of Iranian women on the international stage. By offering a unique perspective through art, I hope to spark conversations that drive positive change and inspire a more compassionate and informed global community in the interest of women’s rights.   CJLPA : Could you discuss a recent illustration or portrait that represents a specific challenge or triumph in the fight for women’s rights in Iran?   RR : I created a portrait in honor of Narges Mohammadi, the winner of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize, for her relentless efforts against the oppression of women in Iran and her advocacy for human rights and freedom. Her win holds profound significance for all Iranian women championing democracy and liberty in the country. Within the image, a reflection of the resounding chants from Iran’s streets is captured, echoing the powerful words ‘Zan, Zendegi, Azadi’—Women, Life, Freedom. CJLPA : Many of your illustrations are emotionally resonant and tell stories. Can you share an example of an illustration that conveys a particularly powerful message about women’s rights in Iran?   RR : I originally designed a poster for my social media channels. It later found a place in the Danish edition of a feminist coffee table book entitled I Can’t Believe I Still Have to Protest This Shit . This book features 20 posters documenting a century of women’s struggles around the world. My artwork portrays diverse Iranian women standing shoulder to shoulder atop the Azadi (Freedom) Tower in Tehran. Through this imagery, I express the hope for a future where unity brings about bright and liberated days. I envision that by remaining committed together, we can collectively witness and embrace such a day.   CJLPA : How has your personal journey and background influenced your approach to advocating for women’s rights in Iran through art?   RR : Since childhood, I’ve observed the imposition of gender segregation and compulsory hijab in public spaces, impacting daily life for women in my community. These personal experiences strengthened my conviction that the Iranian regime enforces gender apartheid, systematically restricting women’s rights. Motivated by these encounters, my art serves as a platform for activism, challenging societal norms, tackling women’s under-representation, and advocating for their rights.   CJLPA : In your experience, how do you see the intersection of religion, cultural norms, and the struggle for women’s rights in Iran, and how does your art address this complexity?   RR : The intersection of religion, cultural norms, and the struggle for women’s rights in Iran presents a complex tapestry. Islamic principles heavily influence legal frameworks and societal expectations, shaping cultural norms that impact women’s experiences. Specifically, in the case of compulsory hijab, the complexity extends beyond religious interpretations. It is linked with the political structure, serving as a tool for the Iranian government to assert authority over society.   My art addresses this complexity by fostering understanding and respecting cultural and religious nuances. My illustrations explore the challenges women face within religious and cultural norms, acknowledging the broader political implications. The goal is not to impose external perspectives but to amplify the voices of Iranian women. In essence, my art serves as a medium for empathy and understanding, engaging viewers in a thoughtful exploration of these complexities, including the political dimensions of compulsory hijab.   CJLPA : Are there specific artists, activists, or role models who have inspired your approach to advocacy through art in the context of Iranian women’s rights?   RR : Among the many artists and activists that I admire, Parastou Forouhar, an Iranian-German contemporary artist, holds a special place. Tragically, in 1998, Parastou’s parents, the political activists Daryoush and Parvaneh Forouhar, became victims of a brutal murder in their Tehran home. This devastating event was part of a series of politically motivated assassinations targeting intellectuals and dissidents. The overwhelming impact of losing her parents resonates not only in the content of Parastou’s artwork but also in her persistent commitment to advocating for human rights and social justice in Iran. Through her art, Parastou delves into political and social issues, offering a thoughtful perspective on the sociopolitical landscape in Iran. Her creative expression serves as a moving medium for raising awareness and prompting critical conversations about the challenges faced by those who dare to stand against oppressive regimes.   CJLPA : Can you discuss the potential for change and progress regarding women’s rights in Iran?   RR : The path to improved women’s rights in Iran involves legal changes, shifts in society, global influence, and ongoing efforts by activists. While hoping for a day when Iranian women can live freely, it may take time due to the complexities in the current socio-political landscape. Despite uncertainties, ongoing advocacy gives hope for gradual progress toward a society where Iranian women can truly experience freedom. This interview was conducted by Solomon Njombai, Legal Researcher at CJLPA. Solomon, an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya, holds a Master of Arts degree in International Relations and an LL.M in Energy Law. His primary focus lies in comprehending how energy intertwines with global issues and how it drives interactions between states on a global scale.

Bo Kyi is a Burmese human rights activist and founder of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a human rights organization that advocates for the release of political prisoners in Burma and works to document prison conditions, unlawful arrests, and detention-related abuses carried out by the Burmese government. The AAPP also provides humanitarian assistance and other support to current and former political prisoners and their families. Bo Kyi is a former political prisoner due to to his participation in pro-democracy protests during the 1988 uprising. Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.   CJLPA : Can you tell us about your first interactions with politics during the 1988 student movement and what made you want to get involved with anti-government protests?   Bo Kyi : I was born in a country where fear was pervasive. We feared imprisonment, there was a fear of being tortured, losing a loved one or home, a fear of losing your dignity, a fear of poverty and forced labor. The military dictatorship began in 1962, three years before I was born. But by the time I was a teenager I already understood that our university students had long been at the heart of political movements in Burma, since before colonial independence.   In 1988, I was a final year student at Rangoon Arts and Sciences University, majoring in Burmese literature. In that time, there was not a multi-political party system, only one military-aligned party called the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). We were taught political science in university, but it was the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ with no space for criticism. We were told to just listen and memorize what was taught. Students had not been allowed to establish student unions since 7 July 1962, when military soldiers infamously blew up a Rangoon student union with dynamite. Thereafter, all students’ unions were declared illegal, students were forced to join the BSPP for a chance to gain further study, everything was controlled by the Party. I had never heard of democracy or human rights. In university, we had to learn what happened in the past by listening to our elders in secret. Professors and tutors taught us the history of the student movement in Burma, and the role that it played before, in colonial times.   My father was a soldier in the Air Force, and he raised me as if I was a soldier, not allowing any question back. If I asked questions, he beat me. When I was young, I had a great fear of my father. But as I got older and older, I tried to look for ways to free myself from my father. This is why I worked hard to get good grades at high school and go to university. Such kind of emotions would lead me to join the struggle.   On 22 September 1987, the military government led by General Ne Win announced demonetization of the national currency, the Kyat. The decision rendered the existing banknotes of 1, 5, 10, and 20 kyats invalid. The purported aim of the demonetization was to curb black market activities and reduce corruption, but everyone knew it was led by the senior generals’ superstition. Most of the population faced challenges in exchanging their old currency for the new notes, so many people simply lost their entire savings and what little wealth they had.   As students, we financially relied on our parents as they supported us through our studies. When they suffered, we also suffered. This dissatisfaction with the economic situation soon boiled over into rage at the injustice of dictatorial military rule.   On 13 March 1988, the police reacted with brutality following a tea shop brawl between fellow students and the youth child of a local official. That same night the militarized police went to a Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT) compound where students were gathering to discuss their response to the crackdown, seeing as the local youths were connected to the regime and would go unpunished. However, the riot police came and fired guns to suppress the gathering students, one student was killed.   The next morning, I went to university like normal, but students were gathering within the university compound to protest the events the night before. Fellow students came to my classroom, rounding us up. They said to us ‘why are you sitting in the classroom, students are being killed, we need to stand up for justice, for them’. I was troubled by what I should do, whether I should commit or not. Finally, I made the decision, I urged my friends to join and in the afternoon of 14 March we went to the protests within the Rangoon Arts Science University (RASU) compound. I knew then, if I was lucky, I would be detained and tortured, if I was unlucky, I would be killed.   We were suffocating under archaic rule but before the 1988 crackdowns we still did not hate the military, we had been indoctrinated to love the Tatmadaw. But the previous junta had ruined the economy through mismanagement and corruption, and relentlessly exploited its citizens to wage war and commit atrocities in the border regions. Due to this state propaganda, I only found out later that the suffering of the ethnic nationalities was even worse. In the end, the Burmese military responded to peaceful protestors calling for change—their response was brutality. Then as now; it is the same military institution in 1988 and 2021.   On the evening of 14 March, I went back to my home. But the next day, on 15 March, I went to my RASU University compound to join the demonstrations all day long.   Then on 16 March, I joined the demonstrations like the days previously. As were the student politics at the time, some wanted to join forces with students from other universities in Rangoon, but professors and tutors with past experiences of crackdowns urged us to stay within the compound. That day, RASU students and unarmed demonstrators were on the streets when the military used live ammunition and batons. Blood poured over the streets. The next day, on 17 March, the regime announced all universities in the country must close, but this prompted students to gather on the streets. But we would not go home, we made banners and placed posters on the streetlamps. We went door by door, explaining to people our demands. Word spread from person to person, before mobile telephones the only way we could receive international news was from shared BBC and VOA radios. So, under the name of the colonial-era All-Burma Federation Student Union (ABFSU) we released statements calling for a general strike on 8 August 1988.   My father demanded I not engage with the demonstrations—as a former Air Force sergeant he understood what the military was capable of, but I refused to listen to him. I decided to join the strikes. The night before we were so enthusiastic, me and my brother could not sleep. On 8 August 1988, Paw Oo Htun led a demonstration from downtown Rangoon, but the local high school I was assigned to recruit did not join us that day. That day passed by with thousands on the streets. Military troops largely decided to let it pass, until the evening, when students camping on the streets nearby the United States Embassy were mowed down with gunfire.   On 9 August, we decided the other students must join us no matter what. Our local chapter went to the high school and stole a local megaphone and pole to climb on. We shouted our demands and cut the telephone lines and warned the teachers not to report us. That day, thousands of students marched with us to downtown Rangoon. We tried to negotiate with the troops because we were unarmed. But before long, protestors who were holding the peacock flag were shot at. We tried our best to return the dead bodies, but we could only carry a few of the injured. The peacock was the symbol of the student movement because we valued the animal’s spirit: they will fight until death if need be. This is the spirit we adopted. We would struggle until we die to defeat the military.   On 9 August, the military violently suppressed the peaceful protestors. At that time the roads were blocked, and most local doctors refused to treat the injured out of fear for their lives. But we found a few people brave enough to treat our friends, and then sent the rest of them to Rangoon General Public Hospital in Downtown. In the early morning of 10 August, we received information that the military would assault the hospital and detain the injured protestors. Our student group went to the hospital and tried to negotiate with the doctors to release the injured persons who were able to leave, but the doctors refused. We told them the military would soon raid the hospital, in the end we had to take our injured friends by force.   The military opened fire on that hospital within a few minutes of us leaving, several nurses were still trapped inside. By then, word was spreading across the country. Students and civilians in other towns and cities were organizing themselves, even some navy and police in uniform were joining the protests. Demonstrations continued throughout the month whilst military troops slowly withdrew from Rangoon. On 25 August, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi made her first public speech, and on 28 August the student movement announced the official re-formation of the ABFSU. It was at this ceremony that Paw Oo Htun adopted the nom de guerre Min Ko Naing.[1]   Then, on 18 September, the military-led radios and TV announced a coup had taken place, political parties would be allowed, and an election freely held. But students continued gathering, demanding justice, and calling for the military to return power immediately. At this time, student groups had several discussions with General Khin Nyunt, who offered to allow them to establish student unions under the regime without political independence. The military regime tried to divide the student movement like they tried to divide and rule the ethnic minority groups for decades.   When the crackdowns become more deadly, the student movement decided to divide into three—one would remain as the ABFSU, another would join the armed resistance movement as the All-Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF), and the other would take the political path as the Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS). I became a close aide to student leader Min Ko Naing at this time. I was with him when he addressed a student march on the anniversary of the death of Phone Maw in March 1989, the first student killed in the uprising.[2]   Even though the military said it would hold democratic elections, they increasingly chased down and detained our leaders. On 23 March 1989, Min Ko Naing was arrested, then Ko Ko Gyi and Ko Aung Din were detained. It was then that I became an Executive Committee member of the ABSFU. Working underground, we continued to organize secret discussions and coordinating flash mob strikes. On 16 March 1990, while I was eating lunch with my family, I was arrested.   CJLPA : Due to your involvement in advocacy, the military dictatorship imprisoned you for years. Can you tell us how your lived experience as a political prisoner has impacted you personally and how it has driven your organization’s work?   BK :   Military Intelligence personnel apprehended me with handcuffs and blindfolds. I was swiftly taken to court, where a judge read out a statement in five minutes, leaving me bewildered about its content. I was then transported in a car, enduring the touch of guns on my ribs as intelligence personnel ordered silence. To avoid public exposure, I was instructed to lie down between benches. After an hour drive, I arrived at an interrogation unit in downtown Rangoon. I was still blindfolded and made to walk according to their orders. Eventually, I stood, and the door opened with a kick to my back, causing intense pain. After some time, I removed my hood revealing an eight-by-eight feet room with a table, two chairs, a bed, and a light. Despite some comfort, bugs bit me when lying down. Contemplating their motive, I faced interrogation without questions, only judgments about my physical appearance.   On that day, they denied me food and water, and hunger set in. Requesting sustenance at midnight, I was denied water. Observing blood spots and names on the walls, I worried about the fate of others. Torture began with deprivation, with blindfolding and isolation. Interrogated for nearly 48 hours, my denial of contact with opposition groups led to physical assault. I was ordered constantly to stand, my plea for a doctor was met with the condition of telling the truth. Seeking relief, I admitted to the truth and was allowed to use the toilet, providing an opportunity to drink water.   The intelligence officer proposed release upon compliance, or wealth if I cooperated. Opting for truth, I wrote down my role as an executive committee member of All-Burma Federation of Student Unions, leading demonstrations for student rights. Upon completion, my writing invited further beatings, and the uncertainty of time in prison loomed. Eventually, I found myself in the interrogation unit for nine days, denied showers and locked in solitary confinement.   The military said I would be in prison for many years, families would be ashamed, and I would be nothing. I remembered those words. They wanted me to be useless. Therefore, when I was in prison, I studied English, so I won the battle of the minds. Even though they could physically restrain me they could not constrain my mind. We tried to see prison as education, we could learn a lot from imprisonment. I was soon sentenced to three years with hard labor under the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act. But the ordeal continued in Mandalay Prison, far from my family. Despite physical privations and inadequate medical care, my resolve persisted. The harsh prison diet included peculiar dishes like pea curry, fish paste, and infrequent meat servings. The health care system was dismal, with a dirty and disease-ridden hospital. Released on 21 January 1993, my suffering did not end. I was allowed to resume my final year at university, majoring in Burmese literature. However, despite my supposed freedom, intelligence personnel would harass me, monitoring me very closely. They would attempt to intimidate me into skipping classes so I would fail my studies. Due to the repeated harassment, I lost my part-time job at a photocopying shop and some parents of students to whom I was offering private English lessons revealed that military intelligence had pressured them not to send their children to my classes. In 1994, military intelligence agents started pressuring me to work for them as an informer. When I told them I would only do so if they released all imprisoned students, NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and committed to dialogue, they told me I had not learned my lesson from three years in prison. Later that year, I was detained under the charges of the same Emergency Provisions Act Section. My inquisitors gave the reason that they found three poems that they said would ‘poison people’s minds’.   I was sentenced to an additional five years in prison with hard labor. A nine-day lockup and a year in Insein Prison without trial ensued. Accused of planning to commemorate the 7 July 1962 destruction of the Student Union, I faced brutal interrogation and physical abuse. I was beaten every day for two weeks straight with a rubber cord and other implements, often until I lost consciousness. I was forced to assume stress positions and ‘hop like a frog’ while bound in chains. I slept on concrete without a mat or blankets, and I was held in solitary confinement for six months. The cumulative impact of brutal treatment has left me unable to undertake physical work and intolerant of prolonged sitting or standing. Post interrogation, I was transferred to Tharyarwaddy Prison until my release in October 1998. Before I was released from prison the second time, my comrades who would remain in prison requested that I do something for them on the outside.   When I received parole, intelligence officers still continued to monitor my every activity. In 1999, some of my comrades were arrested for attempting to create the 9999-movement initiated by People Power 21, an organization based on the Thai-Burma border. Facing the threat of re-arrest, I made the difficult decision to leave my country. I said goodbye to my mother, knowing I would not see her again. With the help of my younger brother, I fled to the Thai-Burma border in September 1999 and began life in exile.   Since I arrived on the Thai-Burma border, I eventually became acquainted with many former political prisoners and pro-democracy activists. In 2000, myself, Ko Tate Naing (current Secretary of AAPP), and several former political prisoners co-founded the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners in Burma (AAPP). The founding of AAPP was a response to the injustices all political prisoners experienced, both during our time in prison and upon release. I witnessed a system where political prisoners were dehumanized and marginalized from society, rather than being honored for their sacrifices. We used our freedom in exile to advocate for the release of all political prisoners in Burma and support for them in prisons and after release.   In over 20 years, AAPP has grown from a member-based association which relied on donations to a civil society organization with established decades-long partnerships with international donors and domestic supporters. The AAPP vision is to achieve national reconciliation and to help transform Burma into a free and democratic society where individuals’ civil and political rights are protected, fulfilled, and maintained, and no political prisoners remain incarcerated.   AAPP has provided assistance to thousands in our pro-democracy community, providing financial assistance, legal representation, vocational and education fees, healthcare costs, mental health counselling, and more. Since the coup, AAPP has been working for the restoration of civilian rule, a federal future, and the release of all political prisoners detained by the State Administration Council in its crackdown on the pro-democracy movement. Meanwhile, our mental health assistance program, initiated in 2008 to assist victims of torture in detention, has been one of the leading grass-roots psychotherapeutic counselling programs in Burma. Our training department is creating the skills and establishing the networks needed for youth political party members and grassroots civil society activists to understand basic human rights concepts, the role of documentation, and transitional justice issues. The data collection and advocacy by AAPP is providing credible and in-depth evidence of human rights abuses committed by the terrorist-like military junta for the purpose of shedding light into the inhumane conditions in Myanmar, ending military’s impunity, and starting to pave the way for much-needed transitional justice procedures and construction of peace.   We believe due to this, on 26 April 2021, the junta accused the AAPP of being an illegal organization. The junta’s announcement on MRTV, MWD, and newspapers threatened ‘severe action’ against the group.   CJLPA : We have seen political instability and attempts at regime change in Burma since your imprisonment, with an internationally supported transition to democracy that was derailed by a coup in 2021. During that transition period, the military retained tremendous influence and power, and targeted violence in the Rakhine state drew global attention. What was life like for political prisoners and anti-government dissidents during that time?   BK :   There was space for civil society when the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a majority in Parliament and formed a civilian-led government under the military-drafted Constitution. Though, within this 2008 Constitution, the military retained 25 percent of parliamentary seats which allowed it to veto any constitutional changes, including potential reforms to its stranglehold on the armed forces and its economic interests. The Ministry of Home Affairs, which contained the Prison Department, was also under the direct control of the Burmese military according to the 2008 Constitution. Detentions of political prisoners were driven by this Ministry of Home Affairs, though we felt ignored by the NLD who failed to recognize the existence of political prisoners in that period.   Through conversations I had with military officials after I moved back to the country in 2013, I understood that they did not think they could get information without torture. Military officials refused to sign international human rights treaties such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture because of this belief.   Despite this, the conditions of political prisoners in most parts of the country improved during this time. Activists, farmers, and ethnic leaders continued to be charged and sentenced using repressive legislation, but it was not at the same scale as under direct military rule. For example, all prisoners were allowed to write, read, and study. The military did not allow this in the past as they wanted to destroy the minds of political prisoners. I think the Prison Department were wary of AAPPs public position, if we spoke to them directly the authorities would change their behavior. This working relationship with the Prison Department allowed our organization, in the open, to provide financial assistance to political prisoners. Monitoring mechanisms such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the so-called Myanmar National Human Rights Commission were allowed inside the walls of formerly restrictive compounds and cells. Meanwhile the role of regional parliamentarians, many of whom were former political prisoners, was crucial to increasing the budget of the Prison Department.   The NLD government abolished the 1950 Emergency Acts and overnight guest registration list, but it was not enough to counteract the military land-grabs and atrocities against the ethnic minority groups. The military reacted violently to any change because they believed they were being belittled by democracy.   Before the democratic transition, Burma was cut off from the world, internet connection and mobile phones were scarce, SIM card prices were extortionate. But post-2015, economic reforms were made and people across the country became better connected with each other and the outside world. It is this connection with the outside world and the role of social media in everyday life for the people which has spread images of military brutality and spread solidarity across the country following February 2021.   In the aftermath of the coup, the military tried to weaken the collective voice by blocking websites and conducting internet blackouts. It is worse now than ever before, but torture has been systematically used against political prisoners for decades. AAPP members have first-hand experience of this: our past reports focused on this issue detail the multitude of torture methods used during the military regime.[3]    In fact, I do not think the civilian government period was a genuine transition. The military thought they could control the country within the 2008 constitution. I always thought the military may initiate a coup because it never cared about true democracy. The transition period under the 2008 condition was coordinated so democracy would not be achieved. The military tried to bring controlled liberalization, they eased repression, but it was not democracy, and we could not implement transitional justice.   CJLPA : The 2021 coup and subsequent reactions against the military junta led to an uptick in arrests and killings of activists and protesters. Can you speak to what your organization has seen in this regard, and what work have you been doing to combat these crackdowns?   BK :   We see the 2021 coup as illegitimate; it was illegal under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. By taking power, the military rejected the desires the people made clear in the 2020 election. Now, the people are joining forces to change the military-controlled system.   Despite calling itself the State Administration Council since the coup, it is the same military institution as since 1962. The military junta in Burma now, is cut from the same cloth as the fascist military institution which ruled Burma in 1962. It is the same military institution who killed students, teachers, monks, men, women, children, boys, and girls. We can say this military sees civilians as its enemy—because the civilians resent military rule. The Spring Revolution is similar to 1988 in that it began with the voices of young people and students. A difference, which is now an advantage, is that we have the entire society joining the resistance, where before it was only led by students. Also, people have the capacity to document and record the atrocities committed by the junta forces—the new generation of protesters have smartphones and utilize social media enabling them to broadcast human rights violations in real-time. The youth are good at communicating with one another and have creative ideas and ways to act. These children grew up free from military rule, and they will not return to it.   For the military, they see the transition in a different way. The military believes that as the people regained their freedom, the armed forces’ raw power decreased. As civilian oversight and independent media grew larger, the military’s ability to exploit the people and natural economy diminished. Civil society activists watched with concern the increasingly aggressive statements by military officials who were scorning the democratic process in late 2020. Some former political prisoners, including myself, held a series of conversations to discuss these developments. We all agreed if the military seized power in a coup, mass mobilization would be essential to any response which would ultimately be led by the demands of people on the ground.   In February 2021, the role of AAPP changed. We could not work openly, so some members joined the peaceful demonstrations, but others supported the collection of information on the arrests and deaths perpetrated by the military in partnership with our cross-country verification network of human rights training participants from before the coup. We also initiated programs for safe-houses and delivered protective helmets and other emergency assistance to the protestors. AAPP documentation quickly became the reliable source for the United Nations and media worldwide. We would send information daily to diplomats in Yangon, in Bangkok, in Geneva, and in New York, which would then be used by the international community to build pressure on the military junta. It was not easy, as my team saw the violence committed by the military on a day-to-day basis as part of its campaign of indiscriminate terror at civilians.   CJLPA : How does the current situation in Burma differ from other periods of political instability and anti-government resistance, and how have changing relationships between ethnic groups and access to information from outside Burma influenced the present political situation?   BK :   As with my experience in the 1988 Uprising, thousands joined the demonstrations and were brutally cracked down on. We called for a civil disobedience campaign, but within a few months and certainly by the end of the 1990, the dictatorship was normalized again. We were not able to create a mass mobilization like what organically grew post-2021. This current period is also unprecedented because of the ethnic solidarity and involvement of the entire society, not only students. Young children understood how bad the coup was, and the elderly have seen it many times before.   What happened in 1988 was significant to the struggle now. Back then, students fled to and joined forces with the ethnic Karen and Kachin and other armed ethnic forces. This established the trust and understanding to support the alliances forming now. In the 1990s, elected parliamentarians also created a government in exile to push the international community for political pressure on the regime. The international community was not interested in Burma during the cold war, our country was forgotten about, but following the 1988 Uprising and flight of parliamentarians, we received increased attention.   The junta has never respected human rights or the rule of law. The military has been committing horrendous human rights violations for generations, including war crimes and genocide against the ethnic nationalities, including the Rohingya. But before there was little understanding; the coup made Burmans suffer like other ethnic groups have for generations.   The military always attempted to use a divide-and-rule policy to break up the resistance movement by giving favor to some parties or groups in order to isolate and suppress the wider Spring Revolution forces. However, due to renewed ethnic solidarity and improved understanding by the Burmans, this is not possible.   As we enter 2024, the pro-democracy resistance led by the National Unity Government (NUG) and Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) control more territory can ever before. The youth generation are bringing technical skills utilized by the resistance, such as drone technology, which the EROs did not have before. Federal units are emerging in the Burman heartlands and are well established in the entirety of Chin and Karenni State.   CJLPA : What would you like to see the international community do to support political prisoners, dissidents, and the people of Burma advocating for democracy?   BK :   I believe the change that this revolution is moving towards will come from inside, however international support is critical.   Stances by UN member states, in particular neighbouring countries of Burma, suggest that these countries believe the Burmese military will hold the country together. They need to change this mindset; the military is actively destroying the country in its attempt to hold on to power. The resistance side is re-building the country from the ground up with federal units. But I believe the pro-democracy movement still requires technical and financial support from the international community and as the resistance controls more and more territory, it needs to enhance its capacities to govern.   Civil society actors are working towards transitional justice, through accountability mechanisms in particular, but we need international development and humanitarian agencies to stop engaging with and empowering the military junta. Especially when it comes to humanitarian aid for displaced persons, the NUG and respective EROs must be worked with as the legitimate governance actors.   The military intentionally created a humanitarian crisis. Neighbouring countries need to understand this because the junta will soon attempt to divide the humanitarian and UN agencies from the pro-democracy movement. International agencies who want to exist inside the country to help vulnerable people will not be allowed to help vulnerable people outside of the junta’s territory, which is shrinking day by day. Throughout Burma, you will find that people, communities, and townships are in open opposition to the junta. The people see the military institution in Burma as an insurgent and armed mafia gang. Foreign governments and international business must not collaborate with any of the military business’ interests or supply arms and technology used to commit atrocities against civilians. Rather than empowering the military to continue its campaign of atrocities, UN member states, in particular the Security Council, should take assertive and forceful diplomatic measures. This includes imposing targeted sanctions on the military, their business interests, and the cronies who supply and support the junta.   Lastly, I would like to say that all the political prisoners detained across Burma should be released through combined political pressure of the international community. If there are political prisoners in Burma, there can be no national reconciliation and the military coup will continue. This interview was conducted by our Legal Researcher Aidan Johnson. Aidan Johnson holds a Master’s degree in international human rights law from the Irish Centre for Human Rights. In addition to his role at CJLPA, Aidan also works on refugee resettlement and advocacy in the US. [1] In late August 1988, word soon spread that there was a conqueror of the kings, or Min Ko Naing in Burmese language, among us to help topple the autocratic military rulers. We used this superstition of the people to rally even more support. [2] An account of this student march from Bo Kyi can be found in Megan Clymer, ‘Min Ko Naing, “Conqueror of Kings”, Burma’s Student Leader’ (2003) 8 Journal of Burma Studies 33, 56. [3] Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, ‘The Systematic use of Torture by Totalitarian Regimes in Burma & the Experiences of Political Prisoners’ (2019) < https://aappb.org/?p=10070 > accessed 21 December 2023; Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, ‘Prison Conditions in Burma and The Potential for Prison Reform’ (2016) < https://aappb.org/?p=4741 > accessed 21 December 2023.

Moral considerations in confiscating Russian assets Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has been going on for almost two years. During this time, Russia has committed brutal crimes against Ukrainians, which were witnessed by the international community. In February 2023, the UN General Assembly demanded that Russia stop the war and immediately withdraw its army from Ukraine.[1] In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, accusing him of being responsible for the illegal deportation of children from Ukraine, which constitutes a war crime.[2] While Ukraine is fighting for its freedom and awaiting fair adjudication of crimes committed during this bloody war, the material losses of the Ukrainian state are growing.   According to the World Bank, the losses caused by the aggressor amount to more than 400 billion euros on the controlled territory alone, and after the liberation of the entire territory of Ukraine from the invaders, this amount might double.[3] Ukraine’s economy currently functions at the expense of macro-financial assistance from partners, but Russia must pay for the damage it caused to peaceful Ukrainians.   Voluntary compensation by the aggressor country is unlikely. A more practical solution is to confiscate the assets of Russia as a state, as well as its citizens and companies that support the Putin regime. However, prior to the full-scale invasion, there were no universal approaches to the confiscation of assets of the aggressor state with the possible aim of transferring them to the state affected by the aggression while the war was ongoing.   Historically, compensation for war losses was conducted mostly at the expense of state funds on the basis of treaties or other international acts. In most cases, the aggressor state must agree to pay compensation under such treaties, since they are typically negotiated and require the consent of all parties involved. However, there are some scenarios in which compensation may be determined without the direct agreement of the aggressor state:   Imposed reparations: in certain situations, the victorious parties in a conflict may impose reparations on the aggressor state as part of the peace settlement, as after World War I with the Treaty of Versailles.[4] These imposed reparations are often outlined in a treaty or agreement. The aggressor state may be required to accept these terms as a condition for the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace. United Nations Actions: in cases where the United Nations is involved in post-conflict resolution, it may establish mechanisms for compensation without the direct agreement of the aggressor state. For example, the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was established to address claims for compensation resulting from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The UNCC operated independently and made decisions on compensation claims, even though Iraq did not initially agree to all aspects of the process. Funds to pay for compensation were drawn from the United Nations Compensation Fund, which received a percentage of the proceeds generated by the export sales of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products.[5]  The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions believes that Russia should be required and forced to pay war reparations for all the damage it has caused Ukraine, the same way Iraq had to.[6] However, Russia is one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, so there is an obvious risk of simply vetoing such an initiative. International Tribunals and Courts: international criminal tribunals and courts, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), can issue judgments that include orders for reparations and compensation for victims. While an aggressor state may not have voluntarily agreed to these reparations, it is bound to comply with the decisions of these international judicial bodies. However, Russia has not recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.   State or private assets as the source for war compensation   Despite the fact that a lot of Russia’s state assets have been frozen worldwide due to the imposition of sanctions, allies of Ukraine have not yet confiscated them. According to the Russian central bank, seven countries participating in the imposition of sanctions against Russia held nearly half of all Russian foreign reserves of 585 billion US dollars as of June 2021. Since then, Russian reserves (frozen) abroad have increased to 640 billion US dollars.[7] According to the international community, the main obstacle in confiscating these funds is the doctrine of sovereign immunity of assets of a foreign central bank, enshrined at the level of national legislation of most countries. In particular, the principle of immunity is stipulated in the UN Nations Convention, according to which states and their property are immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State.[8] For instance, the United States prohibits the alienation of sovereign assets by other countries. However, there were exceptions to this restriction, such as the US confiscation of Afghanistan’s gold and currency reserves, the US confiscation of Cuban sovereign assets, and the disposal of Venezuela’s gold and currency reserves by Great Britain. All of these cases are covered in more detail in the last section of the article.   Considering the confiscation of sovereign assets, international partners are also wary of economic risks, which are weaponising the financial system. In particular, there is the possibility that the precedent of confiscating Russian sovereign assets could in future force countries to abandon the storage of own their reserves in foreign currencies, due to fears that in potential conflicts these would will also be confiscated.[9] Moreover, the European Central Bank warned the European Commission in Brussels against confiscating frozen Russian assets, claiming it could dent confidence in the euro as a global currency and hurt financial stability.[10] So far, there have been discussions but no legal initiatives to confiscate Russia’s central bank reserves.   Another potential source of compensation for the damages caused by Russia to Ukraine is the private assets of Kremlin supporters. Ukraine’s international partners, such as the USA, the EU, Great Britain, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, and Japan, imposed sanctions in the form of asset blocking on more than 12,000 individuals and entities.[11] Such sanctions are designed to put pressure on individuals and legal entities close to the Putin regime and can potentially influence decision-making. It is important to stress that sanctions are the means of political influence and, therefore, cannot usually be considered a legal way to seize assets.[12]    However, some of Ukraine’s allies have developed legislation aimed at confiscating and transferring these funds to Ukraine: last summer, the Canadian Senate passed amendments to the Special Economic Measures Act, allowing the confiscation of Russian assets and their use for the benefit of Ukraine. Grounds for confiscation according to this Act are a call of an international organisation of states or association of states of which Canada is a member,   grave breach of international peace and security, gross and systematic human rights violations in a foreign state, or acts of significant corruption involving a national of a foreign state.[13] Such changes are aimed at both state assets and assets owned by an individual or legal entity that is on the sanctions list of the Federal Government of Canada. Previously, Canadian authorities could confiscate only assets obtained by criminal means, but now, with the help of the updated Act, they can confiscate the assets of persons subject to sanctions, regardless of whether they were acquired legally or illegally. So far, this mechanism has not yet been applied, and the funds have not been transferred to Ukraine.   Sanctions Mechanisms in Ukraine Meanwhile, in Ukraine, confiscation of Russia-related assets as the next step after sanctions were imposed is a rather new but already actively used mechanism. Currently, there are 29 cases of confiscating private assets of individuals and legal entities that supported Russia’s war against Ukraine and more than 1,000 assets confiscated.[14]   This mechanism envisages the confiscation of assets as a new punishment that can be applied to individuals and companies that created a significant threat to Ukraine’s national security, sovereignty, or territorial integrity or significantly contributed to it, including by financing such actions by other persons. The sanction can be applied only by the decision of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) and during the period of martial law.[15]   When it comes to the confiscation of private assets, the question of observing human rights in this process is crucial. A right to property is guaranteed and protected by law at both the national and international level in most countries, including Ukraine. According to international standards,[16] a state can violate the right to property by confiscating it without providing mandatory compensation to its owner when it is determined that the property was obtained through illegal activities. Confiscation of private assets in proceedings other than criminal is rather an exceptional practice (for example, unexplained wealth orders in the UK).[17] That makes the Ukrainian mechanism unusual and possibly risky, since (1) the confiscation is conducted in administrative proceedings by the imposition of sanctions, and (2) without any compensation to the owner. However, in its decisions, the High Anti-Corruption Court, which is authorised to consider confiscation cases, points to three criteria of the European Court on Human Rights, which must be met when restricting the right to property: the restriction must be 1) in accordance with the national law, 2) pursue a legitimate goal, and 3) be proportionate to the legitimate purpose.[18] If everything is clear with the first two criteria because confiscation takes place based on the Law ‘On Sanctions’ to protect national security, the last criterion is more complicated. Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights states that no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and the general principles of international law. Thus, for the criterion of proportionality, the proportionality between the public interest and the restriction of property rights is crucial.   The HACC found that the application of the confiscation is commensurate with the damage caused by Russian proxies to the interests of society. In all cases, to argue such a position, the court cites data on the losses of the civilian population after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which are published by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.[19] The court emphasises that the confiscated assets would be used to cover the losses of Ukraine caused by the illegal actions of Russia and by the sanctioned persons in particular, which is also in the public interest.[20]   In international courts’ practice, there are no relative cases regarding the confiscation of private assets due to their owner’s support of their state’s military actions. However, the HACC references each of its decisions to the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights, and we see a sufficient legal basis in this approach.   Confiscation and Human Rights   In addition to protecting property rights, there are other human rights that the state should observe when confiscating private assets. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees everyone the right to a fair trial (Article 6) and the right to an effective remedy (Article 13). However, the new Ukrainian mechanism has some shortcomings that may be considered a violation of these standards.   For instance, the procedure does not guarantee mandatory notification of third parties about the consideration of the case; the terms for filing a defence and appealing the decision of the first instance are insufficient (five days from the date of announcement or publication of the court decision). This could result not only in potential violation of the rights of defendants but also of third parties, which are often Ukrainian enterprises or citizens. For example, the HACC Appeals Chamber has overturned the confiscation of two quarries that were allegedly indirectly owned by Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska since Ukrainian entrepreneurs managed to refute the connection between the quarry and the Russian oligarch.[21] Ukrainian enterprises managed to prepare and submit an appeal in 5 days, while the case was considered in court for months.   In another case against the Russian oligarch Mikhail Shelkov, the HACC Appeals Chamber decided to confiscate the assets belonging to a non-sanctioned person—a citizen of Ukraine in addition to the assets belonging to the sanctioned oligarch.[22] The court indicated in this case that the interests of third parties (in particular, minority shareholders) which may be violated in sanction cases can be protected by means of private law.[23] Despite the fact that in this case, the defendants do not refer to the practice of the ECHR, there is a relevant decision in the case Batkivska Turbota Foundation v. Ukraine . The court noted that ‘requiring the applicant to file a claim for damages either as part of the proceedings against the applicant or by filing a separate lawsuit will impose an excessive burden on him’.[24]   When implementing a new confiscation mechanism, ensuring procedural guarantees is no less important than material guarantees. Changes to the existing sanctions mechanism in Ukraine are necessary; otherwise, there is a risk of successfully challenging confiscations in international bodies. In this regard, ECHR judge Jeremy McBride, who analysed the confiscation procedure in Ukraine for compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, also expressed his concerns.[25] The experience of Ukraine should also be considered by its allies, who are only working on new solutions.   Criminal proceedings   During Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine’s allies showed the greatest willingness to confiscate Russian assets through criminal proceedings since it is a proven and reliable confiscation mechanism. Confiscation in criminal proceedings can only be applied to the person who committed the crime under the national legislation of a specific country, so it is narrowly focused and very unlikely to cover all the damages caused by Russia in a timely manner. Because of this, international partners are trying to expand and strengthen their criminal legislation.   In May 2022, the European Commission submitted a draft proposal for the revision of the Asset Recovery Directive of 2014 to widen its scope and to unify the legislation of the EU members on the confiscation and recovery of assets.[26] The changes are needed since the system of asset recovery differs significantly in various countries of the Union and contains a number of gaps. Moreover, the authorised bodies are often underfunded. This proposal focuses primarily on providing the legal basis for asset confiscation for organised crime, money laundering, and corruption. That is, it is aimed mostly at Russian kleptocrats without necessary reference to their support of Russia’s military aggression.   Another important legislative initiative in the EU is the criminalisation of sanctions evasion at the block level. The new draft law presented by the Council of Europe defines the conduct member states will need to criminalise: (1) helping persons subject to Union-restrictive measures to bypass an EU travel ban, (2) trading sanctioned goods and running transactions with states or entities which are covered by EU restrictive measures.[27]   Confiscation of assets due to circumvention of sanctions has also proven its effectiveness in practice. In February 2023, the US court confiscated 5.4 million US dollars from Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev for circumventing the sanctions imposed on him.[28] The US is determined to transfer these funds for the reconstruction of Ukraine.   Recently, the Dutch court sentenced a Russian businessman to 18 months and fined his company 200,000 euros for circumventing EU sanctions targeting Russia, which is not a common practice in the EU.[29] However, the national legislation of the Netherlands does not provide for the confiscation of assets for sanctions violations, let alone their possible transfer to Ukraine. Moreover, at the EU level, sanction violation is still not criminalised, so some states only provide for an administrative fine.   Apart from exceptional grounds for confiscation (commission of a crime), another major disadvantage of criminal proceedings is their lengthy nature. Cases can take years, while the need for funds in Ukraine is urgent.   However, confiscation of assets through criminal proceedings is a proven practice that should be applied in the case of Russian assets. EU legislative initiatives to criminalise sanctions evasion at the bloc level are currently the most promising in terms of confiscation mechanisms. The same is confirmed by the practice of the US in confiscating the assets of Russian kleptocrats who have bypassed sanctions. If entering the sanctions list is not grounds for asset confiscation, then the evasion of restricting measures should be, since it is a deliberate act of a person against the law.   Political and legal limitations   Based on the above, we can make the interesting observation that, in the face of Russian aggression, it seems that Ukrainian allies resist the idea of confiscating private Russian assets less than sovereign assets, despite the fact that the question of proportionality and human rights will not arise in the second case. Such dynamics suggest the influence of political weight in legal matters of confiscation.   Scholars agree that it is time to move away from sanctions against Russia to state countermeasures, since the atrocious acts of the aggressor contradict everything in international law. According to James Crawford, a countermeasure ‘may be defined as an act of non-compliance by a state with an international obligation owed towards another state in response to a prior breach of international law by that other state…As long as the countermeasures are proportionate to the wrongs, they do not require judicial or arbitral processes to implement compensation’.[30] Thus, basically, what is really needed is the political will of Ukrainian allies to confiscate Russian sovereign funds and transfer them to Ukraine.   The practice of resolving the legal issue regarding assets during conflicts or international disputes through political decisions is not new, as some historical examples demonstrate:   During the Suez Crisis in 1956, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel invaded Egypt in response to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although the invasion violated principles of international law, including the UN Charter, political decisions by these Western powers were driven by their strategic interests in maintaining control over the Suez Canal. Legal norms took a back seat to political considerations during this crisis.[31] The United States imposed a comprehensive economic embargo on Cuba in the early 1960s. This embargo included the confiscation of Cuban assets in the United States. While the legal basis for the embargo and asset confiscation was established in the US national law, it reflected Cold War political considerations rather than strict adherence to international legal norms.[32] Recent cases of US confiscation of Afghanistan’s gold and currency reserves are more relevant for Ukraine, since, in our opinion, they were also caused primarily by political will. After the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan in 2021, the presidential administration made a decision to freeze Afghan state assets. On 11 February 2022, President Biden issued the Executive Order on Protecting Certain Property of Da Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of Afghanistan.[33] According to this Order, the USA blocked 7 billion US dollars from the Da Afghanistan Bank. Half of these funds (3.5 billion US dollars) shall be transferred to the victims of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack and the other half (3.5 billion US dollars) to the Afghanistan Fund, established in Switzerland in September 2022, for humanitarian and economic assistance to the country suffering from the Taliban.[34] The establishment and use of the fund were not contested legally. However, in February 2023, the New York District Court ruled that the United States was not entitled to use the Afghan state assets to compensate for the victims of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack since US courts lacked legal jurisdiction to authorise the seizure.[35]   It seems that the creation of a fund for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine can have the same success as in the described case of the Afghan state reserves, while compensations to individual victims of Russian aggression can be resolved within individual lawsuits.   Jan Barcz, professor of International Law and the Law of the EU,   emphasises that the effective compensation on the part of Russia for the aggression against Ukraine should work through the comprehensive and coherent action of the countries that imposed sanctions on Russia, with the participation of international organisations and international financial institutions. He believes that ‘this is a great and complicated challenge, a fundamental test of the credibility and effectiveness of the international community’.[36]   Artem Ripenko argues that the confiscation of Russian state assets can be conducted as a non-forcible measure of self-defence by Ukraine according to Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 21 of Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.[37] Such confiscation would meet the proportionality criteria due to the scale of Russia’s illegal acts and the necessity criteria should be considered regarding the Latin maxim in eo quod plus sit semper inest et minus , meaning the right to use force in self-defence must include the right to use non-forcible measures in self-defence. Thus, confiscation as a non-forcible measure should be aimed at repelling an armed attack by strengthening the Ukrainian military potential. Regardless of legal criteria, Ripenko comes to the conclusion that ‘confiscation of assets in collective self-defence is finally subject to the political will of a state, enshrined in an administrative act issued by an authorised body’. However, this kind of confiscation is only possible during the war and does not replace the post-war reparations for the damages.[38]   It is common knowledge that the law does not always prescribe how to act in every circumstance of life. In such situations, legal principles play an important role, including the prohibition of aggression. The aggressor state must bear responsibility for its actions and compensate for all damages. First, this requires political will, which will later create legal grounds for justice. Moreover, in the matter of confiscating Russian assets, the example of horizontal balancing of human rights can be provided: the right to property of Russians and the right to life of Ukrainians or respect for their dignity. It depends only on the trendsetter’s state of how it will be evaluated and compared in terms of human rights law. Katerina Ryzhenko, Pavlo Demchuk, and Natalia Sichevlyuk Katerina Ryzhenko holds the position of Deputy Executive Director for Legal Affairs at TI Ukraine. She obtained her Master’s degree in International Law from the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and furthered her education with an LL.M in International Public Law from the University of Oslo. Fluent in English and proficient in Norwegian and Italian, Katerina brings a wealth of experience from her time in charitable and public organisations in Norway. Natalia Sichevlyuk, a distinguished graduate from the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy with a Master’s degree in Law in 2021, embarked on her legal journey in a law firm as an attorney’s assistant. With a rich background spanning over three years in commercial, civil, and administrative litigation, as well as contract law, she now dedicates her expertise to the confiscation of Russian assets and plays a pivotal role in the initiatives of the National Agency for Corruption Prevention. Pavlo Demchuk serves as a Legal Advisor at TI Ukraine. His academic journey culminated in 2018 with a degree from the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv. Pavlo’s professional path began in the legal field, concentrating on defending suspects and the accused in economic and official criminal offences. His experience includes a stint as an assistant to a judge at the High Anti-Corruption Court. In March 2023, Pavlo made a significant academic contribution by defending his thesis titled ‘Legality as an Element of the Principle of the Rule of Law in Criminal Law’. [1] United Nations General Assembly, ‘Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’ (16 February 2023) < https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N23/048/58/PDF/N2304858.pdf?OpenElement > accessed 1 November 2023. [2] International Criminal Court ‘ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova’ ( ICC , 17 March 2023) < https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and > accessed 1 November 2023. [3] The World Bank, ‘Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment’ (23 March 2023) < https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/03/23/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment > accessed 1 November 2023. [4] See George A Finch, ‘The Revision of the Reparation Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the Cancellation of Inter-Allied Indebtedness’ (1922) 84(12) Advocate of Peace through Justice 418-26. [5] The United Nations Compensation Commission, ‘UNCC at a glance’ < https://uncc.ch/uncc-glance > accessed 1 November 2023. [6] The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, ‘Why and How the West Should Seize Russia’s Sovereign Assets to Help Rebuild Ukraine’ (4 September 2023) 6 < https://fsi9-prod.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-09/workingpaper15_-_confiscating-reserves_09-19-23_update.pdf > accessed 1 November 2023. [7] Paola Tamma, ‘Payback time: The West studies how to make Russia foot the war bill’ ( Politico , 12 April 2022) < https://www.politico.eu/article/payback-time-west-make-russia-pay-war-ukraine-bill/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [8] ‘United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property’ (2 December 2004) < https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/4_1_2004.pdf > accessed 1 November 2023. [9] ‘Confiscation of assets of Russia and oligarchs: plans of Ukraine’s partners’ ( Transparency International Ukraine , 3 November 2022) < https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/konfiskatsiya-rosijskyh-aktyviv-na-mizhnarodnij-areni-shho-vidbuvayetsya-z-24-lyutogo/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [10] Sam Fleming, Martin Arnold, and Philip Stafford, ‘ECB warns Brussels against windfall levy on frozen Russian assets’ Financial Times (London, 16 June 2023) < https://www.ft.com/content/4e6499e0-33db-423a-a74b-528118792d22 > accessed 1 November 2023. [11] Kimberly Donovan, Maia Nikoladze, and Yulia Bychkovska, ‘Russia Sanctions Database’ ( Atlantic Council ) < https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/russia-sanctions-database/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [12] ‘Frequently asked questions: Restrictive measures (sanctions)’ ( European Commission , 28 February 2022) < https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_22_1401 > accessed 1 November 2023. [13] Government of Canada, ‘Special Economic Measures Act’ (1992) < https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/s-14.5/FullText.html > accessed 1 November 2023. [14] Information as of 14 November 2023. You can find the information relevant at the time of reading at ‘How to confiscate Russian assets?’ ( Transparency International Ukraine / Ukrainska Pravda ) < https://russian_assets.pravda.com.ua/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [15] Law of Ukraine, ‘On Sanctions’ (14 August 2014) < https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1644-18#Text > accessed 1 November 2023. [16] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Confiscation’ < https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-10/key-issues/confiscation.html > accessed 1 November 2023. [17] Ali Shalchi, ‘Unexplained Wealth Orders’ ( House of Commons Library , 14 April 2022) < https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9098/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [18] Decision of High Anti Corruption Court (16 January 2023) < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/109031868 > accessed 1 November 2023. [19] Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, ‘Ukraine: civilian casualty update’ (5 December 2022) < https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-12/Ukraine%20-%20civilian%20casualty%20update%20as%20of%204%20December%202022%20ENG_0.pdf > accessed 1 November 2023. [20] Natalia Sichevlyuk, ‘First cases of sanctioned assets confiscation: what HACC decisions reveal’ ( Transparency International Ukraine , 9 February 2023) < https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/first-cases-of-sanctioned-assets-confiscation-what-hacc-decisions-reveal/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [21] Natalia Sichevlyuk, ‘Guilty! What was confiscated from aggressor in 500 days of war and how’ ( Transparency International Ukraine , 11 July 2023) < https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/guilty-what-was-confiscated-from-aggressor-in-500-days-of-war-and-how/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [22] Resolution of the Appellate Chamber of the High Anti-Corruption Court in case No. 991/6606/22 (3 February 2023) < https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/108772467 > accessed 1 November 2023. [23] ibid. [24] The European Court of Human Rights, Batkivska Turbota Foundation v. Ukraine  (no. 5876/15) (3 September 2020) < https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/974_f40#Text > accessed 1 November 2023. [25] Olya Veretilnyk, ‘Sanctions vs ECHR’ ( Dead Lawyers Society , 24 May 2023) < https://www.deadlawyers.org/sankcziyi-vs-yespl/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [26] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on asset recovery and confiscation’ (25 May 2022) < https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022PC0245 > accessed 1 November 2023. [27] Council of the European Union, ‘EU sanctions: Council finalises position on law that aligns penalties for violations’ ( European Council , 9 June 2023) < https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/09/eu-sanctions-council-finalises-position-on-law-that-aligns-penalties-for-violations/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EU+sanctions%3a+Council+finalises+position+on+law+that+aligns+penalties+for+violations > accessed 1 November 2023. [28]  Luc Cohen , ‘Russian oligarch ordered to forfeit $5.4 mln to US, Ukraine may get funds’ ( Reuters , 2 February 2023) < https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-oligarch-ordered-forfeit-54-mln-us-ukraine-may-get-funds-2023-02-02/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [29] Reuters, ‘Dutch court sentences Russian man to prison for EU sanctions breach’ ( Reuters , 1 November 2023) < https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/dutch-court-sentences-russian-man-prison-eu-sanctions-breach-2023-11-01/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [30] The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions (n 6) 4. [31] M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Suez 1956: International Crisis and the Role of Law’ (1975) 24(4) DePaul Law Review 1070-4. [32] United Nations, ‘Adopting Annual Resolution, Delegates in General Assembly Urge Immediate Repeal of Embargo on Cuba, Especially amid Mounting Global Food, Fuel Crises’ ( UN , 3 November 2022) < https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12465.doc.htm > accessed 1 November 2023. [33] The White House, ‘Executive Order on Protecting Certain Property of Da Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of Afghanistan’ (11 February 2022) < https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/02/11/executive-order-on-protecting-certain-property-of-da-afghanistan-bank-for-the-benefit-of-the-people-of-afghanistan/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [34] Sofia Kosarevych, ‘Two Examples to Punish Russia: How US Confiscated Enemy-Owned Assets’ ( European Pravda , 27 July 2023) < https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2023/07/27/7166485/ > accessed 1 November 2023. [35] Ayaz Gul, ‘Afghan Central Bank Hails US Judge for Barring 9/11 Victims from Seizing Frozen Funds’ ( Voice of America English News , 22 February 2023) < https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-central-bank-hails-us-judge-for-barring-9-11-victims-from-seizing-frozen-funds/6973788.html > accessed 1 November, 2023. [36] Jan Barcz, ‘Russia’s Aggression against Ukrain e: How to ensure the effective pursuit of reparation claims from Russia ’ ( Dnistrianskyi Center , 27 June 2022) < https://dc.org.ua/en/news/jan-barcz > accessed 1 November, 2023. [37] Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (1945) < https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml > accessed 1 November 2023; United Nations, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001) < https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf > accessed 1 November 2023. [38] Artem Ripenko, ‘Should Third States Follow Ukraine’s Lead and Confiscate Russian State Assets?’ ( Völkerrechtsblog , 19 June 2023) < https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/should-third-states-follow-ukraines-lead-and-confiscate-russian-state-assets/ > accessed 1 November 2023.

1. The Obligation to Undress and the Destruction of Personal Property: Related Violations   1.1. Evidence of Confiscation and Destruction of Migrants’ Personal Belongings Denounced by International Organisations, Bodies, and Non-Governmental Organisations   The requirements for migrants to undress and the destruction of their personal belongings—including documents and mobile phones—by border guards and Frontex [the European Border and Coast Guard Agency] agents, at both internal and external borders of the EU, has been a subject of reporting and condemnation by various international organisations and institutions for several years.   The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union (FRA), in its 2020 report on the external borders of the EU, exposed severe violations of migrants’ human rights, including the confiscation and arbitrary destruction of personal effects. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has also repeatedly condemned the seizure and destruction of personal belongings of individuals forcibly returned from Greece to Turkey.[1]   The report titled ‘Beaten, Punished, and Pushed Back’ by the Protecting Rights at Borders (PRAB) network, published in January 2023, reveals that the people fleeing persecution or serious harm and in search of protection, attempting to enter the EU via the Bosnian-Croatian border over the past years, have faced denial of access to asylum procedures, arbitrary arrest or detention, physical abuse or mistreatment, and theft or destruction of property.[2] In a testimony of July 2022 provided by two individuals from Bangladesh, it was stated:   We continued walking through Croatia and at around four in the afternoon, we descended from one hill towards a water stream. That is when we heard dogs barking nearby […] and then silence […] so, we drank water and refreshed. After five minutes, we heard and noticed a drone flying above us, and then almost immediately some 20-30 police officers surrounded us. They caught all 16 of us, no one escaped, and not anyone even tried to. […] They asked if we had phones, power banks, money, or anything in our possession. We had to put everything in a bag, and another row of police searched us and took anything that they would find, even lighters or paper bags. […] We asked for water and for our phones, but they refused to give them to us.[3]   Furthermore, the report highlights that the destruction of personal belongings, particularly telephones and SIM cards, is also occurring at the Polish-Belarusian border. The refugees faced robbery by Belarusian border officials as well. These persistent abuses have been extensively documented in a policy note published in December 2021 by the PRAB network. The note asserts that the confiscation and destruction of migrants’ documents and personal property at European borders serve dual motivation (‘ensuring evidence is destroyed, and lucrative purposes’) and takes different forms. As the note states:   The widely occurring practice includes in almost all cases:   Checking for valuable items, such as money, jewellery, and electronic devices, including more expensive mobile phones, or other essential non-food-items such as backpacks, clothes, and shoes. Systematic deprivation and confiscation of personal belongings. While items of value will be kept, others are just taken away (for the purpose of taking away) at border crossings. Elimination of items which might provide evidence of the person’s actual presence at the EU’s. This can take different formats: sometimes papers are burnt, and on other occasions phones which might include pictures.[4]   In the report ‘Greece: Violence, lies and pushbacks’,[5] Amnesty International revealed that during pushback operations from Greece to Turkey, officers typically demand cell phones, which were confiscated and not returned. People on the move also had to hand over their backpacks with its content to the officers, including identity documents and personal effects. A report by Soloman and El País denounced that, over the past six years, Greek authorities have stolen over €2 million worth of cash and personal belongings from people on the move while carrying out pushbacks from Greek territory.[6] The report outlines the authorities’ modus operandi, including arbitrary detention and theft of people’s money, phones, jewellery, and other personal items. The investigation, which also analysed data from the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN) database, noted an increase in the practice over the years, turning it into a systemic strategy of fear and intimidation. The fate of items following the theft is unclear, but one internal source disclosed to Soloman that authorities either keep them for personal use or gift them to family members. The rising incidence of theft has reportedly led transit groups to carry fewer cash and valuable possessions, fearing robbery and assault by state authorities.   The practice of destroying personal belongings—coupled with other human rights violations of people on the move, such as beatings and other physical abuse—is widespread also in other border areas. At the Bulgarian-Turkish border, violence suffered by migrants and refugees also encompasses beatings with sticks, use of other forms of physical violence such as kicks and punches, cuts with razor blades and knives, and even skull fractures.[7] Additionally, instances of deprivation of food and water, arbitrary detention, robberies, and destruction of personal items (particularly mobile phones) have been witnessed. For years, the Adriatic Port Network has reported several cases of pushback from Italian Adriatic ports to Greece.[8] Testimonies collected by organisations within the Network also highlight cases of mistreatment and behaviour detrimental to personal dignity throughout all phases of the procedure, including episodes of forced undressing and exposure to extreme temperatures. At the French-UK border, the destruction of migrants’ property also affects other objects, such as everything ranging from tents and tarpaulins to blankets. Tents are cut up with knives or tools like hand saws, then dumped in a skip and taken to the waste disposal centre:   Other belongings, including medicine, are thrown into the mud and trampled on, rendering them worthless. Even water and food are thrown away or burned during the police operations. […] In reference of the conditions in which the belongings are kept, it discourages people from going to collect anything: the belongings which have been dragged along the ground are stored as they are, day after day, in a closed and humid container, the condensation damaging the belongings and making the air unbreathable in the container.[9]   Looking beyond the EU borders, the pattern of violations suffered by migrants remains similar. At the US-Mexico border, the confiscation of personal property of migrants and refugees is a widespread practice:   Customs and Border Protections Transport, Escort, Detention and Search (TEDS) standards state that their belongings are to be ‘safeguarded’, ‘documented’, and held for 30 days or more. ‘After 30 days personal property will be considered abandoned and may be destroyed’, though it’s not clear how migrants are expected to claim their property while in custody, moved elsewhere, or removed from the United States without it.[10]   1.2. International and European Legal Framework   Given that respect for fundamental rights represents a safeguard clause in the integrated management of European borders and that, during the exercise of controls at the external and internal borders of the EU, Member States must respect international standards and EU law, including the EU Charter and principles established by the ECHR, the destruction of documents and personal effects of migrants, as well as the obligation to strip naked, represent serious violations of their fundamental rights with substantial relevance in the European and international legal systems.   The confiscation and destruction of documents and personal effects (including mobile phones) by police authorities at border crossings, often with the help or presence of Frontex agents[11]—carried out in the absence of a legitimate judicial provision authorising them—translates primarily into a violation of property rights of migrants. On an international level, property rights, and in particular the ownership of personal documents, are recognised in various sources. In particular, Article 21 of the International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families of 1990 provides that:   It shall be unlawful for anyone, other than a public official duly authorised by law, to confiscate, destroy or attempt to destroy identity documents, documents authorising entry to or stay, residence or establishment in the national territory or work permits. No authorised confiscation of such documents shall take place without delivery of a detailed receipt. In no case shall it be permitted to destroy the passport or equivalent document of a migrant worker or a member of his or her family.   Private property is protected also by principle 21 of the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and is the subject of various recommendations, resolutions and decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Security Council, the Commission of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations Human Rights Council, and other UN bodies.[12] In this regard, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in its guide on the protection of fundamental rights at international borders drawn up in 2014, recommended to the States to respect people’s human rights, establishing in particular that personal property—including identity documents, travel documents, entry or residence authorisations, residence or work permits, money, mobile phones, or other personal documentation—can only be confiscated by border authorities if required by law and in compliance with international law. Moreover, for any confiscation of personal property, a valid receipt must be given to the person to whom the confiscated property belongs, and the confiscated property must be returned as soon as possible.[13]   At the European level, the right to property is protected both by Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which guarantees the right of every individual to enjoy ownership of their own goods, and by Article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR, which provides a duty to the Member states to protect and safeguard property.[14] The right to property, therefore, represents a human right in European legislation and as such deserves protection. Like other fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR, the protection of property entails, on the one hand, a negative obligation on the part of the State to abstain from interfering with it and, on the other hand, the positive obligation to adopt measures to protect it.[15]   The principle of peaceful enjoyment of goods, the first of the three rules contained in Article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR, operates both as a general criterion of interpretation of Article 1 Protocol 1 as well as an autonomous norm.[16] As a stand-alone provision, its application has a residual nature, and the principle in question ends up constituting the closing rule for the various hypotheses contained in Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR. From this perspective, the rule under consideration can be applied to any provision that has the effect of decreasing the availability of goods or that, in any case, causes financial damage, thus finding application with respect to all hypotheses of interference in private property.[17]   In addition to the violation of property rights, the seizure and destruction of migrants’ personal belongings and documents also entail a violation of their right to privacy and their right to obtain protection from arbitrary or unlawful interference against their privacy, family, house, or correspondence.[18] This right is protected internationally by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),[19] while at the European level it finds protection in Article 8 ECHR, which establishes the right of every person to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.   The confiscation and destruction of migrants’ personal effects, including documents and mobile phones, could further entail a violation of their right to have access to justice and to obtain effective protection of their rights, and may constitute an indicator of the collective nature of the expulsion procedures implemented.[20]   1.3. Case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the National Courts in same EU countries   The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that when a measure does not constitute inhuman and degrading treatment as referred to in Article 3 of the ECHR, it may, nevertheless, violate Article 8 of the Convention.[21]   In all cases in which the obligation to undress and the consequent or simultaneous confiscation of migrants’ personal effects and their subsequent destruction—even if not accompanied by the excessive use of force or acts of physical violence—is detrimental to a person’s dignity and is directed to arouse ‘feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority such as to lead to desperation’,[22] this behaviour may instead take the form of inhuman and degrading treatments and therefore results in a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. To evaluate whether such conduct reaches the minimum seriousness threshold required for a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that migrants often suffer this type of violation repeatedly and that the conduct carried out by the national authorities also appears to be animated (solely) by the intention to humiliate migrants and is not motivated by security needs or the behaviour of the migrants themselves, as well as accompanied by other abuses such as the obligation to undress.[23]   The ECtHR has already had the opportunity to rule several times on the obligation to undress in the context of personal search procedures carried out in the presence of a legitimate judicial provision that authorises them, stating that there is a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR when ‘the methods with which a search is carried out present degrading elements that considerably aggravate the inevitable humiliation of the procedure’.[24] The Strasbourg judges also stated that ‘any use of physical force that has not been made strictly necessary by the conduct of the applicant undermines human dignity and constitutes, in principle, a violation of the right enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention’[25] and that ‘the procedure of forced undressing by the police may constitute such an invasive and potentially degrading measure that it should not be applied without a compelling reason’.[26]   Recently, however, the Strasbourg judges for the first time applied the above-mentioned principles with specific regard to migrants who were forced to undress during a personal search in the absence of a judicial provision authorising the procedure. In the decision rendered last 16 November, the ECtHR recalled that ‘where an individual is deprived of his freedom or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any use of physical force that has not been strictly necessary by the person’s conduct diminishes human dignity’ and therefore constitutes a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.[27] As regards, in particular, the obligation to undress, the Court recalled that ‘the procedure of forcible undressing by the police may amount to such an invasive and potentially debasing measure that it should not be applied without a compelling reason’ and that in the case at issue the Italian Government failed to demonstrate the necessity of this measure given that the applicants were already in a vulnerable situation.[28]   The obligation to strip naked and the confiscation and destruction of migrants’ personal belongings (including mobile phones) during internal EU border controls were considered a violation of Article 8 ECHR also by the Administrative Court of Styria (Austria).[29] With the sentence delivered on 1 July 2021, the Austrian judges considered the methods of personal searches carried out by the Austrian border guards to be illegitimate, and in particular the request made to the applicant by the police authorities to undress and kneel, without a risk of possession of dangerous objects. Specifically, according to the Austrian Administrative Court, the way in which the appellant was searched impermissibly interfered with his private sphere, especially since he had to kneel during the search. The search methods implemented by the Austrian authorities violated Article 8 of the ECHR. Although the relevant internal regulatory provisions provide for the right to search the person, the intensity of the intrusion during the searches was exceeded as there was no evidence that the complainant could have hidden dangerous objects or documents in the anal fold. The search methods implemented by the Austrian authorities and especially the request to undress—according to the Administrative Court of Styria—were also in violation of Article 7 of the Schengen Borders Code, which protects respect for human dignity by border guards as part of their function of carrying out border checks.[30]   2. The Consequences of the Seizure and the Destruction of the Telephones.   2.1 The Pushback Practices Occurred at the EU Internal and External Borders: Testimonies Collected by NGOs   In almost every pushback across all EU borders, the phone is the object that is usually seized, destroyed, or never returned. In addition to trying to identify the person or whoever helped them, the seizure of the mobile phone also represents a form of disincentive to new attempts to cross borders. Furthermore, various testimonies have highlighted that the seizure of telephones by the officers represents a way to activate and use tools that allow them to intercept migrants in their next try to cross the border. From a testimony reported by No Name Kitchen during a pushback from Croatia to Bosnia, one person of the group who was stopped by the officers said that:   The officers also took the shoelaces of the group members, as well as four phones, some power banks, and some money in different currencies. […] he said: ‘I’m not saying that they [the intervention unit] are all really bad. 3 or 4 times I’ve been deported and 2 times they beat me but they take the things. This time just about the phone and the jacket and the bag. Our friends were deported to a different place and they were beaten. I know why they take the phone so we can’t try again, but I don’t know why they take the clothes’.[31]   According to another testimony gathered during a pushback from Hungary to Serbia, the migrant assumes that in a previous transit attempt, the Hungarian police bugged their phones in order to be able to locate the group:   ‘We slept in the forest for about five hours until 9.30 am. The other groups were close to us. The police, when they catch [someone] they control [bug] their telephones and they know when we cross the border [again]. When we were in the forest, the police searched for us. At first there were two police officers, one [woman] and one [man]’. The respondent’s group was apprehended first. According to the respondent they checked his telephone and saw that it was not bugged. He had brought a new phone for their transit. He related that the officers concluded that more people must be in the area, as he assumed that they got the location of a bugged phone. […] The respondent’s group had to wait next to a road for about an hour while the police checked everyone’s bags and clothes. ‘They took all the phones and gave back all but one. One phone they destroyed’.[32]   This practice is also widespread at the Romanian borders as reported by the BVMN in their October 2022 Balkan Region Report:   POM (people-on-the-move) mentioned that instead of destroying their phones, Romanian officers would enter a code in the settings to make the phone traceable in case of future use. Though this information cannot be confirmed at the moment. POM have claimed that, when using the hacked phone again on Romanian territory, some kind of signal is sent to the authorities, so their location is immediately known to them.[33]   The seizures and destruction of migrant’s cell phones cause a lot of other violations, like the destruction of familiar contacts, photos of loved ones, medical certificates, documents that would be key evidence in an asylum claim. In a testimony reported by Anonymous and published by BMVN during a pushback from Croatia to Bosnia, it is stated that:   When the police stop the migrant ask him directly if he had a phone; the respondent did not want his phone to be taken by police, so he said no; he had a lot of materials in his phone, especially proofs in order to ask for asylum in Germany, and he believes that men in uniform operating push backs usually take people-on-the-move’s phones. The respondent claimed that after he answered, the man frisked him; when he found his phone’s charger and the power bank, the man asked how he couldn’t have a phone if he had chargers. The interviewee stated that the man eventually also found the phone; at that point, he asked the respondent why he lied before; the respondent answered that he cared about his phone because he has a lot of materials on it. The man in uniform got reportedly more angry: he took the respondent’s phone, stepped on it, and threw it in the water, saying to the respondent ‘if you really care about it, go take it’. Then, the respondent reported that he was beaten a lot.[34]   Another testimony of a man from the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported that:   ‘It was the first thing they did, to take away all our cell phones to eliminate evidence’. […] Later, the respondent described that they noticed that many of the cell phones had damage because they were all thrown together in the bag. Some of them had damage to the screens or other malfunctions.[35]   According to a woman with health problems, although she had asked to have her phone back as she kept important medical documents, this was denied to her:   Right after that, the young woman states that she asked the officers to have her phone back and because she kept there some important medical documents, results of ultrasounds and prescriptions concerning a brain cyst she found out to have some months before. As an answer to this request, the authorities smashed her phone and started beating her again with the same batons, but this time they hit her particularly on her head […] After waiting for some minutes in the woods, the respondents heard the car turning on and driving away, and decided to go back to the location where the violence happened to check if the woman’s phone was still there. When they arrived, they found an officer still there waiting for them, and he shot the gun in the air screaming again ‘Go back to Bosnia!’.[36]   A 19-year-old Pakistani man apprehended by Croatian authorities while crossing the Croatian highway 1 stated that:   At the border, the officials to whom they were handed over asked the transit group for their passports and money. Police said: ‘Give me your passport!’. I said ‘I don’t have a passport’. So he said ‘Give me money!’. I said ‘I don’t have money’. So he said ‘Give me your purse!’. The boy then took out his wallet, but there was no money in it, as he had hidden it in the seams of his trousers […] The officers then pointed to the cheap gold-plated necklace the 19-year-old man was wearing. Desperate, he explained that it was not made of real gold […] and begged the officers not to take it, whereupon he was allowed to keep it. During the interview, he explained that it had been left to him by a romantic partner and that it had emotional value. Still, the respondents reported the Croatian authorities took from them their phones, sleeping bag, jacket, and shoes without returning them, with two officers standing aside watching over them and a third one collecting them. ‘The passengers [meaning People on the Move] are so poor, they don’t have money, they don’t have another mobile, there’s just one mobile for six people who need it for the game locations. […] We have just one mobile to talk to our home, our mothers and brothers, our family’.[37]   The destruction of the telephones of migrants also occurred because the officers want to destroy any evidence of the treatment that people on the move have suffered during the pushback operations. Often the seizure of the phone also leads to disorientation at the border, not being able to recognise the way back or to avoid dangerous places. A group of men rejected from Slovenia to Croatia and then to Bosnia stated that:   After the officers had already taken almost all of their belongings, including their mobile phones, watches, power banks, bags, food, and shoes—everything except their T-shirts and trousers—they continued to force them to lie flat on the ground, with one officer reaching out his gun from his lower right pocket and threatening them not to run away; which the interviewees reportedly tried to appease by saying that there was no point in running away after they were already without shoes and food. ‘They don’t want to give us any evidence. That’s why they take all our stuff, mobile, everything. If we had mobiles we could take pictures of everything’.[38]    According to a testimony reported by No Name Kitchen during a pushback from Croatia to Bosnia:   After those days, they tried to cross a road at around 7pm, where some officers caught them, demanding to ‘come and sit down’. A few of the men tried to run away but the police shot bullets in the air and screamed that they should sit down. The uniformed men then started to take pictures of the men and searched their bodies and bags. They stole about 26 phones, several power banks and money. He took all, no give back. Once the officers were done with searching everyone, which took about 1-2 hours, they loaded everyone into two big vans. […] He did not really know where exactly they got pushed back, since they did not have a phone to check for directions. The officers opened the doors and as soon as the men got off the vans, they started hitting everyone with their feet. Some tried running away but fell down. At the border, it was completely dark and only forest. No orientation, no mobile. Too much dark. […] Since most phones got stolen by the police, the men did not have any possibility to reach their families in Pakistan and Bangladesh, which made them feel ‘very, very bad’.[39]   Furthermore, the seizure of the phone represents a business and a method that the border police use to obtain profit by the confiscation of money or objects. A testimony of a man from Iran is effective in demonstrating what is stated above:   We were scared the police would catch us and push us back again. They don’t follow any rules. They are thieves. It didn’t happen only to me, but to my friends, and my friends’ friends, too. I am sorry to say this, but it’s shameful. This is a big business on migration. Migration money, migration phones. In Albania, we wanted to go to Montenegro. Albanian police came next to us and ordered us to go to the police station. We begged them to let us free, so they said: ‘You don’t want to go to detention, then give us money!’. The same happened in Montenegro: Montenegrin police put us in a van, we were five people crammed in the back of the vehicle. We begged them to let us go, so they said: ‘How much money do you have on you?’ We didn’t have any cash, I just had my credit card and my phone, but they didn’t accept them. They dropped us on the mountains, in the cold rain. At the Greek-Turkish border, the Greek border police caught us and took all my money and threw my backpack on the fire. It’s all the same. Money, phones, abuse. In Greece, they forced my friends to undress and walk naked. In all the countries, the police look for us for the money. In Banja Luka, the bus driver kicked us out of the bus. The moment we got off, a taxi came to take us and our money. You see? It’s a business, it’s a dirty business. But people are good, they help us, in the jungles, on the street. People is good.[40]    2.2 The Destruction of Mobile Phones: A Violation of the Right to an Effective Remedy and of the Prohibition of Collective Expulsions   Officially, the authorities of the Member states confiscate the phones in order to have the identity of the refugees or to identify those helping them. In the context of migration, one of the areas where seizure and confiscation measures can play a crucial role is in combating human trafficking and preventing and suppressing transnational crime. In fact, Article 7 of the EU Directive 2011/36 provides that Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure that their competent authorities are entitled to seize and confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds from the offences concerning trafficking in human beings.[41]   On the contrary, refugees who cross borders—as the aforementioned testimonies showed—often experience the confiscation of their phones without being charged with any crime that would warrant such actions. In all cases, this confiscation occurs in the absence of any formal provision.[42] In general, the position of the national authorities is ambiguous; for example, in 2016 Denmark’s authorities approved the so-called ‘Jewellery bill’ that allows the confiscation of valuable cash, jewellery, and other assets of asylum seekers in order to make them contribute to the costs of their migration policies.[43] Swiss legislation requires asylum seekers who enter the country with more than 1,000 Swiss francs to report and hand over the surplus to the Swiss authorities. The rule only covers money, not other valuables such as personal jewellery. In the state of Bavaria in Germany, authorities have been allowed to confiscate the asylum seekers’ cash in excess of €750.[44] In Germany, mobile phones of asylum seekers and refugees are also confiscated and read out.[45] According to the Residence Act, this is possible if people concerned do not have a valid passport or passport replacement at the time of the check. There are no nationwide or state-specific figures on this; MP Jule Nagel recently tried unsuccessfully to find out in the Saxon state parliament.   A seizure can also be made under section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) for the purpose of preserving evidence on the grounds of ‘smuggling in foreigners’. For asylum seekers, the loss of a mobile phone often means additional stress in the asylum procedure, because the device is not only used to communicate with relatives and lawyers, but sometimes there are some relevant documents for hearings stored on it. In one case of three asylum seekers from Iraq and Iran who were arrested in 2020 after entering the country in small boats across the English Channel, The Home Office in London admitted that the blanket seizure of migrants’ mobile phones was illegal.[46] The Home Office also acknowledged that a separate policy to keep asylum seekers’ phones for a minimum of three months was a ‘disproportionate interference’ with human rights, that the complete extraction of data from every phone violated the Data Protection Act and that the policy to command asylum seekers to hand over their PIN numbers to allow immigration officers to access their phones was unlawful, as were the data protection impact assessments done at the time. In most cases, the destruction of migrant’s mobile phones by border police is a tactic that obstructs their access to any third party or assistance and this reduces possibilities of demonstrating the presence of the involved people in the places from where they have been removed, the possibility of producing evidence (videos or photos).   Lastly, the conduct under consideration prevents people from providing useful documentation for their identification and an individual assessment of their situation and may constitute an indicator of the collective nature of the expulsion procedures implemented.[47] As already noted, these conducts can certainly constitute a violation of the article 13 ECHR that protects the right to an effective remedy. Furthermore, the practice of destroying personal property and documents is to be considered indicative of collective expulsion and consequently entails the violation of Article 4, Protocol 4 of the ECHR as such conduct limits the risk that, considering the large number of people involved, someone could preserve items of evidence or create new ones in a more chaotic and less controlled operation.   At the same time, the authorities’ failure to use data from mobile phones or to use technology to pinpoint GPS position may constitute a breach of the duty to investigate effectively and to protect life. In the decision MH vs Croatia , concerning the death of 60 Afghan Madina Hussiny, the ECtHR found that ‘the domestic criminal investigation did not comply with the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention, inter alia because the investigative authorities never verified the police allegation that there were no recordings of the impugned events, and that they had failed to inspect the signals from their mobile telephones and the police car GPS in order to establish the applicants’ whereabouts and their contact with the Croatian police before the train had hit MAD H’.[48]   Conclusion   Borders are becoming increasingly technological: the use of thermal sensors, drones and cameras enables national authorities to detect and stop people trying to cross borders; despite this, following their expulsions, victims have little material evidence other than their testimonies and even if they can produce video-footage this is not always considered reliable evidence.   In the case ND and NT vs Spain ,   The Government submitted that the applicants had not demonstrated that they had taken part in the attempt to enter Spain at the Melilla border at daybreak on 13 August 2014. They noted the applicants’ claim to recognise themselves on the video-footage which they provided (see paragraph 27 above). Basing their assertions on expert assessments, the Government criticised the poor quality of the video-recordings in question, which in their view made it impossible to compare the footage with the photographs in the official identity archives, which had been checked when the applicants had entered Spanish territory subsequently. The applicants had not provided proof of their participation in the storming of the fences, although the burden of proof lay with them.[49]    In the meantime,   The applicants […] submitted that the evidence they had gathered—videos of the storming of the fences in which they claimed to recognise themselves among the other migrants, and reports by independent international institutions and organisations—was sufficient to demonstrate that they had indeed been part of the group that had attempted to enter Spain by scaling the fence at Melilla on 13 August 2014 in large numbers, and that they had been summarily returned to Morocco. […] They criticised the Government for not producing the video-recordings made by the infrared security cameras and movement sensors installed at the Melilla fence. In the applicants’ submission, those images would have been clearer than the ones which they had themselves produced (see paragraph 27 above) and which had been taken by third parties (journalists and other eyewitnesses) despite the threats issued by the Guardia Civil officials in an attempt to prevent them from filming.[50]   The videos filmed by migrants are evidence of the violence they have suffered, but together with photos, documents, and personal belongings they are also ‘memory’ and ‘home’; they are memories of the journey, traces of one’s own experience, they are strength and hope. Therefore, their destruction is a strategy of annihilation.   As observed by Tarsis Brito, at borders:   migrants are not only denied possession of space or land, but their personal belongings—including clothes, shoes, mobile phones, identity documents, tents, etc—have also become the very objectives of border operations, which continue usually to be confiscated and destroyed by the authorities. This movement to border areas, however, is not isolated but is part of an important (dis)possessive phenomenon in European migration regimes steeped in legalised forms of state confiscation. […] The state-led stealing of migrants’ belongings, in this sense, continually extracts from the migrant the possibility of ‘holding possession’ of their belongings, marking their bodies as concomitantly ‘unable to possess’, and ‘available for (dis)possession’. The constant fear that their objects will be taken, damaged, or destroyed by the state illustrates the ways in which ‘property rights’ or, quite simply, the ‘right to possess’ ‘are simply disregarded during the state encounters with migrants. As if the possessiveness that modernity promised to its main ‘subject’—the ‘human’—could simply be denied, taken, or extracted from the racialized migrant.[51]   For all of these reasons and more, the destruction of migrants’ personal belongings, including their mobile phones, along with the obligation to undress, can no longer be deemed the lesser evil. Anna Brambilla, Ivana Stojanova, and Amarilda Lici Anna Brambilla is a lawyer specialized in Immigration and Asylum Law. She is a member of ASGI Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration. Since 2016, she has been involved in the MEDEA project related to migrants’ rights on internal EU borders ( https://medea.asgi.it/ ). She has acted as speaker and trainer in conferences, undergraduate, and postgraduate courses, and is a member of the scientific committee of the Advanced Training Centre on Migration Law promoted by ASGI and the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in Pisa. Ivana Stojanova is a lawyer specialized in Immigration Law, Citizenship, and International Protection. She conducts her professional activities in Bologna, Italy. As a member of the Association for Legal Studies on Immigration (ASGI), she has been actively involved in the association’s Medea Project for several years. The Medea Project is a strategic initiative based on field research, strategic litigation, and advocacy, aimed at defending the rights of foreign nationals arriving in Italy through internal borders and the Balkan route. She represents ASGI in various international networks of associations and organizations that focus on protecting people on the move, including the Protecting Rights at Borders (PRAB) initiative. She is also the author of several publications on migration policies. Amarilda Lici is a lawyer of the Naples Bar Association specialized in immigration law, in particular international protection, unaccompanied foreign minors, human trafficking and labor exploitation. She is involved as a legal consultant in various projects. She conducts and participates in various seminars and meetings either as a trainer or as a guest speaker and has co-authored numerous articles on immigration issues. Amarilda is a member of the Association for the Legal Studies on Immigration (ASGI) and she participates in the MEDEA project, a strategic action aimed at protecting the rights of foreign citizens arriving in Italy across internal borders, both land and sea, and the Balkan route. [1]  European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) (2019), ‘Report on the visit to Greece from 10 to 19 April 2018 ’ (2019) 59-62 < https://rm.coe.int/1680930c9a > accessed 6 February 2024 . In their response, the Greek authorities denied having carried out push-backs of individuals from Greece to Turkey and depriving the people rejected of their personal belongings and documents ; See  the Greek Government’s response on page 36 < https://rm.coe.int/1680930c9c > accessed 6 February 2024 . [2] The Protecting Rights at Borders (PRAB) initiative is formed by protection and legal aid organisations focusing on human rights compliance at the EU’s external and internal borders. See Danish Refugee Council, ‘Protecting Rights at Borders’ ( DRC ) < https://pro.drc.ngo/what-we-do/core-sectors/protection/pushback-protecting-rights-at-borders/ > accessed 6 February 2024. [3] See report from the PRAB ‘Beaten, punished and pushed back’ ( DRC , January 2023) < https://pro.drc.ngo/media/cxihgutp/prab-report-january-to-december-2022.pdf > accessed 6 February 2024. [4]   Danish Refugee Council, ‘PRAB: Policy Note I’ ( DRC , December 2021) < https://pro.drc.ngo/media/he1lnzke/destruction-of-property-or-evidence-_-policy.pdf > accessed 6 February 2024. [5] Amnesty International, ‘Greece: Violence, lies, and pushbacks – Refugees and migrants still denied safety and asylum at Europe’s borders’ ( Amnesty International , 23 June 2021) 13 < https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur25/4307/2021/en/ > accessed 6 February 2024. [6] Stavros Malichudis, ‘The Great Robbery: during illegal pushbacks in Greece, refugees are robbed by border guards’ ( Solomon , 9 March 2023) < https://wearesolomon.com/mag/format/investigation/the-great-robbery-during-illegal-pushbacks-in-greece-refugees-are-robbed-by-border-guards/ > accessed 6 February 2024. [7] Michela Pugliese, ‘Out of sight, out of mind: EU detains, tortures migrants in secret facilities along its border’ ( Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor , 23 December 2022) < https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/5483/Out-of-sight,-out-of-mind:-EU-detains,-tortures-migrants-in-secret-facilities-along-its-borders > accessed 6 February 2024. [8] Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration, ‘Respingimenti ai porti adriatici e trattenimento a bordo dei traghetti–l’inchiesta di Lighthouse Reports’ ( ASGI Medea , 3 February 2023) < https://medea.asgi.it/respingimenti-ai-porti-adriatici-e-trattenimento-a-bordo-dei-traghetti-linchiesta-di-lighthouse-reports/ > accessed 6 February 2024. [9] Human Rights Observers, ‘Observations of State Violence at the French–UK Border: Calais and Grande Synthe––Annual Report 2020’ ( HRO , 2020) 20-23 < https://humanrightsobservers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/HRO-Annual-Report-2020.pdf > accessed 6 February 2024. [10] Adam Isacson, ‘Taken Away: U.S. Border Agents’ Widespread Confiscation of Migrants’ Valuable Personal Items’ ( WOLA , 22 August 2022) < https://www.wola.org/2022/08/taken-away-u-s-border-agents-widespread-confiscation-of-migrants-valuable-personal-items/ > accessed 6 February 2024. Far too often, property does not get returned. Some unreturned items have monetary value, like cash, jewellery, and mobile phones. Some have sentimental value, like photos, small heirlooms, and children’s stuffed animals and dolls. Some are important for health and well-being, like prescriptions and medicines. And some are essential for navigating daily life as a US-based asylum seeker, like identity documents, proof of persecution, and vital phone numbers. [11] See the testimony collected by BVMN at the border between Greece and North Macedonia ( BVMN , 10 February 2021) < https://www.borderviolence.eu/violence-reports/february-10-2021-0000-near-gevgelija-north-macedonia/ > accessed 6 February 2024. [12] See ‘Statement of the United Nations Security Council of February 1996 on the situation in Croatia’ < https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/205443?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header >; ‘Resolution adopted in 2003 by the United Nations General Assembly on the properties and revenues of Palestinian refugees, A/RES/57/122’ < https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/481142#record-files-collapse-header > all accessed 6 February 2024. [13] OHCHR, ‘Recommended principles and guidelines on human rights at international borders’ ( OHCHR ) 27 < https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/OHCHR_Recommended_Principles_Guidelines.pdf > accessed 8 February 2024. [14] Matteo Astuti, Caterina Bove, Anna Brambilla, Amarilda Lici, Erminia S Rizzi, Ulrich Stege, and Ivana Stojanova, ‘“Per quanto voi vi crediate assolti siete per sempre coinvolti” I diritti umani fondamentali alla prova delle frontiere interne ed esterne dell’Unione europea’ ( Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza , 2022) < https://www.dirittoimmigrazionecittadinanza.it/archivio-saggi-commenti/saggi/fascicolo-n-1-2022 > accessed 8 February 2024. [15]  Bistrovic v Croatia, [2007]   ECtHR 25774/05; Öneryildiz v Turkey, [2002] ECtHR 48939/99. [16]  Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden  [1984] ECtHR 7151/75; Matos et Silva, Lda, et autres v Portugal [1996] ECtHR 15777/89; Elia srl v Italy [2001] ECtHR 37710/97. [17] Sergio Bartole, Pasquale De Sena, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, Commentario breve alla Cedu (Cedam 2012) 811. [18] Astuti et al (n 14). [19] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) Article 17(1): ‘No one shall be subjected   to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation’; Article 17(2): ‘Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks’. [20] Astuti et al (n 14). [21]  Wainwright v. United Kingdom  [2016] ECtHR 12350/04. [22]   MSS v Belgium  and Greece,  [2011] ECtHR 30696/09 [263]. [23] Astuti et al (n 14). [24]  Wieser v Austria  [2007] ECtHR  2293/03 [39] [25]  El-Masri v The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  [2012] ECtHR  39630/09 [207] [26] ibid [ 208] ; Lyalyakin v Russia  [2015] ECtHR  31305/09 [75]. [27] AE and others v Italy [2023] ECtHR 18911/17. [28] ibid. [29] See English version of the decision at < https://archiv2022.asyl.at/files/514/translation_court_finding_pushback_austria_bosnia_2021.pdf > accessed 8 February 2024. [30] Astuti et al (n 14). [31] Border Violence Monitoring Network, Testimony reported by No Name Kitchen ( BVMN , 12 April 2021) < https://borderviolence.eu/testimonies/april-12-2021-0018-road-e65-near-the-border-with-slovenia/ > accessed 8 February 2024. [32] Border Violence Monitoring Network, Testimony reported by Collective Aid ( BVMN , 17 June 2021) < https://borderviolence.eu/testimonies/june-17-2021-1200-hungarian-serbian-border-25-km-from-subotica/ > accessed 9 February 2024. [33] Border Violence Monitoring Network, ‘Illegal Pushbacks and Border Violence Reports’ ( BVMN , September 2022) < https://borderviolence.eu/app/uploads/MonthlyReportSep2022vA.pdf > accessed 9 February 2024. [34] Border Violence Monitoring Network, Testimony reported by Anonymous ( BVMN , 29 August 2021) < https://borderviolence.eu/testimonies/august-29-2021-0005-croatia-e70-closed-to-banja-luka-in-cafe-9-parking/ > accessed 9 February 2024. [35] Border Violence Monitoring Network, Testimony reported by Blindspots ( BVMN , 30 July 2022) < https://borderviolence.eu/testimonies/july-30-2022-0500-near-velika-kladusa/ > accessed 9 February 2024. [36]   Border Violence Monitoring Network, Testimony reported by No Name Kitchen ( BVMN , 9   April 2023) < https://borderviolence.eu/testimonies/april-9-2023-maljevac-area/ > accessed 9 February 2024. [37]Border Violence Monitoring Network, Testimony reported by No Name Kitchen ( BVMN , 29 September 2021) < https://borderviolence.eu/testimonies/september-29-2021-0630-about-5km-south-of-the-bosnian-town-sturlic-45-022742-15-766085/ > accessed 9 February 2024. [38] Border Violence Monitoring Network, Testimony reported by Aid Brigade Sarajevo ( BVMN , 7 October 2021) < https://borderviolence.eu/testimonies/october-7-2021-0000-green-border-about-3-km-north-of-the-small-bosnian-town-of-glinica/ > accessed 9 February 2024. [39] Border Violence Monitoring Network, Testimony reported by No Name Kitchen ( BVMN , 23 April 2022) < https://borderviolence.eu/testimonies/april-23-2022-2200-close-to-glinica-bosnia-and-herzegovina-2/ > accessed 9 February 2024. [40] Border Violence Monitoring Network, Testimony reported by Anonymous Partner ( BVMN , 27 October 2021) < https://borderviolence.eu/testimonies/october-27-2021-2330-batrovci-serbia/ > accessed 9 February 2024. [41] European Parliament, Council of the European Union, Directive 2011/36/EU (2011) < https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32011L0036 > accessed 9 February 2024. [42] Commission of the European Communities, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the signing, on behalf of the European Community, of Council of Europe Convention No 198 on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime and on the financing of terrorism’ COM/2005/0426 final (2005) < https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52005PC0426 > accessed 9 February 2024. [43] Arwa Damon and Tim Hume, ‘Denmark adopts controversial law to seize asylum seekers’ valuables’( CNN , 26 January 2016) < https://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/26/europe/denmark-vote-jewelry-bill-migrants/index.html > accessed 9 February 2024. [44] Kees Groenendijk and Steve Peers, ‘Can Member States seize asylum-seekers’ assets?’ ( EU Law Analysis , 24 January 2016) < https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/01/can-member-states-seize-asylum-seekers.html > accessed 9 February 2024. [45] Matthias Monroy, ‘Germany and Great Britain: Confiscation of asylum seekers’ mobile phones can be illegal’ ( Site 36 , 28 January 2022) < https://digit.site36.net/2022/01/28/germany-and-great-britain-confiscation-of-asylum-seekers-mobile-phones-can-be-illegal/ > accessed 9 February 2024. [46] Lizzie Dearden, ‘Home Office admits unlawful secret policy to seize all Channel migrants’ phones’ ( The Independent , 27 January 2022) < https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/migrant-phones-channel-home-office-b2002036.html > accessed 9 February 2024. [47] Astuti et al (n 14). [48]  MH and others v Croatia  [2021] ECtHR 15670/18 and 43115/18 [272]. [49]  ND and NT v Spain  [2020] ECtHR 8675/15 and 8697/15 [80]. [50] ibid [81]. [51] Tarsis Brito, ‘(Dis)possessive Borders, (Dis)possessed Bodies: Race and Property at the Postcolonial European Borders’ (2023) 17(2) International Political Sociology 1, 15

Elsa has been serving as a Senior Legal Advisor for TRIAL International’s program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since September 2015. Before joining TRIAL International, she interned with the Emergencies Team at Human Rights Watch, focusing on the armed conflict in the Central African Republic. Commencing her legal career as a criminal law trainee handling legal aid cases in Quebec, Elsa is a qualified lawyer in the region. Possessing an LLM in International Law from the Graduate Institute of International Studies and Development in Geneva (Switzerland), a Master’s degree in Transnational Law, and a Law degree from Quebec (Canada), Elsa is an expert in safeguarding vulnerable populations during armed conflicts. In the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Elsa plays a pivotal role in TRIAL International’s involvement in addressing war-related matters. Her expertise contributes significantly to the organisation’s efforts in protecting vulnerable populations and addressing international crimes.   CJLPA :   Welcome, Ms Elsa Taquet. Thank you very much for taking the time to come and interview with The Cambridge Journal of Law, Politics, and Art  to discuss your work at TRIAL International, a non-governmental organisation that fights international crimes and provides victims access to justice. Different legal avenues enable the international community to prosecute crimes committed by state actors. At TRIAL, the focus is on domestic investigation based on universal jurisdiction. Can you please provide us with more overview and insight into what this means and how it works in practice?   Elsa Taquet : I want to start by saying that in times of conflict, the prioritisation of the prosecution and the investigation of core international crime by the domestic jurisdictions themselves is a way for international justice to be more reactive and efficient. What we are seeing here with the Ukrainian conflict is that the Ukrainian authorities have the primary mandate to investigate and prosecute core international crimes committed on their territories. If they are willing and capable to do so, the focus should be on them primarily.   They need additional expertise and resources to help and assist them. They are the main actors that should be investigating simply because they have access to the crime scenes, are in contact with a large number of victims and witnesses, and have also been able to arrest some suspects, so they are definitely the main jurisdiction to do it.   But it does not happen in a vacuum. What is interesting here is how, in complement to what the Ukrainian authorities can do, other domestic jurisdictions can assist in pushing the accountability agenda forward. For example, by triggering universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction, some countries can take on investigating some of the war crimes or other types of quarantine national crimes that were committed since the full-scale invasion in Ukraine.   In that sense, they are able to assist the Ukrainian authorities and other international mechanisms where they are not necessarily the best equipped to target some types of cases. For example, they can bridge some of the current gaps that we have seen in the Ukrainian criminal system in responsibility, which is something that Ukrainian authorities are not necessarily able to prosecute because they do not have that in their legal framework. But they also have additional resources and expertise in profiling perpetrators who are likely to travel abroad, for example. If we look at the international justice sector right now, when it comes to the Ukrainian conflict, it is crucial to see the key role that domestic jurisdiction can play.   CJLPA : Based on what you just discussed about universal jurisdiction, how does this differentiate from the International Criminal Court’s investigations? And what are the broad advantages of using universal jurisdiction?   ET: The ICC is investigating an essential legal avenue. It is focusing on the top leadership we have seen. From that simple fact, it differs from what the domestic jurisdiction will be able to do. That is the main point that I would like to highlight. As we have seen with the tool, an arrest warrant against Putin was somewhat of a decisive moment for the ICC to show that they could also be reactive and efficient in times of conflict, and it would not take years for them to issue such a warrant, for example.   The ICC investigation is key because they are focusing on the top leadership. They are complementary to what domestic jurisdiction can do. But there are some specific advantages. I’m especially thinking about the profiling of perpetrators. They have access to different resources and types of information that would allow them to create a web of accountability across various countries, where some perpetrators will likely travel across borders one day. Those domestic jurisdictions can help track and trace those perpetrators. This domestic jurisdiction can investigate and prosecute core international crimes, especially in countries with an absolute universal jurisdiction, which means we do not need specific conditions to trigger that legal motion. They have many tools and access to key evidence that the ICC, for example, does not necessarily have. That would be another key element that militates for the use of universal jurisdiction.   CJLPA : Following on the differences you have just touched upon, using universal jurisdiction and the mechanisms of the ICC, how do these different legal avenues complement each other?   ET: The keyword here is complementarity. We have seen that play a key role in other conflicts, offering other models where international justice was sucessful because multiple jurisdictions and mechanisms tackled some of the investigations and later the prosecution together. A good model of positive complementarity between the ICC and the domestic jurisdiction is the conflict in DRC, for example, where it has been very efficient in the past few years; the Congolese authorities were able to investigate and prosecute warlords and military commanders at the national level very successfully and efficiently in complementarity with the ICC.   This is not happening in a vacuum. Something positive with the Ukrainian conflict is that all the different actors that play a role in the international justice landscape have one thing in common: they very quickly and early on in the conflict sent a powerful message that international justice does not need to happen ten years after the fact. It can play a role immediately, when the crimes are still being committed, sending a determined message or playing a deterrent role in preventing more atrocities because we see how the conflict is evolving.   There are still crimes committed against civilians, sadly, but at least it sends a strong message and shows that the perpetrators will be facing justice at some point using all the different legal avenues. In that sense, all those different mechanisms must complement each other.   CJLPA : Now, looking more closely at your work and what your organisation does, you are working with the Ukrainian Prosecutor General Office (OPG) to support the investigation of the various international crimes committed by Russia. Can you explain more about the kind of work that TRIAL does in this respect and how it supports the OPG?   ET: TRIAL International has been able to work, as I mentioned, in other contexts where we have been able to assist national authorities in investigating and prosecuting international crimes and mass atrocities domestically. We come with the expertise to assist national authorities.   When the full-scale invasion started in Ukraine, I was able to meet with the Prosecutor General and the head of the war crime unit. They needed that simple model from other jurisdictions that had been in similar situations. That was one of the first ways we saw we could assist. We have also been collaborating more closely with the OPG to aim to use universal jurisdiction to fill the gaps.   There are multiple gaps within the Ukrainian legal framework, including a very important one, which is that they don’t have a form of command responsibility (as in, for example, Article 28 of the Rome Statute). They do not have such a form of criminal responsibility in the Criminal Code, and so they cannot target mid to high-level perpetrators and commanders, or it gets more difficult for them. That is a very concrete way, an area where we, by bringing and building cases in countries abroad, can trigger universal jurisdiction, help fill the gap, and target and focus on those mid- to high-level perpetrators. That would be one of the concrete examples I can mention.   As I mentioned earlier, there are also ways to provide and trace some of the perpetrators, and the ones that have not yet been arrested in Ukraine are likely to be in Russia, but maybe one day, they will be travelling abroad. That is where other jurisdictions can also help Ukrainian authorities and profile those persons of interest in collaborations with different agencies, such as Europol or other types of agencies that have that level of expertise.   There are other ways that universal jurisdiction can also inform the national strategy. We can think of a way to build cases and focus on a selection of cases, prioritising types of patterns of violations that happen against civilians. We needed this to develop cases and select which ones we would bring for universal jurisdiction prosecution. In that sense, we can inform the national strategy of the OPG as well. Those are different areas where international legal scholars and practitioners can assist the national authorities in Ukraine.   CJLPA : Can you provide a bit more detail about the gaps in the legal frameworks? You briefly mentioned that Ukraine currently does not have this concept that we have in Article 28. Could you speak more about what Article 28 does in terms of establishing accountability and being able to prosecute, and the consequences of Ukraine not having this?   ET:  That is a very important question. When you are dealing with mass atrocities, one of the key things is to be able to move away from an individual case approach, the way that criminal cases are usually built by criminal authorities in the national context outside of conflict. You need to move away from an individual case approach and a direct perpetrators approach, because that does not adapt to the mass atrocities matrix. When you are dealing with mass atrocities, you need to be able to build cases based on patterns of violations, patterns of war crimes that happened in a region, for example, against civilians, and then you are going to build cases around those patterns and then move higher up in the chain of command to identify the most responsible: the commander in charge of those different crimes.   Working with only direct responsibility—what we have in Article 25 of the Rome Statute, with a direct perpetrator and complicity and modes of direct responsibility—is not necessarily the best tool for war mass atrocities. In that sense, Article 28 was specifically created to adjust to international crimes, since targeting that type of perpetrator is key to the prosecution and the investigation of international crimes in a domestic setting. That is one of the main gaps in the Ukrainian legal framework. That is where universal jurisdiction, for example, can facilitate bridging this gap. Other countries have that type of liability or limited liability in their legal framework, whether they have implemented the Rome Statute fully or because they have that type of responsibility in their own criminal code.   The Ukrainian Criminal Code also does not have a form of crime against humanity. Again, this is a type of qualification that was specifically established to adapt to mass atrocities. We have been in touch with other jurisdictions and other war crime units in other countries who do have a form of crimes against humanity and are willing to assist the Ukrainian authorities in investigating those types of qualifications. We will touch upon the type of collaborations amongst countries later on.   Something exciting was set up very early on at the beginning of the conflict, which is the joint investigating team (JIT) among different countries, mostly neighbouring countries with Ukraine, though other countries have joined since then, and the ICC as well, to share investigation or evidence and strategies without duplication of efforts. I think that is another important element here. When we talk about complementarity, amongst all those different legal avenues, what we want to achieve is also to make sure that there is no duplication of efforts and that everybody is working on something different when they are collaborating on together.   CJLPA : Is there also scope for the prosecution to try these cases in Ukraine, or do their frameworks not currently enable them? They would have to rely solely on universal jurisdiction. Would they need to amend their laws to be equipped to address these crimes?   ET: It is quite complex to answer this in a straightforward answer. There are a few things to consider here. The first thing is that other modes of liability can potentially be used. It is not the case that you simply cannot target those types of perpetrators because you do not have that exact replica of Article 28 in your criminal code. There are other ways to get around this with the types of liability that you have in your own criminal code. That is an important point to raise. If they wanted to do that, they could, and there are some cases where they have been able to prosecute either individuals in absentia or some of the prisoners of war that they arrested. Some trials are going on or have been conducted in Ukraine. But we see that it has reached the limit of what they can do, and one of the reasons is the lack of criminal responsibility. It does block the investigation and the type of prosecution they can conduct, but also because they do not necessarily have access to those suspects.   A second element is judicial collaboration, and cooperation will definitely be key in the years to come. That is something that all the jurisdictions are very aware of. They do want to work together. If they push for the investigation of their specific perpetrator, and then later on that person is arrested, who  is going to prosecute that suspect eventually is a political question. We will see these debates in the future—whether it is Ukraine, or whether it is that country where the person has been arrested, or whether it is the ICC, depending on who that person is. There is a lot of difficult discussion around that. But the level of judicial cooperation is something we have seen in the past. We need to hope that this is going to be enough. But that is my hope, that they are going to work together.   But to answer your question, it would be possible. Something key that is also happening at the moment is that there have been a lot of efforts from both Ukrainian and international key stakeholders. Not only since February 2022 but even before, there were lots of efforts from Ukrainian NGOs mainly to push Ukraine to fully ratify and implement the Rome Statute. There have been some laws, and there have been lots of advocacy efforts around that in the past year. There have been lots of discussions at the different levels, within the Ministry of Justice and with the presidency, to discuss how this would take place and what type of implementation they could work towards. We have yet to determine exactly how it is gonna play out in the future. But there are all those things to take into account.   CJLPA : I want to touch upon what you said about states coming together in unprecedented circumstances where everyone’s collaborating. You are also working with other states to see who is equipped and can take on these cases. How does this collaboration work in practice? Could you give some more detail about this, concerning universal jurisdiction and states collaborating and helping with the investigation for the OPG?   ET : Many tools were established, even before the full-scale invasion in Ukraine happened, which are key here. From February 2022, I was in some of those first meetings, where it was exciting to see the ICC, the Ukrainian authorities, and the different jurisdictions talk together and discuss how they could cooperate. That has been very unprecedented. It is a very encouraging sign that there were those kinds of discussions as early as the first few weeks of March 2022.   This is a lesson from the past. I am thinking here of the Syrian conflict, where there have been sadly not as many legal avenues that were open to survivors and victims. It took many years to have an efficient corporation. They definitely wanted to avoid here, taking that long. It has been encouraging to see some specific tools. There is what we call the Genocide Network. That is where all the war crimes units from different countries come together, along with other key stakeholders; agencies like Europol or Interpol, and key international NGOs were part of that network. So we can see how all those countries and jurisdictions share at least their priorities in terms of investigations, some key elements they want to focus on, and they can figure out how to work together.   As I mentioned, this JIT was also set up very early on, which serves as a way to share evidence amongst different jurisdictions who have signed up to join the JIT. That includes the ICC, the Ukrainian authorities, the neighbouring countries, and now other countries like the US or Germany, which have signed a MOU to join this joint investigation mechanism. We are seeing a strong desire to cooperate. But how is that going to play out in the future when somebody is facing different investigations and different mechanisms, so whether it is there is an open investigation in Ukraine or in Germany, who’s going to be responsible for arresting that person if that person is travelling abroad? Who is going to be responsible for prosecuting that person? I think what we need to focus on here and now is how all those investigations can work together. How can we use all those tools and resources to help profile the suspects and persons of interest who are most responsible for the crimes committed in Ukraine now? Then, there is the question of who will be prosecuting whom. In time, we will be able to answer that unclear question.   CJLPA : It is fascinating to hear how all these different stakeholders, states, and NGOs are coming together, each one playing a distinct, unique role in bringing this together. Following on that, I was wondering if you could talk more about the more specific groundwork that your organisation is doing as you build these cases for the war crimes committed in Ukraine. Specifically, for instance, how do you decide which cases you will select?   ET : The DRC is an important parallel here. There are different types of criteria that you need to consider, especially when there is that level of mass atrocities. I am using that as a parallel comparison because although it is a very different type of conflict, there are a lot of parallels that can be drawn. There are a lot of mass atrocities targeting civilians. Whether it is by armed groups in the Eastern DRC, the military commanders of the Russian military in Ukraine, or even military commanders in the DRC, you want to target the top or the mid-level. Commanders are the responsible ones and the top leadership, so they are the same type of perpetrators you wish to target, the same type of atrocities. Even though it is not necessarily the same type of qualification, there are similar criteria that you want to use to select and prioritise some cases.   Pattern-based case building is one of the key tools we have been using with other national jurisdictions, in other cases or conflicts, and in building our cases of universal jurisdiction here for crimes committed in Ukraine. It is how you want to target the matrix of international crimes. That is the way it is easiest for me to explain. You have all those different types of violations committed against civilians. Let’s take, for example, one specific region in Ukraine. One of the ones we are working on is the region of Chernihiv. In the first few months of the conflict, Chernihiv, the region north of Kyiv, was where the Russian troops were advancing towards Kyiv. They occupied the region. So let’s take a region like that. You want to focus on building cases that target the patterns of violations that happen in that region, specifically against civilians. Or at least that is one of the criteria that we used. You want to see what type of patterns of war crimes, for example, were committed and bring cases together. That way, you were able to identify not only the units that were responsible for the individual attacks or individual crimes against civilians, but by putting all those attacks together and looking at, which is who the commander is or who the command structure behind those units, and then hold that command structure accountable for those crimes. In a very simple way, that is the pattern-based, case-building methodology used when discussing mass atrocities. You have different elements to take into account: the access to evidence, the type of evidence that is available, the type of perpetrators, etc.   One more thing: maybe there are two priorities. When discussing accountability, in terms of any type of conflict, but specifically here in Ukraine, you want to focus on providing justice for victims. So, you want to use that as a priority if you can build cases that could help provide justice or open legal avenues for a large number of victims. That is one criterion to take into account. Something else is also access to perpetrators. You want to focus on cases where there is, even if it is a tiny little possibility that one day you’ll be able to prosecute someone, you do want to focus on that.   CJLPA : As you discussed pattern-based case building, how does that work in respect of gathering evidence? As we speak, there are constantly new war crimes being committed, and also the grounds aren’t safe. So how does it work in getting evidence from the prosecution, and also getting access to the victims, because not everyone has left Ukraine and there might be some difficulties in reaching out to them under the circumstances now.   ET: The first thing that we did, something I was lucky to be able to do as early on as in the first few months of the full-scale invasion, was to go to Ukraine and work directly with amazing actors that have been documenting or crimes and atrocities committed against civilians, since the annexation of Crimea and the occupation in the Donbas, so since 2014-15, by Russian troops and the military.   Something very important to acknowledge immediately is that international actors are coming in but do not know the field, do not know the context, and do not speak the language. They can have a lot of international law expertise, but they are not the best equipped to document and investigate those crimes. You need to work with local actors, the national authorities or the locals, both at the national level and also at the regional level. One of the first things was to come and work with the regional war crime units, whether the police or the prosecutor’s office. You want to work with those units. You want to work with key amazing Ukrainian NGOs or actors who have been documenting war crimes in the country and have some experience documenting them. So they are the first ones to have access to the crime scenes, the victims, and the survivors. I think the documentation effort is done the best by local actors. If you can work with them, and you can work with that material, you can then start building your case and pattern-based methodology for a strong international or strategic litigation, whether it is in Ukraine or using universal jurisdiction or even if it is for an international mechanism like the ICC.   The main challenge was to actually identify who to work with, and how to work with local actors. It has been amazing to work with them. They are working in tough conditions, whether it is security or access to the victims. I have been to Ukraine a few times, accompanying our local actors, working and documenting in the Chernihiv region and working with them on Investigation missions. It is, well, it is like you see on the news, you have to wear bulletproof jackets, you have to be careful with mines, you have to be there taking risks, to be able to document those crimes.   That is also something that has never been seen before, where you have national authorities and local actors who were able to immediately, after the fact, document, investigate, and collect all the evidence. One of the challenges it raised very early on was collecting, storing, and keeping all of that evidence. If we think of the Syrian conflict, there is this mechanism that was set up to bring all of the evidence together and ensure that it is safely stored somewhere to facilitate later prosecutions in the future. That is something that has been done very early on in the conflict in Ukraine as well. Learning from the experience of Syria.   CJLPA : I wanted to ask you about Syria. There were of course crimes committed by Russia in Syria as well. Now, in light of what’s happening with Russia and Ukraine, do you think this also opens the door to getting justice for Syrians? Or has too much time passed to reopen these investigations and use universal jurisdiction to establish accountability?   ET : I am glad you are bringing this up as a question because this is one of the main points. There is one thing to highlight here, which is the fact that it is not the first time we are seeing the Russian command structure committing those types of crimes against civilians, and Syria is the best example of it. Sadly, we are seeing a double standard for international justice. It is sad to acknowledge it, but it is true. There have been a lot of resources and lots of legal avenues currently brought together to help the Ukrainians investigate and prosecute the crimes committed in Ukraine. But we have not seen that for other types of conflict, including the Syrian conflict. That is something that we have at heart. We have been, or at least in our strategic litigation, or at least the way we have developed the project on Ukraine at trial, is to ensure that the cases we are bringing forward are focusing on suspects that not only have been identified as responsible for crimes committed against civilians in Ukraine in the past year, but those are the same suspects that we have also seen and we have clear evidence about their involvement in similar types of patterns of crimes against civilians in Syria. If we can help to bring more legal avenues, not only for Ukrainian survivors but also for Syrian victims and Syrian survivors at the same time, because here we are talking about similar suspects that are involved in both, I think that would be something extremely important that international justice can do. Obviously, there are other actors involved in crimes committed in Syria. I am not simplifying it here. But we have been focusing on suspects committing exactly the same type of attacks using the same modus operandi in Syria and in Ukraine, and to me that is key.   CJLPA : How does that work in practice? When can the prosecution commence in this respect? Would they be tried for crimes that they have committed in Ukraine and in Syria simultaneously? Would both victims from Syria and Russia be involved in this whole process? Or would it be more individual?   ET : I do not think we have the answer just yet. I think it is quite an innovative way of profiling suspects and focusing on the investigation. That is another area where universal jurisdiction can be a good tool, because there are countries that have been, for the past few years, building investigations, opening what we call structural investigation, so focusing on patterns of crimes committed to a different in a specific context. In Syria, and thinking here of Germany or France, we have seen all those different investigations and even the first conviction against Syrian suspects and perpetrators. We have that level of expertise, investigation, and evidence collected by jurisdiction for the past few years.   We are bringing cases against people who have been identified in some of those investigations in Syria and are now identified in Ukraine. Therefore, you want those countries to work together. That is another element with focusing on how to use universal jurisdiction to target and just simply channel that type of expertise that some countries have developed, to also think constantly about the type of profiles we can build against some suspects in the context of crimes committed in Ukraine. But how are all those investigations going to work together? I think that is something to be answered by the national authorities. That is where we, as an international NGO, are. That is where the limit is; we need to know exactly how their judicial cooperation works. That is behind closed doors. We have seen a willingness to work together and bring those different elements together that can help push forward the struggle for accountability.   CJLPA : At what stage do you think you will be in a position to begin prosecuting the Russian perpetrators? Is it something that must be done after the war where enough evidence is built? Or would it also be in a position that even as the war continues, if it so happens that they have left Ukraine and entered another country, that is when it can begin?   ET : I strongly believe that it should happen as soon as possible. Again, in the DRC I have seen it firsthand. I was in eastern DRC in Goma, working on some cases against warlords, and I have seen how it has helped send a powerful message to other warlords, the fact that we could arrest them, investigate them, and then convict them, as the crimes were being committed, and not that late after the fact. That sends a very strong message on the battlefield and to other perpetrators. It does help prevent more atrocities from being committed. I think this is the key element here. If we can, I do not want to be naïve, and it will be difficult to have some arrests and convictions. But it should definitely happen if we can go in that direction. I do not believe building the perfect case for those crimes must take ten to 20 years.   We have seen in other contexts how it has been efficiently done and successfully, with all the international standards. Of course, you are working in a conflict zone, so there are minimum standards that you can ensure, and then there are top-level standards that you are not necessarily going to be able to ensure, and I think you need to find a balance between the two. But I have seen it work. I have seen the deterrent effect when international justice is done quickly after the fact and in a conflict zone. I am definitely pro trying to work as soon as possible. If some perpetrators or suspects will be travelling abroad, this will be one of the main challenges for all those legal avenues we have identified and discussed. Hopefully, we can play a role in that. But by that I am not necessarily saying that we should go ahead and open lots of different trials in absentia. I think that is different. It is a different discussion. We do not necessarily believe that trial in absentia can send a deterrence, a strong message to the suspect, so I would just add a caveat here.   CJLPA :   To follow up on your last point, how would trial in absentia work in practice? Where is this conducted currently?   ET: We see a lot of trials in Ukraine that are conducted in absentia. Some are conducted with suspects being present and being arrested as prisoners of war some of the time. Usually, from what we have seen, it is direct or low-level perpetrators who are being prosecuted for individual cases. So again, I would not necessarily believe that this is the priority right now we should focus on or that the Ukrainian authorities should focus on. They are trying to set up a strategy for prioritisation of cases, moving away from individual cases and direct perpetrators towards more of a pattern-based approach to case building. But yeah, there’ve been a few trials conducted in absentia, and I'm not sure they’re necessarily sending the right message right now.   CJLPA : There is a great symbolic impact here. Has the international community’s commitment to international criminal law strengthened due to what’s currently taking place?   ET : Definitely, it would have been a huge failure for all of us working in that sector, the international community, as you call it, if we had not been able to cooperate and set up that type of international cooperation so quickly, in reaction to what was happening. I strongly believe, and that is my own opinion, that we failed a bit with Syria. It took a long time and is still not really there yet. This was a test for international justice to show that they could have a role to play when such conflict happens and could send a strong message. Otherwise, I strongly believe it would have been a huge failure.   That was quite a test for the ICC to show that they had a role to play now with the rise of domestic jurisdiction, and how efficient domestic jurisdiction can be because they are closer to the fact, they can get closer to the victims. They know the context, are more efficient, and it is usually way cheaper than setting up an international tribunal or having very expert but very expensive investigators and prosecutors working on a case for years and not necessarily having access to territories. For international mechanisms, it was also a clear test of their role, when domestic jurisdiction so quickly decided that they were willing to open an investigation. The Ukrainian authorities impressed everybody by saying ‘we are willing, we are capable of investigating, even though we are in the midst of an international armed conflict’. Also, other domestic jurisdictions would very quickly say we are opening investigations on those crimes. So, it was a clear test for the ICC, for example, to prove that they still had a role to play. Everybody showed they were reactive, which was very important for international justice to play a role. There is still a lot more to do. But it was definitely a big test.   CJLPA : Following up on this response, do you see this transforming how we approach international crimes moving forward and if so, how?   ET :   One of the main things it shows is the role that domestic jurisdiction can play, whether it is by the Ukrainian authorities or pushing towards positive complementarity between all those different mechanisms, the national and the international ones. I think that is the main consequence that we are seeing. The other one is that judicial cooperation amongst all those actors is possible. It should impact and influence how we fight against impunity for other conflicts or other crimes that are happening in other conflicts. Hopefully, it will help be more efficient in investigating and prosecuting crimes committed in Ukraine and other contexts. Something else that was extremely key at the beginning was how we could safeguard the best interest of the victims, when you have such a crowded space with loads of actors wanting to all do something good. It all comes from good intentions of wanting to work together, open investigations everywhere, and ensuring the resources and the expertise are there.   There is also a high risk of over-duplication of efforts and re-traumatisation of victims because they end up being interviewed by different actors. You want to ensure that everything works together and everybody talks to each other. We also learned that from experience. There were lessons learned from Myanmar and from other cases like in Syria, where actors willingly were saying, we need to work together, and we need to cooperate. Otherwise, we are going to duplicate efforts, we are not going to be efficient, and we risk re-traumatising victims. That is something you want to avoid. It is something that we are seeing still needs some work. It is still a challenge. But it was good to see how all those avenues for cooperation were implemented to ensure that.   CJLPA : How can we make our current national and international frameworks more equipped to address these international crimes? Where do the main issues lie in this respect?   ET :   From my own experience, I am a practitioner and have been in the field, and I differ sometimes from the view of other actors or experts in the international justice field, simply because I have also dealt with the more concrete challenges of what it means to be on the field and having to help national authorities in doing the work. I have seen how it made it so much easier, for example, for countries who have ratified and implemented the Rome Statute simply because the legal framework is adapted to mass atrocities, to core international crimes. Therefore, you have not only the qualifications and the modes of liability, but you also have all of the procedures in place to help you better protect victims, survivors, and witnesses. Some of the very concrete challenges that you have when you are investigating those types of crimes versus when you are a national system investigating national criminal cases is that you need some of those tools that are specifically designed for mass atrocities. I definitely would push for that.   I think we have seen models of positive complementarity where the implementation of the Rome Statute was definitely your key element. The implementation of a national strategy for the prioritisation of cases is absolutely key. That is something where, from day one, you want to have criteria to select your cases. You want to move away from an individual case approach towards building patterns or cases based on patterns, whether war crimes or crimes against humanity. But you want to have that methodology in place because it helps address the type of mass atrocities you are facing and helps to be more efficient, but it helps also target not the direct perpetrators and the low-level perpetrators like the soldier who pulls the trigger, but the mid to high-level suspects that are the most responsible for those crimes. The only way to do that is to focus on the patterns of crimes that were committed. That is the other very concrete tool that is key for any type of jurisdiction to target and tackle those kinds of atrocities committed.   Ukrainians and the OPG have opened more than 90,000 cases at the minute, only after a year of conflict or a year and a half. They need help tackling that. They have shown the world that they can and will be capable of investigating and prosecuting. But the more we are to help, the better it is. Because of this Russian command structure, we have seen it is not the first time that they have committed those types of atrocities. They have done that in Syria, they have done that in Chechnya, and it is time now for them to be held accountable for those crimes.   CJLPA : Given all your work and observations over the last year and a half, what would you say has surprised you the most regarding the international community’s response to the war?   ET :   What has surprised me the most, to be honest, is seeing how the Ukrainian authorities and the Ukrainian actors on the ground have been able to conduct their work and achieve so many results. I have been to Ukraine myself a few times in the past year, and I have seen how it is on a day-to-day basis. You have air raid sirens, totally cutting off your day of work, you have to go to the bomb shelter, you barely can sleep, and when you have to go and investigate crime scenes, you have to be careful of mines you have to be cautious of airstrikes. We are talking about battlefields here, it is constantly changing, the investigators are risking their lives. New types of crimes are coming every day, and new cases.   They have been able to develop so much, to develop a national strategy, to establish war crime units in all the different regions. They have a strong national war crime unit as well. I have seen a lot of amazing things that they have been able to achieve, not alone with the help of the international community but also with the help of groups like the Ukraine Advisory Group (ACA). It is extremely impressive.   I strongly believed from the beginning that they could do it. I was amongst the first ones because, for the past few years, I have been in the DRC, seeing how a country like DRC, with the proper expertise, the proper help and resources, has been able to do itself and establish that type of strong strategy for the prosecution of national crimes. So I knew that Ukraine could do it, but they have proven themselves extremely capable.   CJLPA : I also want to ask you more about your opinion on justice concerning international crimes. Undoubtedly, as you touched upon earlier, this will be incredibly difficult in respect to arresting the Russian perpetrators, finding them, and profiling them, especially the main state actors and Putin. From your point of view, how is justice served? What is the purpose of trying these crimes in the aftermath of a war, when all the crimes have already been committed, the lives have been lost, and most victims already have received some sort of financial redress from political means?   ET : Justice for the victims can take different forms. That is what we need to focus on right now. It will take time to arrest some of the key perpetrators. But providing a form of justice, whatever that means for survivors and for victims, right now is crucial. Again, I am not being naïve. Having an investigation open does not bring much to victims. But there are lots of other things that are being put in place alongside criminal investigations, that target, for example, how to bring reparations for victims, including the EU registry for damages that has been set up. While not a new concept, it is something amazing that has been developed for victims to bring claims and compensation claims. There are all these discussions around the freezing assets and how they can also be used to compensate victims and Ukraine as a country. I think the answer is to get it to the victims and how it can help. It will never help erase what they have been through, but it can help reduce the suffering and the feeling that they are being heard, their voices are being heard. I think that is something that we have seen, which has been frustrating and lacking for many survivors of the Syrian conflict. For example, in other types of conflicts where legal avenues were not available, the fact that legal avenues are available ensures that we can bring those vulnerable survivors and the victims to not just the public sphere but also to some concrete steps towards accountability. That would be my main answer.   Then, it is going to take time in terms of targeting and arresting perpetrators, especially if we want to focus on the ones who are the most responsible for the crime. Not the low levels, but the ones behind those ones. It is going to take time. Again, I use this metaphor of the web of accountability. But to me, having that image in mind is extremely useful. You want to have all those legal avenues. You want to have all those investigations because it can only help create that spiderweb across different jurisdictions and across different countries and different mechanisms, to at least make sure that whenever some suspects are travelling abroad, they are being immediately arrested or at least there are some hits that we know about, so we can put in place all the different mechanisms to assist with their arrest in place. That would be the second portion of the answer: how to help create that web of accountability. That is by working with all the legal avenues now available.   CJLPA : I would like to thank you for taking the time to interview with us. Hearing about the significant work you do at TRIAL International provides that sense of hope for our readers and the wider community that, in the near future, we can and will achieve justice for the victims in Ukraine. This interview was conducted by Nadia Jahnecke, Legal Editor and Founder of Human Rights Volume of CJLPA 3. In addition to her role at CJLPA, Nadia is a qualified lawyer in England & Wales specialising in public international law.

Tschabalala Self (b. 1990 Harlem, USA) lives and works in Hudson Valley, New York. Tschabalala is an artist and builds a singular style from the syncretic use of both painting and printmaking to explore ideas about the black body. She constructs depictions of predominantly female bodies using a combination of sewn, printed, and painted materials, traversing different artistic and craft traditions. The formal and conceptual aspects of Self's work seek to expand her critical inquiry into selfhood and human flourishing. Recent solo and group exhibitions include: Espoo Museum of Modern Art, Espoo (2024); Highline, New York (2024) Brooklyn Museum, New York (2024); FLAG Foundation, New York (2024); Barbican, London (2024); CC Strombeek, Grimbergen, Belgium (2023); Desert X, Coachella Valley (2023); Kunstmuseum St Gallen (2023); Le Consortium, Dijon (2022); Performa 2021 Biennial, New York (2021); Haus der Kunst, Munich (2021); Kunsthalle Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf (2021); Baltimore Museum of Art, Baltimore (2021); ICA, Boston (2020); Studio Museum Artists in Residence, MoMA PS1, New York (2019); Hammer Museum, Los Angeles (2019); Frye Art Museum, Seattle (2019), amongst many others. Gabriella Kardos : The Fourth Plinth commissions make us look at the world in different ways, addressing issues of importance for British society. They point a mirror to our contemporary world, they embody ideas which need to be expressed in concrete form to remind us of important issues we are facing today. How do you view Lady in Blue within this context?   Tschabalala Self :   Lady in Blue is a sculpture that pays homage to a young, metropolitan woman of colour—a quotidian figure, like many one might encounter in contemporary London. Lady in Blue is not a figure from the historical or political past, but rather a symbol of our shared present and future ambitions. She reflects equity through representation, acknowledgement, and action, where all global citizens are exalted and appreciated for their unique contributions, and a future where the ordinary individual is recognised for their extraordinary capabilities. She expresses resilience and grace through the complications of our ever-evolving modern world.   Inspired by a desire to bring a contemporary woman to Trafalgar Square, Lady in Blue adds a new perspective to the public space. Unlike Henry Havelock, Charles James Napier, or George Washington, this anonymous woman is not a real person but an icon; she represents many individuals rather than the adulation of one. This symbolism allows all who interact with the sculpture to imbue her with their own personal relationship and take meaning from her placement.   This figure would be the first sculpture of mine to depict a walking figure. Movement and walking are associated with agency in my work. The fact that my figures are often ‘on the move’ speaks to their ability to assert their own will and exist within their own reality, rather than existing solely for the edification of the viewer. Similarly, I feel there is great political power in showing a woman walking in the public sphere as opposed to being posed or static: the gesture illuminates the forward moment of all women collectively. GK: Monuments have been pulled down in the recent past. Is this sculpture a way of addressing the historical imbalance of power?   TS : Public art exists to challenge preconceived notions, allowing all individuals, even those who did not seek an artistic experience, to encounter it. These encounters can be intense, conjuring a range of emotions, from joy to rage. As an artist working within the public realm, I have seen the full gamut of reactions. I do not value one over the other as all elevate the discourse around any given project. In 2023, Seated (2022) was targeted and attacked by vandals in Bexhill-on-Sea, an incident that was particularly disheartening as it epitomised the violence Black and female bodies are subjected to. The violence enacted on the sculpture illuminates the persistent issues plaguing contemporary society and exemplifies the need for more diversity and representation in public art. Exalted images of people of colour and women should not provoke rage and should not automatically be deemed political. Iconography depicting blackness should be treated with the same respect and neutrality given to artistic media depicting all other groups. After the attack, rather than hide the sculpture from view, I wanted the local community to feel empowered though action. I organised with the museum a restoration event through which the community could remove the paint from the sculpture. Three hundred people queued to help to clean the sculpture and through community support she was restored to her former likeness.   GK: Can you talk about the scale of the work and the choice of materials: bronze and a dress painted in dazzling Lapis Lazuli?   TS : Made of bronze, Lady in Blue will reference existing sculptures in the square but will be patinated, adding colour to signify a change. The blue is Lapis Lazuli, a rare and refined pigment used since antiquity, in North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe primarily, a colour that has gained historical significance over time. Lapis Lazuli was used by Renaissance artists such as Bellini and Raphael and was often reserved for the clothes of the central character of their paintings, particularly the Virgin Mary. The blue remained significant for centuries in Western painting. I am interested, for example, in the link with Vermeer’s Girl with a Pearl Earring— as with Lady in Blue , the painting is a character study rather than a portrait of a particular person, a gesture that opens questions and conversations, rather than a fixed meaning. In both works, the protagonists are draped in ethereal Lapis Lazuli. GK: How does this work fit within your art practice in general?   TS :   The starting point for this figure was a series of drawings I made in 2020 in preparation for my first public art project, commissioned by Performa 2021, which took the form of an experimental play. In 2020, I was deep in character development, devoting a lot of attention to the two main archetypes who would become the play’s main protagonists. My commission, Sounding Board , bore a series of fictional characters, amalgamations of several people who have appeared since in various iterations throughout my work. These drawings were strange, making great use of symbology, often conflating the figures with set props and various objects that one might find within the home. The domestic space and its trappings became embedded in my figures. My series At Home , which later inspired my first public sculpture commission Seated (2022), was developed during this time. My first two public art projects are tethered to a mediation on the home, which may seem ironic; but the home is a microcosm of the society at large and should never be considered distinct from the public realm. This interview was conducted by Gabriella Kardos, an artist and art historian. In 1976 she escaped communism with her family, fleeing Ceaușescu’s regime in Romania and emigrating to Montreal, Canada in search of freedom. Here she studied Fine Arts at Dawson College and Art History at Concordia University. She went on to teach Art Theory in the Painting and Drawing Department of Concordia University and Painting in the MA course of Vermont College of Norwich University, USA. She holds an MA from Central St Martins, London and has exhibited at the Czech Museum of Fine Arts, Prague, Anglia Polytechnic University in Ipswich, UK, ROSL, Victoria & Albert Museum, and WCPF in London. She lives in London where she is pursuing her art practice in painting and printmaking.